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This thesis is a collection of four related but self-standing chapters about memory 
and testimony. In Chapter 1, I argue that memory and testimony are analogous 
because both are reconstructive, incorporating information from sources in 
relevantly similar ways. In Chapter 2, I begin with the standard taxonomy of 
memory, according to which memory-how (procedural memory) is distinct from 
memory-that (episodic or semantic memory). From there, I develop an account of 
testimony-how by arguing that testimony need not be propositional. In Chapter 3, I 
turn to the curious case of the Mandela Effect and argue that it is an instance of 
collective confabulation, in which large groups of people develop highly similar 
apparent memories of events that never occurred.  For at least some of these cases, I 
claim, testimony is an integral ingredient in the production of collective 
confabulations. In Chapter 4, I proceed from the analogy between testimony and 
memory and argue that testimonial injustice has a memorial analogue, which I call 
memorial injustice. I consider internalised false confessions to be an example of 
memorial injustice, and I identify failures of metacognition as being a key 
component the precipitation thereof. Ultimately, the work in this thesis leads me to 
the conclusion that while social epistemologists have focussed on the social factors 
influencing the epistemology of testimony, the ways that social phenomena 
influence memory and remembering are too great to ignore. I do not offer a positive 
account of how social epistemology ought to treat memory, but I hope that thinking 
about the relationship and similarities between memory and testimony offers a new 
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 Some of my earliest memories come from a trip my family took to my father’s 
hometown of St. John’s, a comparatively small city on the east coast of Canada. 
Having grown up in a landlocked province, my sister and I had never seen the ocean 
before, and our parents took us on a whale-watching trip on a boat called the 
Scadamia. 
 Children at young ages seem to delight in being upside-down, and I was no 
exception. Aboard the Scadamia, I sat on a bench and bent over until I was upside-
down, looking between my legs through the railing out at the water. While dangling 
off the bench, I noticed an earring on the deck of the boat, and recognised it as my 
mother’s. I sat upright, looked at her ears, and saw that an earring was missing. I 
retrieved the fallen earring and gave it back to her, feeling proud of myself for 
having saved the day and glad that she was happy to have the earring back. (She 
hadn’t, in fact, noticed that it was gone.) 
 The memory is completely innocuous in almost every regard, but it stands out 
in my mind for this reason: when recounting it to a family friend many years later, 
my sister interrupted me and said, “You didn’t find Mom’s earring – I did! I 
remember hanging upside-down and seeing the earring on the ground.” My (our?) 
memory of rescuing the earring aboard the Scadamia is what is known in the memory 
literature as a disputed memory, in which two people (often, but not always, twins) 
claim ownership of the same memory (A. S. Brown et al. 2015; Ikier et al. 2003; 
Küntay, Gülgöz, and Tekcan 2004). Both my sister and I genuinely believe ourselves 
to be the protagonist of the story. When we consulted our mother to settle the 
dispute, she was unable to remember what had happened, and so the truth has been 
lost to the past. 
It is likely that my sister, my mother, and I will never know who really 
rescued Mom’s earring aboard the Scadamia. I can, of course, insist that the memory 
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is mine, but then again, my sister can do exactly the same, and with no testimony 
from my mother to break the tie, we are at an epistemic impasse. Our knowledge of 
who rescued the earring is limited by what we remember and how we tell each other 
about it. In the end, it probably does not matter who really rescued the earring, but 
plenty of epistemic impasses do have great consequences for those caught within. 
Thinking about the relationship between memory and testimony, and the epistemic 
positions they allow us to take, is both the purpose and theme of this thesis. 
 I begin this project with a claim that I hope will not be too controversial: that 
memory and testimony alike are indispensable to our successful functioning as 
agents. Philosophers have frequently remarked on the similarities between memory 
and testimony. Dummett (1994), for instance, has remarked that memory may be 
thought of as the testimony of the past self. Sosa (1991, 218) has said that “memory is 
a psychological mechanism that conveys beliefs across stages of [one individual’s] 
life,” and testimony is “a social mechanism that conveys beliefs across lives at a 
time.” Testimony and memory are also similar in that they are both vital to our 
successful epistemic functioning. If we were to remove all those beliefs formed 
purely on the word of others, or all those beliefs for which our only evidence lies in 
memory, we would be left with precious little epistemic ground on which to stand. 
The aim of this project is to explore the similarities, relationships, and interactions 
between memory and testimony with respect to their epistemic function. This thesis 
is a collection of four somewhat self-standing chapters that approach this question 
from different perspectives. 
Chapter 1 proceeds from the observation that the tendency in the 
epistemologies of memory and testimony has been to assume that the two are 
analogous. Crucially, support for this analogy comes from the supposition that both 
memory and testimony play primarily transmissive roles: memory, the claim goes, 
transmits content within a subject from an earlier time to a later time, while 
testimony transmits content from one subject to another. Given the lack of empirical 
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support for the conceptions of memory and testimony that ground the transmissive 
analogy, however, the pervasiveness of the analogy is curious at best and 
indefensible at worst. But the problem is not only that there is no empirical support 
for claims that memory and testimony are transmissive; the problem is that 
empirical evidence points in another direction altogether by showing that memory 
and testimony are matters of construction and reconstruction. I have two aims in this 
chapter. First, I attack the transmissive analogy and show that it is threatened by 
evidence about memory and communication. Second, I show that the analogy turns 
out to be correct, as long as we accommodate—even capitalise on—the 
(re)constructive features of memory and testimony. I sketch the general features of 
this constructive analogy and finish by considering a few worries about its limits. I 
return to the features of the analogy in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 Before proceeding to the implications of the analogy for our thinking about 
memory and testimony, the next two chapters tackle issues that put tension on the 
analogy, but lie specifically with testimony (Chapter 2) and memory (Chapter 3), 
respectively. Thinking about the analogy between memory and testimony invites 
many questions about how far the analogy goes, In Chapter 2, I begin with the 
standard taxonomy of memory (Squire 2004), which divides memory into two kinds: 
declarative memory, including memory for facts and events, and non-declarative 
memory, including procedural memory, or memory for how to do things. One point 
at which the analogy between memory and testimony might appear to break is at the 
highest level of the memory taxonomy. Procedural memory, in particular, appears to 
pose a problem for the analogy, since it is unclear how testimony might convey how 
one does something. 
This is especially problematic given that received wisdom has it that the 
currency of testimony is propositions. Though the literature is saturated with 
disagreement over the manifestation of the proposition (e.g., belief vs. statement vs. 
knowledge vs. something else altogether) and the process it undergoes during 
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testifying (e.g., replication vs. transmission vs. generation), the propositionality 
of testimony is virtually universally accepted. This is often taken to preclude certain 
types of utterances—namely, interrogatives and imperatives—from qualifying 
as testimony, since they seem to lack truth conditionality, a defining feature of 
propositions. As a result, normally only sentences in the declarative mood qualify 
as testimony. In Chapter 2, I focus on imperatives. Specifically, I am interested 
in instructions, which are epistemologically interesting if understood as attempts to 
instil beliefs in an instructee. Under normal declarative circumstances, it would be 
entirely natural to think of instilling a belief in another (or attempting to do so) as an 
instance of testimony; what complicates matters in the case of instructions is that 
they are seemingly non-propositional. The aforementioned propositionality 
condition in testimony precludes instructions from qualifying as testimony, and yet, 
instructions still seem to fill much the same functional niche that paradigmatic 
testimony does. If, in any other case, we would not hesitate to apply the label 
“testimony” to the transfer of knowledge from one person to another, it is puzzling 
that we should be disinclined to do so in the case of instructions.  
Chapter 2, then, proceeds from a puzzle in reconciling three inconsistent 
claims arising from the above considerations: first, that some instructions are 
delivered in the imperative mood (i.e. in a non-propositional way), second, that 
instructions are a means to testify as to how to do something, and third, that 
testimony is propositional. I ultimately argue that the way to resolve the inconsistent 
triad is to reject the claim that testimony is always propositional, and conclude that 
while typical testimonial utterances can be characterised as testimony-that, 
instructions amount to testimony-how. As a result, we ought to develop 
epistemologies of testimony that can account for propositional and non-
propositional forms of testimony alike. Finally, I argue that doing so strengthens the 
analogy between memory and testimony that I defended in Chapter 1, as it shows 
that the analogy applies not only to memory-that and propositional testimony 
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(testimony-that), but that some version of the analogy will apply to non-declarative 
memory (or memory-how) and testimony-how. 
In Chapter 3, which draws on work co-authored with Kourken Michaelian, I 
enter the woolly world of memory in a communicative (and testimony-filled) space: 
the Internet. In recent years, popular fora, particularly Reddit, have seen lively 
discussion of the “Mandela Effect”. The Mandela Effect—so called in reference to the 
paradigm case of a widely shared memory of Nelson Mandela dying in prison in the 
1980s—occurs when individuals who have never met each other in person develop 
highly similar memories of events that never occurred. Popular explanations of this 
phenomenon (e.g., that the apparently false memories in question are in fact accurate 
memories of events that occurred in parallel universes) are fanciful, and the scientific 
literature so far contains no discussion of the effect or the mechanisms giving rise to 
it.  The purposes of this chapter are, first, to make a case for the existence of the 
Mandela Effect as a novel memory error worthy of scientific attention and, second, 
to sketch a general account of a mechanism that might give rise to it. My hypothesis 
is that the Mandela Effect is an instance of collective confabulation. I argue that, 
given either the causal account of mnemic confabulation defended by Robins (2016a; 
2017) and Bernecker (2017) or the reliability account defended by Michaelian (2016b), 
the effect amounts to confabulation on the collective level. It does not, however, 
reduce to individual confabulation. Instead, the effect occurs when ordinary 
misremembering goes online. The interaction among misrememberers results not in 
correction by peers, as it typically would offline, but in reinforcement of the 
mismemory by confirmatory testimony and corroboration by others. The Mandela 
Effect thus amounts to a novel, genuinely collective form of confabulation. 
In Chapter 4, I return to the core concern of the interaction between memory 
and testimony. I introduce Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice 
and I argue that, based on my claims in Chapter 1, if memory and testimony are 
analogous, and there is a form of epistemic injustice specific to testimony, then there 
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is an analogous form of epistemic injustice for memory. I take internalised false 
confessions—in which an innocent suspect confesses to a crime he did not commit 
because hostile, guilt-presumptive, and manipulative interrogation results in the 
suspect coming to believe that he is guilty—to exemplify this phenomenon. From 
there, I develop an account of memorial injustice by appealing to the role of source 
monitoring in memory and likening it to mindreading in testimony. I conclude that 
memorial injustice comes about owing to failures of source monitoring and self-
assigned credibility deficits. 
Chapters 3 and 4 especially emphasise the interaction of testimony with 
memory: they show that testimony from outside can influence, modify, and even 
produce memories within a subject. If this is right, then this has significant 
implications for epistemology. Epistemologists have traditionally understood 
memory to be uniquely internal and individual in a way that even perception and 
reason are not, and this assumption has infused much of the inquiry into the nature 
of memory and memory justification. What I claim in this thesis directly challenges 
this assumption. Testimony leaves its fingerprints all over the memorial looking-
glass, and to disregard this fact is to deny the myriad ways in which our memories 
are not entirely internal or individual after all. Let us now venture into the worlds of 
memory, and testimony, and the smudged looking-glass between them. 
  




ARE MEMORY AND TESTIMONY ANALOGOUS? 
1.1. Introduction  
In epistemology, there is a longstanding assumption, made explicit in Dummett’s 
(1994, 252) claim that “memory may be said to be the testimony of one’s past self,” 
that memory and testimony are analogous. Though much work in epistemology of 
memory and testimony has depended on the apparent similarity between the two—
namely, that memory and testimony appear to preserve or transmit content (Lackey 
2006c)—recent memory research has repeatedly shown that memory is a capacity 
that generates rather than preserves content (see Michaelian (2011c) for a systematic 
review). If the analogy between memory and testimony hinges on the false claim 
that memory preserves content, then defenders of the analogy have been barking up 
the wrong tree all along. Even though the analogy has been fruitful in developing 
increasingly sophisticated accounts of memory and testimony, we simply cannot 
endorse it if it is false. At best, what we have come to believe about memory and 
testimony on the basis of this analogy is true, but only luckily so. At worst, what we 
have come to believe is false, and needs radical reconsideration. 
 It is easy to jump to the conclusion that the analogy is beyond redemption, 
since it rests upon qualities that have turned out not to be so similar after all. But 
while it is true that the transmissive analogy is mistaken, it turns out that we are not 
wrong to claim that there is an analogy. Testimony, as we shall see, is similarly 
constructive in the way that memory is, and so the claim that there is an analogy is 
correct after all; it will, however, require some rethinking. My arguments in this 
chapter are first, that testimony is constructive, and second, that memory and 
testimony really are analogous in virtue of their constructive features. Crucially, I 
claim, in both remembering and testifying, it is not merely the past self or the 
testifier who supplies information that is integrated into the final message. Neither 
does the present self or the recipient get off scot-free: both must play their respective 
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roles in reconstruction and interpretation. Rather, memory and testimony are both 
constructive processes that integrate information from a variety of sources to 
produce coherent messages, which the receiver must decode. 
1.2. The transmissive analogy 
Testimony and memory are both critical for our successful functioning as social and 
epistemic agents, but they also exhibit epistemological qualities that motivate 
thinkers such as Dummett (1994, 264) to defend the “almost exact analogy between 
memory and testimony.” On his view, the analogy between memory and testimony 
is such that since we are justified in accepting beliefs from memory, then we are 
similarly justified with respect to testimony.  
Two linked similarities between memory and testimony point to this analogy. 
First, memory and testimony preserve or transmit knowledge: memory is “the 
retention of knowledge previously acquired” (Dummett 1994, 264), while testimony 
is “the transmission from one individual to another of knowledge acquired by 
whatever means” (Dummett 1994, 264). This claim aligns with the Archival View of 
Memory (AVM), the pervasive and enduring historical view of memory as a faculty 
that creates, stores, and retrieves discrete representations of past events (Robins 
2016a). Some version of the view goes back at least to Plato, who described memory 
as a wax tablet upon which impressions of perceptions are imprinted (Theaetetus 
191c-d), although it has enjoyed several incarnations in metaphors of memory as 
palace, library, computer hard drive, and so on (see Brockmeier (2015, chap. 3), 
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), and Roediger (1980) for methodical reviews of these 
metaphors). Traditionally, perception and reason have been taken to generate new 
knowledge in virtue, inter alia, of their capacity to generate new beliefs (e.g., Graham 
2006). But unlike perception and reason, neither memory nor testimony have been 
taken to generate new beliefs. Rather, both convey content from a source to a 
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receiver1: memory maintains beliefs over time, while testimony allows one person to 
gain a belief from another, or so the assumption goes (Lackey 2008).  
The second similarity between memory and testimony that motivates 
Dummett’s analogy is the claim that a subject must know that p in order to preserve 
or transmit this knowledge; if it is not known, the subject cannot preserve or 
transmit knowledge.  In Audi’s (2006, 43) words, “testimony can increase the 
number of knowers in the world, [but] it cannot increase the number of propositions 
known” (emphasis in original); similarly, Dummett claims, a subject cannot 
remember something she does not know. This latter claim goes some way toward 
explaining why neither memory nor testimony generate knowledge. 
The analogy defended by Dummett relies not only on implicit assumptions 
about memory, but about testimony, which he calls “the transmission from one 
individual to another of knowledge acquired by whatever means” (Dummett 1994, 
264); such a characterisation requires that every participant in a testimonial chain 
know that p in order to transmit it. But this view has not gone uncriticised: a later 
participant in a testimonial chain could come to know that p from the first 
participant even if the intermediate participants fail to know that p (Burge 1993; 
Gelfert 2014; Lackey 1999). On either Dummett’s or Lackey’s views, however, the 
first person in the chain must know that p through non-testimonial means, such as 
reason or perception. Although there is disagreement over precisely what is being 
transmitted by testimony—whether it is knowledge, justification, or belief—accounts 
converge on the point that some act of communication functions as a vehicle for 
propositions to travel from testifier to recipient. Lehrer calls this view, which is 
 
1 A brief terminological note is necessary here. Throughout this chapter—and the rest of this thesis—I 
use the terms “source” and “receiver” to refer to the participants in a generic case of content 
transmission (whether testimony or memory), where the source asserts that p and the receiver gains 
the belief that p. Specifically for memory, I use the terms “past self” or “earlier self” to refer to the 
source, in contrast with “present self” or “later self” to refer to the receiver. For testimony, I use the 
terms “testifier” to refer to the source and “recipient” to refer to the receiver. 
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widely accepted among philosophers (Graham 2006; Lackey 2006a) “the causal 
theory of knowledge” or “the transmission theory of knowledge” (Lehrer 2006, 145).  
 This transmission theory aligns with the Code Model of Communication 
(CMC), an application of Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) General Communications 
Model, developed to be applicable to communication, broadly construed (Turnbull 
2003). As Turnbull (2003) characterises CMC, a source encodes information from a 
message into a signal, and transmits it across a channel, which also contains “noise” 
(competing signals that originate in some other source).  The signal—which may be 
different from the one sent, depending on noise in the channel and how it has 
overwritten the original signal—is received at the destination and decoded to receive 
the message. The picture CMC paints is clear: while it allows that noise-type signals 
may influence how the signal is received at the destination, it implies that the 
message decoded by the receiver is the same as the one encoded by the source. At 
most, it permits information loss, but not the integration of new information. It is not 
difficult to identify the parallels between this picture and Dummett’s 
characterisation of testimonial chains. The key features are these: at least one 
participant has some message to pass to the next participant, that message remains 
largely unchanged throughout the transfer, and the recipient does some work—
namely, decoding or interpreting—upon receiving the message.  
Standard accounts of testimony have been heavily influenced by the apparent 
similarities between memory and testimony (Lackey 2006b), so CMC’s resemblance 
to AVM is both obvious and unsurprising. On an AVM-compatible account of 
memory, an experience is converted into a representation that is preserved until a 
later point, at which it is retrieved and remains relatively faithful to the original 
experience; on a CMC-compatible account of testimony, a testifier converts a 
message into intelligible signals and sends it to a recipient, who receives the signals 
and gains a message that is, again, largely unchanged from the original message the 
testifier intended to communicate. In neither case, it is claimed, is new content 
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generated: in testimony, Goldberg (2001, 517) argues that “the proposition believed 
on the basis of accepting [a] piece of testimony (the ‘received proposition’) must 
derive from the proposition attested to in such a way that the received proposition 
contains no more information than the one attested to,” while in memory, Bernecker 
(2008; 2010) argues that what is remembered cannot exceed the content of the 
original experience. It is, however, acknowledged that content might be lost, as in 
the case of ordinary forgetting or understanding “It is raining” from the utterance “It 
is raining very hard.”2; in cases such as these, we find content loss. Furthermore, 
both AVM and CMC posit a causal connection between the original experience or 
message (what is encoded and sent by the source) and the representation formed 
downstream (what is received by the receiver, whether that be the testimonial 
recipient or the later self). It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why 
philosophers like Dummett readily endorse a memory–testimony analogy.  
1.3. Why the analogy fails: memory is constructive 
The family resemblance between AVM and CMC is strong enough that a memory–
testimony analogy is intuitively appealing. Both memory and testimony appear to 
function as a kind of conveyor belt, moving content from one person to another or 
across time. Illustrative though they may be, the metaphors we use to describe 
memory are inadequate descriptions of the processes unfolding during 
remembering. It is curious that despite strong counterevidence from well-
documented memory errors, such as misremembering and confabulating,3 the claim 
that memory is strictly preservative has endured. This is especially surprising given 
that not even the proponents of causal theories claim that memory preserves 
perfectly. Dummett (1994, 265), for instance, admits that “knowledge, like 
 
2 This example is borrowed from Goldberg (2001). 
3 See De Brigard (2014) and Robins (2016a) for overviews of this literature. 
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everything else, is liable to be corrupted in transmission,”4 while Martin and 
Deutscher (1966, 191) advance the (underdeveloped) idea that “it might seem 
possible that the memory trace should itself be a suggestible state.” As Robins 
(2016a) points out, however, the problem is not merely that AVM cannot explain 
memory errors, but rather that the frequency of these errors far exceeds what we 
would normally expect if AVM were more or less correct. Hence, we cannot 
justifiably retain confidence in an analogy that hinges on the preservative character 
of memory, when there is mounting evidence that this view is mistaken. Memory is 
ultimately constructive, not preservative, as researchers across disciplines have 
found. Their findings contradict early assumptions about memory’s archival nature. 
Brockmeier (2015, 57), for instance, challenges AVM and its role in shaping memory 
studies, writing that “each act of remembering an experience is itself a new 
experience which, in the very act, subtly transforms the memory of the ‘old’ 
experience.” During this transformation, he remarks, “we might add new emotional 
values, new beliefs, and even new knowledge to our memory […] fusing all of it 
with what we all the same consider an authentic and original memory” (57). The 
point here is that, although remembering may feel to the remembering subject like 
accessing an archive, it is in fact a process during which information and experiences 
are continually combined and recombined. 
 Alba and Hasher (1983) claim that this generative, constructive process of 
combination might happen at four different stages of encoding: selection, 
abstraction, interpretation, and integration. During selection, information is selected 
for encoding according to pre-existing schemas for remembering, and the 
information’s relevance to the appropriate schema. In abstraction, the meaning of the 
selected information is abstracted from the syntactical and lexical context in which it 
 
4 Dummett frames his discussion in terms of knowledge. I take a broader view, thinking more in 
terms of content than knowledge. My account should still be compatible with Dummett’s, though, 
since transmitting or preserving knowledge entails transmitting or preserving content. 
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is embedded; in other words, the message’s meaning, but not its format, is coded. As 
Michaelian (2011c) points out, we can see in these first two stages that identifying 
content construction with generation is mistaken: both the first and second stages are 
constructive but involve content elimination, not generation. Following abstraction, 
interpretation involves accessing relevant prior knowledge and using it to form 
connections between the incoming stimulus and other knowledge. Finally, 
integration is the production of a coherent representation by blending together the 
products of the previous stages. As we can see, encoding is far more constructive a 
process than the image of a seal making an imprint into wax, as the wax tablet 
metaphor would lead us to believe! The wax tablet and the AVM it illustrates remain 
inadequate representations of how remembering unfolds. 
 While Alba and Hasher (1983) limit their discussion to construction during 
encoding, there are broader accounts that address the constructive nature of memory 
during retrieval, the later stage of remembering. Robins (2016a) categorises these 
accounts into three groups: connectionist, gist-based, and episodic hypothetical 
reasoning. The differences are subtle but important.  
Connectionist accounts (e.g., Sutton 1998) are distinguished by their rejection 
of the AVM thesis that memory stores particular details of events. Instead, they 
claim that memory preserves patterns of semantically and conceptually linked ideas, 
which are grouped together such that the activation of one activates the whole set. 
For the connectionist, remembering a certain event is a result of forming associations 
based on general similarities from one experience to the next. 
 Gist-based accounts (e.g., Michaelian 2011c), by contrast, do not emphasise 
the similarities from one event to the next, but rather understand remembering as 
being a matter of forming general representations of single events. In other words, 
they capture the gist of what happened. While the precise details of an event are lost, 
those that are most likely to be relevant in the future are retained. The subject is 
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equipped with relevant knowledge for the future, while conserving cognitive 
resources. 
 Episodic hypothetical reasoning (EHR) accounts (e.g., De Brigard 2014; 
Michaelian 2016a) are distinguished by their rejection of the notion that memory is a 
distinct cognitive capacity. Proponents of EHR accounts point to the functional, 
phenomenal, and anatomical similarities between remembering and imagining 
counterfactual situations or planning for the future. Remembering, they claim, is not 
an act of preservation, but rather the deployment of a larger cognitive capacity that 
simulates situations to generate either plausible outcomes (De Brigard 2014) or 
accurate imaginings of the past (Michaelian 2016a); the temporal orientations of the 
products of these simulations —i.e. whether the simulation has a past, present, or 
future temporal valence—is what distinguishes remembering from the others 
(Robins 2016a). 
 Although connectionist, gist-based, and EHR accounts of memory offer 
different explanations of memory’s architecture, all accounts converge on a central 
thesis: that remembering is not, as supposed, the reproduction of a singular, discrete event 
from the past, but an act of reconstruction using information from a multitude of available 
sources (Robins 2016). Memory science has repeatedly confirmed this point (e.g., 
Bartlett (1932); Brainerd and Reyna (2005); and Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal 
(1998)). Because these findings and their corresponding constructivist accounts are 
incompatible with AVM, we have good reason to reject AVM and adopt a 
constructive model—or at least the central constructive thesis—in its place. I take it 
that the case for constructive memory has been well-defended in the literature (see 
e.g., De Brigard (2014); Michaelian (2016a; 2011c); Robins (2016b); Schacter and 
Addis (2007); Sutton (1998); and Sutton and Windhorst (2009)), so I have discussed it 
only briefly here, but I will add this last note: though different versions of 
constructivism offer different accounts of how memorial construction works, the 
important thing is that remembering is a process of continual combination and 
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recombination of information and experiences (Brockmeier 2015, 57). Importantly, 
the resultant representations can contain more content than the original experiences that 
they apparently depict. 
 At this point, it is clear that the transmissive analogy fails: if it is the case that 
memory is constructive and testimony is transmissive, they are fundamentally 
different. So, the analogy that so many philosophers have pointed to is simply 
incorrect, and we should abandon it altogether.  
1.4. Testimony is constructive 
Above, I showed that remembering is constructive, and that because this is the case, 
the analogy—as it has been described in the past—fails. However, if there are certain 
features of memory that compel us to think of memory as constructive, we would be 
remiss to ignore the fact that the same features are present in testimony. The 
transmissive analogy is misguided, but it will turn out that memory and testimony 
really are analogous; the analogy, however, will not rest on the transmissive features 
of memory and testimony. Instead, it will rest on their constructive features. 
When I say that testimony has constructive features, what exactly do I have in 
mind? In other words, how is testimony constructive? Lackey (2008) argues that 
accounts of testimony focussing on the transmission of beliefs are incorrect, and we 
should recenter our discussion around statements. Crucially, she claims, recipients do 
not learn from testifiers’ beliefs, but their words. It is this account that provides the 
grounds for restoring the analogy. In this section, I combine Lackey’s account with 
Scott-Phillips’ (2015) ostensive-inferential communication model, and address 
mindreading (Shanton and Goldman 2010) and its pivotal role in interpersonal 
communication (Nichols and Stich 2003).5 
 
5 There is a vast body of literature on these topics, spanning philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. 
Engaging with it in full would render the chapter nearly unwieldy. For the sake of simplicity, I rely 
on a few sources to paint a generic picture of the ways in which testimony might be constructive.  
   
16 
 
Most accounts of testimony, Lackey (2008) claims, are inadequate because 
they focus exclusively on either how testimony is an intentional act by a testifier, or 
how it is a source of belief for a recipient. Lackey’s Disjunctive View of the Nature of 
Testimony seeks to remedy this situation by defining testimony as an act of 
communication a through which a testifier intends to convey information, or the 
content of which acts as a source of belief (Lackey 2008, 35–36). Since only one 
disjunct needs to be satisfied for a to qualify as testimony, we can analyse testimony 
as either intentional act or source of belief. Accordingly, we may consider the unique 
but complementary roles played by testifier and recipient, a task made easier by 
Lackey’s supplementary definitions of speaker testimony (s-testimony) and hearer 
testimony (h-testimony): an act of s-testimony obtains when a testifier performs an 
act of communication through which she intends to convey information (Lackey 
2008, 30), while an act of h-testimony obtains when a testifier performs an act of 
communication that a recipient reasonably understands as conveying information 
(Lackey 2008, 32).  
There are two points to be made about the act of communication described in 
these definitions. The first is that the definition is broad enough to include gestures 
and writing alongside the more traditional category of literal speech. The second is 
that although s-testimony requires that the testifier “intend to express communicable 
content,” it does not require that the testifier “intend to communicate to others” 
(Lackey 2008, 28, emphasis added). Thus, a given act of communication can 
constitute an act of testimony even if it was not so intended by the testifier, provided 
that the act of communication serves as a source of belief for the recipient. 
Lackey’s account affords us the opportunity to consider the roles played by 
testifier and recipient. Consider, as Scott-Phillips (2015) does, the character Hymie 
from the TV show Get Smart. Hymie is a humanoid robot with no ability to process 
idiomatic or metaphorical speech. Because he takes everything literally, in response 
to a speaker who says “Give me a hand!” he removes his own hand and passes it to 
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the speaker. As Scott-Phillips claims, this indicates that human communication 
involves a level of interpretation beyond simply literal phrases. For him, owing to 
the underdeterminacy of language, every single utterance can have an indefinite 
number of meanings. The underdeterminacy thesis states that 
“the linguistic semantics of the utterance, that is, the meaning 
encoded in the linguistic expressions used, the relatively 
stable meanings in a linguistic system, meanings which are 
widely shared across a community of users of the system, 
underdetermines the proposition expressed (what is said)” 
(Carston 2002, 19–20). 
It may be tempting to think that here, Scott-Phillips is merely repeating the 
Gricean point that any given utterance bears both a sentence-meaning (the literal 
meaning of what is said) and a speaker-meaning (what the speaker intends to 
communicate) (Grice 1975; see also Turnbull 2003, chap. 4). But one crucial difference 
between Grice’s and Scott-Phillips’ accounts is that while Grice takes sentence-
meaning to be fixed and speaker-meaning to be a matter of interpretation or 
inference, Scott-Phillips claims that even sentence-meaning needs to be determined 
by conversational participants (Scott-Phillips 2015, 18; see also Vicente and Martínez-
Manrique 2008). Consider the phrase “Give me a hand!” Although it usually means 
“Help me,” the phrase could have quite different meanings when uttered by a 
clockmaker (who needs the hands of a clock), a mannequin assembler (who needs to 
attach the mannequin’s hands to the arms), or an attention-seeking violinist (who is 
demanding applause). Note that the first two are equally literal, yet have different 
meanings. Although Hymie gets “Give me a hand!” wrong, he must perform some 
interpretation, since communication is more than just a series of noises or symbols 
that magically produce a thought in an audience. As Scott-Phillips (2015) points out, 
if Hymie performed no interpretation whatsoever, it is not only idiomatic phrases that 
would confuse him—every phrase would.  Exactly which meaning is intended by 
any act of communication will depend on a variety of factors, including, for 
example, the environmental context of the exchange and the participants’ 
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conversational and personal history. While Grice’s account fails to accommodate 
cases where the same sentence bears not only different speaker-meanings, but 
different sentence-meanings, Scott-Phillips’ account can explain these cases by 
appealing to the role that interpretation plays in understanding. 
The underdeterminacy thesis is, however, controversial. Semantic 
minimalists, notably Cappelen and Lepore (2005), claim that “a well-formed 
sentence does not need any contextual completion of the kind suggested by most 
pragmaticians in order to express a thought” (Vicente and Martínez-Manrique 2008, 
394). If minimalism is right, then natural language can carry thought, and if natural 
language can carry thought, it is harder to identify the role of interpretation in 
testimony. But the cases for the underdeterminacy thesis and against minimalism 
are, to my mind, persuasively argued by Vicente and Martínez-Manrique (2008). I 
lack the space to rehearse the argument in full here, but importantly, they echo and 
provide compelling examples for Recanati’s (2001) point that the presence of 
underdetermined terms is generalised: that an endless (or at least, unmanageably 
long) sequence of specifications is needed to disambiguate terms. Furthermore, on a 
minimalist view, sentences have complete truth conditions, and so a sentence such 
as “John is ready” is true iff John is ready. It seems, though, that we do not entertain 
such general thoughts: introspection suggests that thoughts are much more specific 
and complete than this, and furthermore, “if thoughts are to be responsible for our 
actions, they had better be more explicit than these putative minimal propositions. 
What would we do after tokening the very general thought that John is ready, 
punkt?” (Vicente and Martínez-Manrique 2008, 395). Though it may be the case that 
we occasionally entertain thoughts consisting of purely semantic, general 
information, such thoughts are atypical. 
Still, it is not clear that we need to go quite as far as Scott-Phillips does when 
he says that language is radically underdetermined. In fact, we do not need to 
endorse a version of the underdeterminacy thesis à la Carston (2002) at all. We can 
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even defend minimalism à la Cappelen and Lepore (2005), and still get to where we 
are going. Not much hinges on the idea that language is underdetermined. What 
really matters for my argument that testimony is constructive is that there is some 
interpretive work done by testifier and recipient alike, and even if language is fully 
determinate after disambiguation, as the minimalists claim, there is a strong case to 
be made that the disambiguation itself will require interpretive labour from testifier 
and recipient. With this in mind, I offer a brief description of how interpretation 
plays a role in testimony. 
Perhaps the most interesting determinant of interpretation is mindreading, 
which is “the capacity of ordinary people to understand the mind” (Nichols and 
Stich 2003, 2). During a communicative exchange, mindreading enables subjects to 
determine other subjects’ background knowledge, motives, and intentions (Scott-
Phillips 2015). Testifiers and recipients alike must cooperate to produce and interpret 
evidence of their own and each other’s mental states and background knowledge 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986), and must provide evidence appropriate for that 
particular audience (Scott-Phillips 2015). When we couple the need for mindreading 
with the need for recipients to evaluate a given testifier’s trustworthiness, sincerity, 
competence, motives, and intentions (Fricker 1994; 1995; Lackey 2015; Lehrer 2006), 
we learn that testimony is never a matter of producing a straightforward, literal 
utterance: in every situation, testifiers must determine an appropriate way to 
communicate an idea to a recipient, and must monitor the recipient continually to 
confirm understanding. In Scott-Phillips’ words, both must establish “common 
ground: the information (the mental representations) that is known to two (or more) 
individuals and which both of them know, or believe, that the other knows” (Scott-
Phillips 2015, 64). All of this happens in addition to the statement’s literal meaning, 
which, it turns out, is only one input into a deeply layered and complex process; one 
that the transmissive model simply fails to capture. 
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The point here has been to show that interpretation is vital to communication. 
But a description of interpretation only tracks the recipient’s cognitive task in 
receiving testimony, and thus tells only half the constructivist’s story about 
testimony. To complete the account, we must also consider the testifier’s role in 
constructing testimony. Here, it is worth emphasising the point that, just as it is the 
case that “construction” in memory is not synonymous with “generation” 
(Michaelian 2011c), neither should we identify testimonial construction with 
generation. The production of testimony may involve the elimination of some 
content as part of a larger constructive process. A testifier with a message to send 
needs to determine what the important features of the message are. That message 
itself is abstract and needs to be converted into an act of communication; the 
conversion requires selection of the abstract message’s relevant details, which must 
then be organised according to linguistic rules and then communicated to a 
recipient. Developing the communication will require predictions and judgments 
about factors like what the recipient already knows, the recipient’s motives, and the 
environmental context of the exchange. The testifier must depend on the recipient to 
do the same kind of mindreading. For example, if communicating sensitive 
information, a testifier who fears being overheard might lower her voice or be 
especially vague, counting on the recipient’s ability to ‘fill in the blanks.’ She might 
also depend on the recipient’s successful inference (from her lowered voice, for 
instance) that the information is sensitive, and subsequent actions to keep the 
information private. Since language is underdetermined and even simple sentences 
can have multiple meanings, both need to cooperate to establish mutual 
understanding and make testimony possible. In fact, we can even go so far as to say 
that testimony can generate content. In part, this content generation is a result of 
mindreading, but it could also be the case that testifiers and recipients contribute 
and rely on their own background knowledge to understand what is being 
communicated. 
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In testimonial exchanges, not only is it the case that participants occasionally 
mindread, make reparations, and ‘fill in the blanks,’ but that these features of 
communication are the norm rather than the exception. Scott-Phillips goes so far as 
to claim that we always engage in these activities. I am inclined to agree, but for the 
reader who finds that claim distastefully strong, it should be enough just to claim 
that these features play a central role. Thus, we see that just as memory involves 
construction, testimony involves ongoing interpretation. Construction and 
interpretation share important features, one of which is the practical benefit of 
reducing the amount of processing power required to remember or to communicate. 
Rather than storing a vast multitude of discrete memories that preserve specific 
details and particulars, the remembering subject is able to generate hypotheses about 
what might have happened in the past (De Brigard 2014). In testimony, participants 
conduct ongoing simulations of the other’s mental state that allow us to enrich and 
expand on the content of their testimony, and reduce the amount of information 
required to be encoded into a message. Importantly, both construction and 
interpretation enable the introduction of new content, and thus lead to the surprising 
and counterintuitive conclusions that, despite Bernecker’s (2008; 2010) and 
Goldberg’s (2001) arguments against the generation of content by memory or 
testimony, that one can remember more than one experienced, or understand more than a 
testifier communicated. 
This last claim should not be taken to imply that this means that all our 
memorially or testimonially based beliefs are false. I follow Sutton and Windhorst 
(2009) in resisting the idea that construction in memory inevitably results in 
distorted, inaccurate, or false memories. I claim the same about testimony: 
interpretation does not inevitably lead to distortion or misunderstanding. It is, 
rather, a process without which testimony would never occur. To say that testimony 
and memory are constructive is not to say that the contents are entirely fabricated, 
but to emphasise that both require the selection and integration of information from 
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a multitude of sources. The counterintuitive conclusion we thus reach is that content 
dissimilarity—in other words, when a recipient understands more than the testifier 
communicated—indicates that interpretive faculties are working correctly, not 
incorrectly. 
There is a natural worry here that the possibility of understanding more than 
what was communicated risks the possibility that one can understand any 
proposition from any piece of testimony; that there need not be any connection 
between what is communicated and what is understood. We need not be alarmed, 
though. In memory, philosophers try to identify conditions for what constitutes a 
genuine memory, which has downstream consequences for a subject’s claim to know 
that p on the basis of her memory. So should it be possible to set down limits on the 
type and strength of the connection between what is communicated and what is 
understood. Just as philosophers need to establish some conditions differentiating 
successful from unsuccessful remembering, so too do they need to establish some 
conditions that work to restrict how much, what kind, and by what process new 
content can be introduced into testimonial exchanges. There have been forays into 
this project: Lackey (2008), for one, has stipulated that a “reasonably obvious 
connection” must exist between “the content of the proffered act of communication 
and the content of the proposition testified to” (30). It should be noted here, though, 
that to say that there needs to be a connection is to say that the content of the 
testimony must have some kind of match with the resultant representation. 
Requiring that there be such a match does not presuppose that one endorses a causal 
theory of either memory or testimony (i.e. the connection in question is about the 
content, not the causal link between what is testified and what is received). It is not 
my project here to determine what constitutes a “reasonably obvious connection,” 
nor indeed what any of the other limits of accuracy are, but it is my project to show 
that such considerations need to be made in both memorial and testimonial cases.  
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One final note should be made here before moving on: I argued above that 
noise could contribute information to the intended message in testimonial 
exchanges. It may seem that there is no memorial analogue for noise, but I think this 
is mistaken: it is easy to imagine signals that might compete with what one appears 
to remember. For example, alcohol consumption (Lister, Eckardt, and Weingartner 
1987), sleep deprivation (Stickgold 2013), exposure to distinct events that are 
sufficiently similar that one collapses them into a single representation (Devitt et al. 
2016), or exposure to a conflicting account of an event that one has experienced 
(Loftus 1997b) can all influence what is recalled; indeed, each might contribute 
information to the message that is understood.6 It does seem, then, that noise-like 
phenomena appear during ordinary remembering as they do during testimonial 
exchanges. 
1.5. Drawing an analogy between memory and testimony 
It is not difficult to understand why figures like Dummett endorse an analogy 
between memory and testimony: intuitively, both transmit but neither generate 
content. This version of the analogy, however, is inadequate in that they are 
grounded in faulty understandings of memory and testimony. It is a mistake to 
characterise memory as (strictly) preservative and testimony as (strictly) 
transmissive, and therefore the transmissive analogy fails. But if we abandon, as we 
are right to do, the preservative and transmissive views of memory and testimony 
that underpin the transmissive analogy, and embrace constructivist accounts 
instead, it will turn out that the two really are analogous after all. 
It may seem that endorsing a certain version of constructivism about memory 
(detailed above in Section 1.3) would bear on the plausibility of the analogy, 
depending on whether testimonial construction is sufficiently similar to memorial 
 
6 Justine Kingsbury rightly pointed out to me that alcohol consumption and sleep deprivation might 
better be understood as factors that increase the likelihood of noise effects, but not as competing 
signals themselves. 
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construction. While the account of how memorial construction works will depend on 
the specific version of constructivism one endorses, it should suffice for my purposes 
to adopt a generic version of constructivism. This is because the central thesis I 
advance about testimony—namely, that testimony is constructive in virtue of the 
integration of information from multiple sources—is broadly similar to the central 
thesis about constructivism in memory, and the specific details and variations on the 
central thesis do not threaten my argument. 
Because both remembering and testifying involve simulation and 
interpretation, a subject can remember something more than what was experienced, 
or understand something more than what was said. The similarities between 
memory and testimony as they function as sources7 of knowledge cannot be ignored; 
importantly, they have parallel epistemic and epistemological implications, 
including, most crucially, the ability for a receiver to gain more than what is 
expressed by a source. Thus, if this analogy holds, it creates room to apply the same 
debates from epistemology of testimony to epistemology of memory (and vice 
versa). But the potential products of this analogy do not end there. Not only is the 
analogy of epistemological significance, it would also allow us to conceptualise 
memory and testimony in similar terms, to investigate their metaphysical similarities 
and differences, and to explore the ethical questions that arise in one while shifting 
our focus to the other (for instance, concepts such as Miranda Fricker’s (2007) 
testimonial injustice, which I take up seriously in Chapter 4, or Sue Campbell’s 
(2003) relational remembering). The analogy is conceptually rich and has 
tremendous potential to bear philosophical fruit.  
 
7 I use the term “source” quite loosely. To be sure, there are lively debates over whether either 
memory or testimony can function as sources in any genuine sense, i.e. generate new knowledge (see, 
e.g., Graham (2006) and the exchange between Lackey (2005; 2007)  and Senor (2007)). However, 
when I use “source,” I am not weighing in on those debates. Those debates lie downstream of my 
claim, which is merely that memory’s capacity to act as a (genuine or pseudo-) source of knowledge is 
coextensive with testimony’s. 
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 Although the features of memory and testimony indicate that there really is a 
constructive analogy between memory and testimony, and although endorsing the 
analogy might be tempting because of its potential implications, there are also 
reasons to resist it. There is, for instance, one disanalogy that is obvious right at the 
outset: although both memory and testimony act as sources of knowledge, they act 
as sources of knowledge about fundamentally different things. To a first 
(controversial) approximation, memory is a source of a knowledge about 
experiences in the past, and testimony is a source of knowledge about a state of 
affairs in the world, in propositional form. It might seem that the difference is 
irreconcilable and the project of drawing any analogy whatsoever is severely 
misguided, but I think this is mistaken. First, it may turn out that memory and 
testimony are both propositional (i.e. all features of episodic memory may be 
expressible as propositions) (Fernández 2006). If this is the case, then the analogy is 
clear. But even if episodic memory is not reducible to propositions—and the claim 
that it is reducible is controversial (Sant’Anna 2018b)—then we can still draw an 
analogy between the two. The important thing is that both carry content, and the 
content that they carry undergoes the same kind of transformation such that the 
processes, though they involve different components, are deeply similar. We must 
accept this disanalogy, but if we do, we will see that memory and testimony are 
otherwise broadly analogous. To show that they are indeed analogous, I next 
consider and respond to two worries about where the analogy’s limits lie.  
 Before proceeding to these worries, it is worth addressing the following 
objection. The characterisation of testimony upon which I have relied throughout 
this chapter is that testimony is “the [testifier’s] intentional expression of 
communicable content” (Lackey 2008, 28, emphasis added). But remembering, 
everyday experience suggests, can be done intentionally (by encoding deliberately) 
or non-intentionally (by encoding subconsciously). Because there are instances of 
remembering that lack an intentional component, while testifying is intentional, the 
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constructive analogy appears to fail. I readily concede that both remembering and 
testifying can be done intentionally, but I deny that testifying is only ever intentional 
in the sense that memory is intentional. In other words, I argue that both 
remembering and testifying can be done non-intentionally, and furthermore, that 
this is entirely consonant with Lackey’s account of testimony. 
Many of our experiences of remembering are non-intentional: we often 
navigate our lives without forming intentions to memorise information now for use 
in the future, and memories often surface without a subject’s intention to retrieve 
them (Berntsen 2010). Both encoding and retrieval are processes that routinely 
unfold in the background, with little or no real direction from the subject. That we 
find ourselves reminiscing without meaning to do so, or recalling information we 
were not consciously aware we could access, indicates that the relevant memories 
were formed without our awareness or intention.8  
A source’s role in remembering non-intentionally is at the point of encoding 
at the time of the original experience. It is only in exceptional cases that we 
consciously encode with the express intention of making the information available 
for recall in the future. Yet, despite this lack of conscious remembering for the future, 
we still find ourselves able to recall events from the past. Similarly, a testimonial 
recipient can gain beliefs from a testifier, even if that testifier did not intend to instil 
those beliefs in the recipient. Initially, it seems odd to claim that one can testify non-
intentionally, but I show next that the claim is supported by our everyday 
experiences of testifying. 
 To understand how non-intentional testifying is consistent with Lackey’s 
characterisation of testimony as requiring an act of communication on the part of the 
testifier, recall that Lackey does not consider an act of communication to “require 
 
8 It is important to note that to claim that some instances of remembering are non-intentional is not to 
claim that remembering happens despite one’s intentions. It is to claim that remembering might 
happen absent a subject’s intention to do so. 
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that the speaker intend to communicate to others; instead, it requires merely that the 
speaker intend to express communicable content” (Lackey 2008, 28). The testifier might 
intentionally express communicable content without intending to express anything 
to anyone, but may nonetheless do so; if this is the case, the instance still qualifies as 
testimony. In other words, the expression of content is intentional, but the testifying is 
not. This is consistent with Lackey’s h-testimony: a testifier’s act of communication 
that a recipient reasonably understands as conveying information (Lackey 2008, 32). 
Separating the intention to express communicable content from the intention to 
testify allows for cases such as posthumous publications of private diaries to qualify 
as testimony, since the expression of communicable content—namely, the act of 
writing—was intentional, even if the author never intended for the content of the 
diary to be accessed by others. It is precisely because Lackey does not view the 
higher-level intention as being a necessary condition for testimony that the notion of 
non-intentional testimony is even coherent. 
Recall from Section 1.4 that if a subject performs an act of communication 
intending to convey certain information, then S s-testifies that p, and that a subject 
performs an act of communication that serves as a source of belief for a recipient, 
then S h-testifies that p (Lackey 2008, 32). Unsurprisingly, in many cases, s-testimony 
and h-testimony overlap: both obtain where S testifies that p by performing an act of 
communication through which she intends to convey the information that p, and that 
act of communication also acts as a source of belief for the recipient. For example, if 
someone asks me what time it is, and I intend to instil the belief that it is 7:35 p.m. by 
saying “It’s 7:35 p.m.,” and my statement acts as a source of belief for the recipient, 
then both s-testimony and h-testimony have come to pass. But where h-testimony 
instantiates without s-testimony, there is non-intentional testimony. It is testimony 
in virtue of being h-testimony, and it is non-intentional in virtue of the fact that the 
testifier did not intend to communicate to others. Let us clarify this with an example. 
Imagine Isadora, a student who uses a calendar to manage her time. None of the 
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information is secret and she makes no effort to keep the contents of the calendar 
private. She records all her appointments, assignments, and classes in the calendar, 
and regularly refers to it. One evening, Isadora leaves her calendar on the kitchen 
table, where her brother picks it up and learns that Isadora has a biology midterm in 
the morning and a poetry assignment due the next day. 
In this example, Isadora intentionally expresses communicable content by 
writing, and so performs an act of communication that is transformed into an 
instance of testimony once the calendar acts as a source of belief for Isadora’s 
brother. In doing so, the act of communication satisfies the second disjunct of 
Lackey’s view on the nature of testimony, making this case an instance of h-
testimony. Such a case illustrates how one might testify without having any 
intention to do so. 
 The objection at issue here is that although remembering can be done 
intentionally or non-intentionally, testifying can only be done intentionally. This 
seems to be especially worrisome if we take seriously Lackey’s claim that testifying 
involves intentional expression of communicable content: if testimony qua epistemic 
source necessarily involves intention, does it not threaten the analogy that memory 
seems to lack the intention required by this definition of testimony? I think not. By 
dissociating the intention to express communicable content from the intention to 
testify, as Lackey does, I have shown this objection to be mistaken. Both memory 
and testimony can be either intentional or non-intentional in the relevant sense; that 
is, one can remember without intending to remember, and one can testify without 
intending to testify. 
1.6. The mindreading problem 
I claimed in Section 1.4 that mindreading—the capacity of minds to represent other 
minds—is an integral feature of communication, and thus, of testimony. Testifiers 
and recipients need to form representations regarding each other’s mental states, 
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motivations, background knowledge, and credibility. In testimony, I have argued, 
mindreading is a key component of interpretation, and is what makes testimony 
constructive. Mindreading allows participants to make reparations for unfinished 
sentences and misused words, to ‘fill in the blanks,’ and to discern why a given 
testifier is offering testimony or what a given recipient needs to know; in other 
words, it contributes content to testimony and thus plays a vital epistemic role.  
The reader might wonder why we should worry about mindreading in 
particular. It might be unclear why, of all the features of memory and testimony, 
mindreading is the one that should concern us. Why would a disanalogy in this 
respect threaten the analogy at large? The answer is that this project is about the 
epistemic functions of memory and testimony. In particular, I am interested in 
whether memory and testimony provide knowledge in similar ways. Therefore, any 
aspect of either memory or testimony that influences its epistemic function—
including transmission of information, generation of content, etc.—is of interest to 
my project here. And so, because mindreading contributes content to testimony, we 
are confronted with this question: is there mindreading in remembering? Without a 
plausible cognate, the analogy appears to fail. Furthermore, translating testimonial 
mindreading into memorial terms would come quite close to claiming that a subject 
mindreads her future self when committing something to memory, or mindreads her 
past self when recalling. These phrases have an odd ring to them, but I aim to show 
in this section that such mindreading is possible, and so the objection does not 
threaten the memory–testimony analogy. 
 A central question regarding mindreading is precisely how a subject 
represents in her own mind the mental states of another. As Shanton and Goldman 
(2010) characterise it, the simulation theory of mindreading holds that to attribute 
mental states to others, subjects simulate the mental processes of others’ minds. To 
do so, subjects ‘put themselves in the other’s shoes’ to determine what might be 
unfolding in that person’s mind. A subject creates pretend mental states in her own 
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mind that correspond to the mental states of a target and uses those pretend mental 
states as inputs into a simulation. The simulation generates an output mental state, 
which the subject then attributes to the target.  
What is particularly interesting about Shanton and Goldman’s (2010) 
account is that they are not simply concerned with how subjects attribute mental 
states to others (interpersonal mindreading); they also offer an account of how 
subjects attribute mental states to themselves (intrapersonal mindreading). They 
claim that, given the mounting evidence that the same (or a very similar) cognitive 
mechanism involved in simulation is deployed in a broad range of cognitive 
processes, including mental time travel (MTT), or projecting oneself into the past or 
future.9 The parallels between simulation in MTT and in mindreading are striking 
(Shanton and Goldman 2010), and have not gone unnoticed by psychologists and 
neuroscientists (e.g., Buckner and Carroll 2007; Hassabis and Maguire 2007; Spreng, 
Mar, and Kim 2008).  Even earlier than these writers, Gordon (1986) argues that 
predicting one’s own future behaviour and predicting others’ behaviour and 
attributing certain beliefs to them is a function of the same capacity for simulation. 
MTT and mindreading are similar in at least two respects: first, in MTT, the mental 
time traveller sheds present mental states and project herself into the past or future, 
just as the mindreader sheds her own mental states to adopt those of a target. 
Second, both simulational mindreaders and mental time travelers construct their 
target states through the combination of details from the past (Shanton and 
Goldman 2010). The upshot of these similarities is that the cognitive mechanism 
that is deployed to enable simulations in mindreading is also deployed during past- 
 
9 The cognitive mechanism at work here is likely also deployed during other cognitive tasks, such as 
imagination and navigation (Mahr and Csibra 2018), but that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
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and future-oriented MTT (Buckner and Carroll 2007; Shanton and Goldman 2010).10 
Though Shanton and Goldman come quite close to arguing that remembering is a 
kind of mindreading (Michaelian 2016a), I am not committed to so strong a view; I 
claim, more modestly, that remembering includes activities that are very much like 
mindreading. 
 My aim is to show how mindreading could play a role in remembering, even 
though there is only one subject. In the ordinary case of interpersonal mindreading, 
a subject must manufacture pretend beliefs based on factors such as circumstances, 
competence, and desires or motives affecting the target, and generate an output 
based on those pretend beliefs. To have a chance at doing so successfully, the subject 
must ‘step into another’s shoes’ and construct or simulate what it would be like to be 
that person, to generate a hypothesis of what another could be thinking. In memory, 
things are somewhat different: because the subject is remembering her own past, she 
already knows what it was like to be herself at that past time. And so, in this non-
paradigmatic intrapersonal case, the subject does not simulate what it would be like, 
but what it was like to be that person. 
 A few examples will help to clarify how the ordinary case of mindreading can 
be adapted from interpersonal to intrapersonal. What is important here is that the 
subject is trying to understand things from his past self’s perspective. Consider a 
situation in which the subject retrieves a memory of event e. When he projects 
himself into the past to try to understand things from his past self’s perspective, he 
 
10 One problem for this view is the evidence that subjects with medial-temporal lobe amnesia can pass 
false-belief tests (Rosenbaum et al. 2007). We should expect difficulties in mindreading tasks from 
individuals with MTT deficits, so the fact that these individuals can pass false-belief tests—
paradigmatic measures of mindreading—suggests that mindreading and MTT are not subserved by 
the same cognitive mechanism(s). Though it may not be the case that the cognitive mechanisms that 
subserve mindreading and MTT are perfectly coextensive, it should be enough for my argument that 
there is a significant overlap. Even if they are different at the neurological level, MTT and mindreading 
seem to play similar roles in learning from memory and learning from testimony, respectively. After 
all, for there to be an analogy between memory and testimony does not require that the two be identical 
in every respect; it merely requires that the two play analogous roles. This seems to be the case even if 
it turns out that MTT and mindreading are not subserved by the same cognitive mechanism(s).  
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might recall that he was angry at the time. He might remember his own accelerated 
heart rate, his proverbial tunnel vision, and might realise that in that moment, he 
was not very observant of the world around him. Alternatively, he might remember 
that e happened late at night. He may feel the fuzziness of his own mind, the 
heaviness of his eyelids, the slower speed at which the world seemed to pass by in 
that moment. He might feel his own past self’s difficulty in observing and encoding. 
He can relive his own mental state, much like testimonial exchange participants try 
to understand each other’s mental states. In either case, knowing that his memories 
are spottier when he was tired or angry at the time the event occurred may cause 
him to cast moderate suspicion on what he seems to remember, and be cautious in 
taking a given memory as conveying the information that p. Similarly, certain 
judgments about the circumstances under which a testifier offers testimony may also 
influence whether and how that testimony is taken up. 
 A subject can also mindread her past self’s desires and motivations. Imagine 
a teenager trying to explain a poor decision to her parents by saying “It seemed like 
a good idea at the time.” She might know that she would not make the same 
decision again, but she can put herself in her past self’s shoes, and understand that 
her past self believed that decision to be a good one. It should be noted, however, 
that it is not necessary for the subject to defend their motivations aloud for us to say 
that mindreading has taken place. As long as the subject attributes desires to the 
past self, there has been mindreading.  
 So far, I have shown how mindreading plays a role at the point of memory 
retrieval; that is, how a subject might mindread his past self. This alone, however, 
does not establish that mindreading plays the same role in memory that it does in 
testimony. After all, I have only shown that receiver mindreads source, but 
mindreading is a two-way relation in testimony. To show that mindreading plays 
the same role in memory and testimony, we would need to find a case of 
mindreading in which source mindreads receiver; in the testimony case, this would 
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be a testifier mindreading his recipient, but in the memory case, it would involve 
the earlier self mindreading her later self when attempting to make information 
available for later recall.  
 Let us consider this example: Say a subject, Hector, knows he has a long day 
of travel soon. Because he has travelled before, he knows that at the end of the trip, 
he will be tired and mentally scattered. He can imagine things from his future self’s 
perspective, and predict that he will have difficulty recalling things like the name of 
his hotel or the train route he needs to take to arrive there. Although Hector might 
be able to remember these details under normal circumstances, he can also imagine 
that his future self, having been in transit for a long time, will be less able to recall 
them.  
In this example, because Hector can imagine things from his future self’s 
perspective, he is able to take steps to minimise the impact the travel has on his 
ability to function. He might, for instance, compile a detailed itinerary that he can 
refer to upon arriving at his destination. Hector’s situation shows that it is indeed 
possible for a subject to predict how future circumstances might affect his cognitive 
capacities, much like a testifier can predict how a recipient’s circumstances might 
affect how he receives testimony. 
 It is also possible for a subject to predict her competence in different 
domains. Imagine, for instance, that I reliably remember birthdays and 
appointments, but have a very poor memory for lists of items. Knowing this fact 
about myself, I might rely only minimally on a calendar to keep track of dates; I can 
imagine that my future self will be able to recall this information without difficulty. 
However, if I can imagine entering a grocery store and suddenly being distracted 
by the available products, I might not trust myself to remember what groceries I 
need to buy without writing them down. In doing so, I am imagining what it will 
be like to be my future self, and adjusting my behaviour based (in part) on the type 
of information to be retrieved. We can see here, then, that competence is domain-
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specific, and that mindreading with respect to competence is possible in the 
memory case just as it is possible in the testimony case.  
We may worry that predicting facts about one’s future self and her mental 
states is an unreliable enterprise: even under the best circumstances, predictions 
about the future are often wrong. One might therefore object and claim that we 
cannot mindread reliably in remembering contexts. At worst, however, this worry 
only points out a problem with the effectiveness or reliability of mindreading, not 
the presence of it. Indeed, it is fair to point out that we are not very good at 
mindreading in the case of memory; a prime example would be believing that one’s 
memory is infallible and being unwilling to accept evidence contradicting what one 
seems to remember. While we might not be very successful at mindreading in the 
memory case, however, it is worth noting that we do not mindread perfectly in the 
testimony case either; any number of considerations a subject makes about her target 
could be mistaken. (We would expect, for example, that if we were strong 
mindreaders, we would see higher rates of deception detection, but in fact we detect 
lies at rates barely above chance (Bond and DePaulo 2006).)  Thus, the fact that we 
might be mistaken in future-oriented mindreading does not threaten the analogy. 
Above, I argued that one role of mindreading in testimony is to compensate 
for the underdeterminacy of language. Because testimony is typically presented in 
propositional statements, it is easy to see how underdetermination might present: 
simply put, a certain statement or sentence could have more than one meaning, and 
so could be expressing different propositions depending on what the meaning of the 
statement is. But memories are not clearly propositional, so it is more difficult to see 
how there might be a memorial analogue for testimonial underdetermination. In 
other words, because the medium of memory is not propositions, but episodes (pace 
Fernández 2006), the notion of underdetermination that applies to testimony does 
not seem to apply to memory. But if we are more open-minded about how 
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underdetermination might appear in non-propositional contexts, we can see how 
underdetermination plays a role in episodic remembering.  
Episodic memories typically present themselves to us as though they come 
from particular past events. For instance, I might remember a cycling trip I took 
between two cities. If I have only done this one time, I can be fairly confident that I 
really am remembering a particular event. This, however, is not always the case: for 
instance, when I think of cycling to my office, I take myself to be remembering a 
particular trip (for example, yesterday morning’s ride). But in fact, I have cycled to 
my office hundreds of time, so unless something very unusual and memorable 
happened yesterday, I have no obvious way to differentiate this apparent memory of 
yesterday’s trip from any other ordinary ride. If I am to gain knowledge from this 
apparent memory, I need to perform some kind of inference to determine what the 
memory really represents and what kind of knowledge I can claim to have in virtue 
of what I seem to remember.11 
If it sounds familiar to assert that a subject needs to perform an inference to 
determine what is really being conveyed by a message, it should: it is exactly what I 
have claimed above is at work in testimonial exchanges. Just as the 
underdeterminacy of language means that a given utterance could express different 
content, a given memory representation could carry several potential meanings. In 
both cases, subjects must use other information to infer what the message is really 
conveying. 
1.7. The possibility of source-receiver interaction 
I now turn to one final objection, which hinges on this prima facie difference between 
memory and testimony: in testimony, a recipient has the opportunity to ask a 
testifier for more information. By contrast, it appears that when remembering, a 
subject (the later self) has only limited information. Given the direction of time, it is 
 
11 I owe this view to Denis Perrin. 
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impossible for her to obtain information beyond what her earlier self has encoded. 
Her knowledge is restricted to the contents of her memory. Consequently, there is a 
difference between the limits of testimonial knowledge and memorial knowledge. 
Testimonial knowledge is such that it can be clarified, amplified, and updated 
almost immediately through conversation with a testifier, but memorial knowledge 
exhibits no such property. A testifier and recipient can engage in a verbal volley of a 
kind that is unavailable to a remembering subject: recipients are able to ask 
questions and update their beliefs in ways that rememberers cannot. Put simply, 
recipients of testimony have much more access to supplementary information than 
rememberers do, since rememberers cannot communicate with their past selves to 
gain more information. The possibility of updating is closed off once the original 
memory is formed.  Thus, the objection goes, testimony acts as a much richer source 
of knowledge than memory does, and the ability of receivers to seek further 
information in one case but not the other poses a threat to the epistemological 
analogy in terms of the nature and accessibility of knowledge that is available 
through each source.  
A few examples may help to underscore the difference between memory and 
testimony in terms of the availability of further information. First, imagine Beatrice, 
who is at work and realises she does not have her wallet. Upon this realisation, she 
remembers what she did this morning, and remembers that although she had her 
wallet as she was preparing to leave for work, she set it down on the kitchen counter 
to take one last sip of her morning coffee. She subsequently forms the belief that her 
wallet is on the kitchen counter. In this example, Beatrice forms a belief based on her 
memory. But what if she cannot form such a belief? What if she cannot remember 
what she did with her wallet? 
Suppose that Beatrice has realised that she does not have her wallet, but 
cannot remember what she has done with it. She phones her partner Bertrand to ask 
whether he has seen it. He tells her that her wallet is sitting on the kitchen counter. 
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Beatrice subsequently forms the belief that her wallet is on the kitchen counter. In 
this modified example, as in the original above, Beatrice forms the belief that her 
wallet is on the kitchen counter. In this example, however, Beatrice can ask for more 
information: she can, for instance, ask whether her credit card is still inside, or 
whether she has any cash (and how much), or whether she left her office ID card 
next to her wallet. When receiving testimony from Bertrand, she is in a better 
position to seek new information than she is when relying on her memory alone. It 
seems, then, that the potential for gaining knowledge through testimony is higher 
than in memory.  
 Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the ability for that 
testimonial knowledge to be instantly updated is more a feature of conversation than 
it is of testimony simpliciter. When a recipient seeks further information by asking 
questions, she is still engaged in an epistemic project, but that project is not strictly 
testimonial. While we might readily agree that asking questions is both a component 
and type of conversation, it is less clear that asking questions should be considered 
part of testimony. Another modification to the example will help to illustrate this 
point. Suppose that just as Beatrice realises that her wallet is missing, she receives a 
text message from Bertrand that says, “You left your wallet on the kitchen counter.” 
Beatrice subsequently forms the belief that her wallet is on the kitchen counter. She 
sends a reply asking whether her credit card is still inside, but receives no reply. 
Unbeknownst to Beatrice, Bertrand’s phone battery has just died and he neither 
receives nor replies to her texts. In this final example, the difference between 
testimony and the broader category of conversation is highlighted. In this case, 
Beatrice attempts to gain further information from Bertrand, but because his battery 
has died, she is unsuccessful. But her inability to gain further information from her 
partner (and form corresponding beliefs) does not compel us to disregard the initial 
text message as an instance of testimony; rather, it emphasises the point that asking 
questions and gaining answers are not necessary features of testimony. Instead, 
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these kinds of exchanges are examples of conversation, broadly construed. When 
recipients engage in dialogue with testifiers, they are conversing, but not every 
utterance qualifies as testimony. Thus, there is no true disanalogy between memory 
and testimony here: although it is the case that testifiers and recipients can converse 
with each other in a way that rememberers do not converse with their earlier selves, 
what is paramount here is that they do not always do so, and yet the absence of back-
and-forth communication does not disqualify these utterances as instances of 
testimony. Although the objection raised here might be an objection to establishing 
an analogy between memory and communication broadly construed, it poses no real 
threat to the narrower memory–testimony analogy I propose here. When we limit 
our analysis to testimony proper, excluding back-and-forth supplementary 
conversation, we find no disanalogy with memory.  
1.8. Conclusion 
Here, it bears repeating what I said at the beginning of this chapter: it is tempting to 
believe that there is some deep analogy between memory and testimony. The 
analogy aligns with our intuitions about how memory and testimony function, while 
also offering fertile ground for developing epistemologies of both. But since neither 
testimony nor memory are preservative or transmissive in nature, the transmissive 
analogy does not hold. But once we acknowledge that both memory and testimony 
are not transmissive but constructive, the analogy re-emerges. It has been my project 
in this chapter to reconceptualise testimony and memory along exactly these lines, 
and to show that the two really are analogous. Dummett, it turns out, was right all 
along, but for the wrong reasons. 
 In the epistemologies of memory and testimony, there are many lively 
debates too broad and diverse to capture here. The aim of this chapter has not been 
to address these debates, nor to posit any solutions; those controversies lie 
downstream of my project. But if testimony is constructive, and we are right to think 
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that there is a constructive analogy between memory and testimony, we should 
expect that the questions in one will translate to the other. So too, I imagine, will the 
answers. The analogy I have developed in this chapter grants us all the advantages 
of the transmissive analogy—for instance, allowing us to apply epistemology of one 
to epistemology of the other—while maintaining consistency with empirical 
research.  It has been my aim to show that memory and testimony are sufficiently 
similar that applications of issues in the philosophy of memory controversies to 
philosophy of testimony, and vice versa, are both possible in the first place. It is very 
exciting indeed to find that the memory–testimony analogy, long-persistent in 
philosophers’ minds, can find real purchase.12 
 
 
12 I am grateful to audiences at the 2016 New Zealand Association of Philosophers’ conference, the 
2017 Issues in the Philosophy of Memory conference, the University of Otago philosophy 
postgraduate seminar, and the 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy conference for feedback 
that greatly contributed to the development of this chapter. I am also grateful to Zach Swindlehurst 
for proofreading. 
 






Thinking about the relationship between memory and testimony in Chapter 1 invites 
us to wonder about how far the analogy between the two might go. One point at 
which it might appear to break down, for instance, can be found at the taxonomic 
division between declarative and non-declarative memory. While my argument in 
Chapter 1 established an analogy between testimony and declarative memory, we do 
not so far have any principled reason to think that there is a further analogy between 
non-declarative memory and testimony. Although I do not offer an extended 
argument in favour of this extension of the analogy, in this chapter I aim to address 
that concern by providing a suggestion as to how we might argue for such an 
extension. The very name “non-declarative memory” hints at the obvious objection 
one might have to extending the analogy: by definition, non-declarative memory is 
non-propositional, but testimony is propositional, and it is much harder to understand 
an epistemological analogy between two sources of memory that differ on such a 
fundamental level. This chapter can be understood as an extended response to this 
concern; for the duration of it, I bracket memory altogether and focus only on 
testimony. 
Like Franklin the turtle from the children’s book series, I know how to count 
by twos and tie my shoes. I can zip zippers and button buttons. I can also ride a bike, 
knit, speak French, change a flat tire, type, and operate a lawn mower. How do I 
know how to do these things? Because someone taught me how to do them.  
 Since Coady’s (1992) landmark study on testimony, several different accounts 
of testimony have emerged. Each responds to supposed problems of its 
predecessors, and the differences between the accounts are sometimes minor and 
other times quite pronounced. Nevertheless, the accounts converge on the basic 
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point that testimony comprises assertions or utterances offering information about a 
state of affairs. In other words, received wisdom has it that propositions—truth-apt 
statements about the world—are the currency of testimony. 
 However, the way that we deliver instructions is often in the imperative 
mood, such as “Turn left and go down the stairs,” “loop the yarn counter-clockwise 
around the knitting needle,” or “lather, rinse, repeat.” None of these instructions are 
strictly propositional; they cannot be true or false any more than it can be true or 
false that “Shut the door!” Yet, instructions seem to instil some kind of knowledge 
(albeit incomplete knowledge) in instructees: how to get to a certain room, how to 
perform part of a knit stitch, and how to shampoo one’s hair. The knowledge gained 
is not perceptual, not introspective, not memorial, and not rational, nor is it 
synthesised from a combination of these sources. Coming to know how to knit, for 
example, depends crucially on an instructor’s knowledge of how to knit and her 
delivery of that knowledge to an instructee. If that is not testimonial, then it is hard 
to see what else it might be.  
 This conundrum may be presented as an inconsistent triad of commitments: 
i. All instructions are a kind of testimony. 
ii. Some instructions are non-propositional. 
iii. All testimony is propositional. 
If it is true that testimony deals exclusively in propositions, then instructions ought 
not to count as testimony in virtue of the fact that they are non-propositional. Yet, 
instructions ought to qualify as testimonial. So, the solution is to deny (at least) one 
of (i), (ii), or (iii). In this chapter, I consider what commitments each solution would 
involve, and whether each solution would indeed be tenable as an answer to the 
triad. Ultimately, I show that rejecting (i) and (ii) are not feasible strategies, but 
rejecting (iii) provides us with a viable way forward when it comes to understanding 
exactly how information about how to do something can travel from one agent to 
another. 
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This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, I discuss some 
preliminary considerations about knowledge-how and giving instructions. I proceed 
with a detailed discussion and defense of commitments (i) and (ii) in Sections 2.3 
and 2.4, respectively. In Section 2.5, I argue that (iii) is the least tenable of the 
commitments, and argue that we ought to reject it in order to resolve the inconsistent 
triad. If it is correct to deny that testimony is necessarily propositional, then such a 
denial might seem to mean that much of contemporary epistemology is wrong. I 
think this response would be going too far. We do not need to restart the 
epistemology of testimony from scratch; rather, we need to supplement existing 
accounts of testimony. The final sections of this chapter begin this task. In Section 
2.6, I argue that giving instructions qualifies as a specific kind of testimony, namely, 
testimony-how. Section 2.7 introduces a basic account of testimony-how, including 
discussion of how testimony-how compares to paradigm cases of testimony. Finally, 
in Section 2.8, I consider the analogy between memory and testimony and how it 
looks once we consider that testimony is not necessarily propositional.  
Let us begin with some preliminary remarks. 
2.2. Preliminary remarks 
I will begin by addressing a possible objection to my entire project. I could be 
accused of advancing a circular argument of the form that testimony isn’t 
propositional because instructions are testimony, and instructions are testimony 
because testimony isn’t propositional. I understand where such an objection might 
come from: after all, it might look a bit like I am simply cutting the Gordian knot by 
amending the definition of testimony to suit my purposes. But I think the objection is 
misguided. My interest here is about the nature of testimony, not its definition: our 
work on testimony has been shaped by an assumption that the thing of interest 
when we talk about testimony is propositions. This assumption has, of course, 
informed our definitions of testimony. But, as I will go on to show, we would do 
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well to abandon the assumption. This will, of course, influence the downstream 
definitions of testimony, but is most fundamentally about the nature of testimony: 
whether testimony really does trade exclusively in propositions, or whether 
propositions are just one currency in the economy of testimony.  
2.2.1 Intellectualism and anti-intellectualism 
It seems fairly clear that one agent can bring another to believe (and possibly know) 
that p on the basis of her testimony. Knowledge-that is shared among agents through 
testimony; on this, epistemologists basically agree.1 My project here is to explore 
how agents might bring each other to know how to do something. 
An important thing to take away from this section is that the status of 
knowledge is, to some degree, independent of what testimony is. What matters is 
that we understand what the currency of testimony-how ought to be: namely, an 
agent’s coming to know how to φ on the basis of testimony. We need to understand 
what knowledge-how really is before we can begin to understand its relationship to 
testimony.  
The relationship between testimony and knowledge is not the only 
relationship of interest: epistemologists have also sought to understand the 
relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism are opposed positions in the debate. Intellectualists hold that 
knowledge-how is fundamentally knowledge-that: that procedural knowledge is just 
a species of propositional knowledge. On this view, knowing how to perform an 
 
1 There is a lively debate amongst epistemologists about whether knowledge-that is appropriately 
characterised as shared through testimony, and if so, in what sense—i.e. whether beliefs are 
duplicated, transmitted, or generated anew—as well as the epistemic status of the recipient’s belief 
and the conditions under which it rises to the level of genuine knowledge. I bracket this debate for 
now, since there is nevertheless general consensus that one agent can bring another to believe that p 
on the basis of her word. The exact details of how this comes to pass are still under debate, but for my 
purposes, don’t matter. What matters for me is that whatever is going on at the epistemological level 
for knowledge-that, it seems that there should be some analogous way that agents share knowledge-
how.  
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action requires some prior knowledge of rules or facts that guide the action; in other 
words, knowledge-how depends on some way on knowledge-that. Anti-
intellectualists deny this thesis, either by asserting the negation or by asserting the 
opposite, i.e. weak anti-intellectualists deny that knowledge-how depends on 
knowledge-that, while strong anti-intellectualists invert the hierarchy and hold that 
knowledge-that in fact depends on knowledge-how (Fantl 2008). 
Most epistemologists accept that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are 
distinct kinds, at least on the surface. The real disagreement about knowledge-how 
and knowledge-that arises when we try to cash out the relationship between the two. 
Those who hold that knowledge-how reduces to knowledge-that—i.e. that 
knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that—are intellectualists. This view is held, 
notably, by Stanley and Williamson (2001), but has a long lineage of defenders 
including Bengson and Moffat (2011a), Brown (1971; 1974), Ginet (1975), Katzoff 
(1984), Snowdon (2003), and Vendler (1972). 
Ryle (1949, chap. 2) is often credited with catalysing the intellectualist/anti-
intellectualist debate with his rejection of what he called “the intellectualist legend” 
(Bengson and Moffett 2011b) and defense of what Fantl (2008) calls weak anti-
intellectualism. On Ryle’s view, knowledge-how does not depend on knowledge-that, 
and knowing the right facts about how to φ is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowing how to φ. Since Ryle, many others have defended weak anti-
intellectualism, including inter alia Carr (1979), Lewis (1990), Noë (2005), and Riley 
(2017). 
An even stronger version of the anti-intellectualist thesis is what Fantl (2008) 
calls strong anti-intellectualism, which is the view that knowledge-that depends on 
knowledge-how (Hartland-Swann 1956; 1957; Hetherington 2006; Roland 1958). 
Habgood-Coote (2018a) and Williams (2008) offer intermediate or hybrid views. I 
bracket these strong anti-intellectualist and intermediate views for this chapter.  
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The point of this section has been to emphasise that the category of 
procedural knowledge is wildly variable both with respect to its relationship with 
propositional knowledge and the degree to which procedural knowledge rests more 
on algorithm and learning a set of propositions (e.g., Bengson and Moffett 2011b) or 
more on skill or practice. This will necessarily complicate the discussion in this 
chapter, since my argument pertains to testimony’s (non-) propositionality, and this 
will be more or less interesting or persuasive depending on the degree to which you 
think propositional knowledge is involved in procedural knowledge. If you take the 
paradigm case of knowledge how to be something like “S knows how to prove the 
Pythagorean Theorem,” then the argument  that we can transmit knowledge-how 
through testimony will strike you as much less interesting—and controversial—than 
if you take the paradigm case to be closer to “S knows how to knit.”  
The reason I bring this up is not to take a stance in this debate. In fact, I mean 
to bracket the tension between anti-intellectualism and intellectualism altogether for 
the time being. For this chapter, I am not directly concerned with knowledge-how, 
but with testimony-how. I focus on what constitutes testimony-how and leave the 
question of whether a subject knows-how on the basis of another’s testimony-how as 
an avenue for further research (but see Carter and Pritchard 2015; Hawley 2010; Peet 
forthcoming; Poston 2009; 2016). While the anti-intellectualist/intellectualist issue is 
relevant to the topic of the present chapter, the divide is epistemological and not 
metaphysical. The debate can be therefore decided independently of my argument 
for testimony-how and my account of its nature.   
 The purpose of the chapter is to spell out exactly how it is that one agent can 
learn how to φ from another; this is perfectly compatible with knowledge-how’s 
being a species of knowledge-that. Moreover, since the intellectualist already holds 
that to know how to do something is to know some fact or set of facts about the 
world (Stanley 2011), he should agree that any utterance capable of instilling beliefs 
about the relevant facts should constitute testimony-how. In other words, 
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propositional statements about the relevant facts of how to do something (as the 
intellectualist understands those facts to be) just are, by the intellectualist’s own 
lights, testimony-how. Nevertheless, the intellectualist still needs to explain how 
imperative utterances (namely, instructions) can convey facts. This chapter is meant 
to do just that. 
However, to claim that one agent can learn how to φ from another does not 
commit one to the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. Because 
my claim that an agent can come to learn how to φ from another does not turn on 
the claim that what is communicated is propositional knowledge, I do not commit to 
anti-intellectualism of either the strong or weak variety.  
Because my argument is neutral with respect to the debate over the 
relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, both the intellectualist 
and anti-intellectualist alike should be open to it. To say that there is such a thing as 
testimony-how neither precludes nor necessitates that testimony-how is a species of 
testimony-that, or vice versa. 
2.2.2 A working definition of testimony 
The following definition should not be confused with an account of testimony; 
indeed, developing an account is the project of Section 2.7 of this chapter. The 
purpose of the present section is to elucidate the general phenomenon at issue when 
epistemologists talk about testimony, in order to minimise confusion throughout this 
discussion. Part of this definition will be taken from Chapter 1 of this thesis, while 
other parts will be taken from the literature. It is, therefore, probably worth saying a 
few things that I already take for granted and are supported by the literature. 
 Crudely put, to learn from testimony is to learn from somebody’s telling 
something to somebody else. One important feature I take testimony to have is that 
there need not be a strict 1:1 ratio between what is testified to and what is said; i.e. 
one can testify to more than what the literal content of the testimony conveys 
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(Lackey 2008), as when you ask me whether it is raining and I reply that there is an 
umbrella in the closet.  
 Second, and relatedly, testimony is constructive as opposed to transmissive, 
meaning that testimony is not a matter of implanting ideas from one person’s mind 
into another’s, but rather testifier and recipient alike perform cognitive labour in 
order to produce and interpret the content of the testimony. I argued in Chapter 1 
that mindreading—in which testifiers and recipients must discern the other’s 
motives, intentions, background knowledge, and how these are influenced by the 
context of the exchange—is a key way by which testifiers and recipients perform this 
labour. Moreover, this process contributes information that becomes part of the 
resultant beliefs. 
Third, testimony can take many forms. Testimony can be spoken, signed, 
gestured, written, or otherwise offered; what is important is that there is some 
central act of communication that conveys communicable content. (I discuss this at 
length in Chapter 1.) This will mean, for the argument presented here, that if we 
understand instructions as being a kind of testimony-how (as I argue we should), 
then there will be several different ways of instantiating that testimony. 
Demonstrations, written procedures, and spoken instructions will all constitute 
testimony-how, on my view, provided they meet the other conditions I discuss later 
in this chapter. 
Fourth, I deny that a testifier must know in order to testify, and, 
correspondingly, a recipient need not gain knowledge in order to have learned from 
testimony.2 A testifier might not know something (because he lacks justification or 
belief, or holds a false belief) and yet testify to it. Testimony, then, can generate 
knowledge, either by instilling a true belief in a recipient who already holds some 
justification, or by providing justification for a true belief the recipient already 
 
2 My view here is informed by Goldberg (2005), Graham (2000), and Lackey (1999; 2006b; 2008). 
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holds.3 I therefore deny that testimony is a matter of knowledge or belief transfer; 
rather, the way epistemologists ought to understand testimony is as one person’s 
instilling a belief in another. 
Testimony is epistemologically unique in that it is generally understood 
necessarily to take a propositional form. The same is not true, however, for at least 
one other source of knowledge: perception. When I perceive that the table before me 
is red or that my dog’s fur is soft, I do not perceive those as propositions; rather, I 
have a qualitative experience and infer from the experience the relevant proposition, 
such as “the table is red” or “the fur is soft,” and so on.4 The question, then, is what 
we really mean when we talk about testimony: should we understand testimony as 
being, broadly, anytime we learn from others? Or should we understand it as 
learning only from others’ propositional utterances?  
Let us entertain the former:  it would imply that if (unbeknownst to you) I 
watch you perform an action, and then I successfully copy you, and in the process 
come to know how to perform the same action, it does seem as though I have 
learned from you. Or, at least, my knowing how to perform the action is 
counterfactually dependent on my witnessing your performing the action. But 
intuitively, this should not count as testimony: you were completely unaware that 
you were being observed, and your performing the action was not meant to 
communicate anything. So, treating the former as though it is testimony seems to 
miss the point about what testimony is.  
Let us now entertain the latter: it would imply that you can know from others 
only when they put their knowledge into propositional form. But this seems too 
restrictive. It would exclude a case where I ask my friend where he put the book he 
borrowed from me, and he points to the shelf where the book sits. His utterance (if 
 
3 This is a view defended by Lackey (2005; 2007) and Graham (2006), in response to Senor (2007). 
4 See Sant’Anna (2018b) for a critical discussion of the arguments for understanding mental content as 
propositional. 
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his gesture is even properly understood as an utterance) has not taken a 
propositional form, or at least it is no more propositional than seeing a green apple 
and coming to entertain the proposition “this apple is green.” Nevertheless, I come 
to know from him because he has expressed to me some information in an attempt 
to instil a certain belief in me, i.e. that the book is on the shelf. This is not merely 
perceptual, since I did not see the book on the shelf on my own. My belief that the 
book is on the shelf is counterfactually dependent on my friend’s pointing at the 
shelf; i.e. it depends on his communicative action meant to instil a certain belief in 
me.   
Above, I asked whether we should understand testimony as being, broadly, 
anytime we learn from others, or whether we should understand it as learning only 
from others’ propositional utterances. From the examples above, it looks as though 
the former is too permissive, but the latter too restrictive.  Testimony, then, is not 
simply learning from someone, but neither is it a matter of learning strictly from 
another’s propositional utterances. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. I 
return to both points throughout the chapter, but for now, I will close this section 
with the following remark.  
Since the purpose of this chapter is to discuss a non-propositional form of 
testimony, and the existing literature overwhelmingly describes testimony as being 
propositional, it is necessary to propose a working definition of testimony. For 
obvious reasons, I want to resist the popular formulation “S testifies that p.” I 
develop a more precise account of testimony-how in Section 2.7 of this chapter, but 
for the time being, I will say roughly that testimony is what happens when one agent 
instils beliefs5 in another, as a result of that agent’s intentional act of communication. 
I leave open the question of whether what is communicated is information that p or 
some non-propositional procedural information.  
 
5 The beliefs formed need not be propositional, even if the corresponding testimonial utterance is.  
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2.3. Commitment (i): All instructions are testimony 
Let us revisit the inconsistent triad I advanced above. The first solution is to deny (i): 
that all instructions are testimony. In this section, I argue that instructions are a kind 
of testimony. It may seem that of the three triadic commitments, this one is the 
weakest. Why, then, should we not reject it out of hand? After all, doing so would 
resolve the inconsistent triad and leave us with two other prima facie entirely 
plausible and broadly accepted claims. But let me explain why (i) is not as far-
fetched as it seems. 
Recall from the working definition of testimony I set out in Section 2.2.2 that 
at its heart, testimony is a matter of one agent’s instilling beliefs in another (or 
attempting to do so). So, instructions count as testimony if instructing is a way for 
one agent to instil beliefs in another. To reject triadic commitment (i), you would 
need to claim that (at least) some instructions are not testimony. The obvious way to 
do this is by finding a counterexample: a case where an instruction is delivered but it 
fails to qualify as testimony. To this end, let us consider different kinds of 
instruction. 
Instructions take many forms. Hawley (2010) lists “a number of ways in which B 
can learn from A how to φ: 6 
1. A describes to B how to φ 
2. A gives B imperative instructions how to φ (‘do this, do that’) 
3. A describes to B how A φs (or something like φ) 
4. B overhears A talking to someone else [C] about how to φ (or about how A 
φs) 
5. A intentionally shows B how to φ, and B imitates A 
6. B observes A φ -ing and imitates A 
7. B observes A trying and failing to φ, and thereby works out how to φ (maybe 
A intends this, maybe not; maybe A thinks she knows how to φ, maybe not) 
 
6 Hawley uses the term “how to X” rather than “how to φ.” For the sake of consistency, I have opted 
to substitute φ for X throughout this chapter.  
   
51 
 
8. Intentionally or not, A forces or encourages B to come to know how to φ (to 
use trial and error, to practice, to pay for lessons?)” (Hawley 2010, 400, list 
numbers added for clarity and ease of discussion) 
I think it is clear in (1), (2), and (5) in Hawley’s list that A is instructing B in how to 
φ. The instructional status of (3), I think, depends on whether A describes to B how 
A does φ with the goal of having B learn how to φ; it seems to me that iff A has this 
goal, and is counting on B to update indexicals in the appropriate way (i.e. to update 
“I [A]” to mean “I [B]”), then A is instructing B in how to φ. Describing (4), (6), (7), 
and (8) as instructions is more strained: in (4), A may be instructing C, but although 
B learns from A how to φ, A is not instructing B. In (6) and (7), A is not so much 
instructing B as A is simply φ -ing, and B learns from A how to φ through non-
instructional means. Finally, for (8), that A is a participant in the exchange seems 
almost inconsequential; to my mind, it is more appropriate to say that A is operative 
in B’s learning how to φ, than it is to say that B is learning how to φ from A.  
Importantly, to say that B has learned how to φ from A is not to say that A has 
instructed B. But there are some cases in which B has learned how to φ from A, and 
it has been through A’s instruction. Since the purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
epistemology of instructions, I will concentrate my attention on Hawley’s (1), (2), the 
relevant kinds of (3), and (5) throughout this chapter.  
To that end, let us consider candidate counterexamples to the first triadic 
commitment. A counterexample could take any of the following forms of instruction: 
1. A describes to B how to φ 
2. A gives B imperative instructions how to φ (‘do this, do that’) 
3. A describes to B how A does φ (or something like φ) 
5. A intentionally shows B how to φ, and B imitates A 
What we need is a case where A performs one of the given actions without actually 
instructing B. The obvious target is a case in which A performs one of the given 
actions, but B fails to learn from A; this, however, is not a genuine counterexample. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that Lackey (2008) distinguishes between s-testimony and h-
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testimony, where s-testimony is the speaker’s intentional expression of 
communicable content conveying the information that p, and h-testimony is the 
hearer’s reasonably taking an intentional expression of communicable content to 
convey the information that p. Because Lackey’s view is disjunctive, it is possible for 
a testifier to attempt to instill a belief in a recipient and fail to do so, owing to 
misunderstanding, noncomprehension, obstinance, or some other obstacle. The 
attempt, however, is still testimonial. Similarly, if A performs an action meant to 
instruct B in how to φ, B’s failure to learn how to φ is not reason to say that A’s 
action was not instruction. Rather, we have something akin to Lackey’s s-testimony 
without h-testimony. 
Now that the issue of counterexamples has been put to rest, of the 
instructional forms in Hawley’s list, (2) is the kind of instruction at issue as regards 
the inconsistent triad I have presented above. So, as I discuss the inconsistent triad in 
the coming few sections, the reader should bear cases of type (2) in mind; these are 
non-propositional imperative instructions. I return to cases of types (1), (3) and (5) in 
Section 2.7 of the chapter, but for now, what is important about it is that there is at 
least one case where B can learn how to φ from A through A’s use of imperatives. It 
is, as Hawley emphasises (2010, 398), an empirical question as to how many of our 
instructions are offered in each of the forms she enumerates. Similarly, I wish to 
emphasise that the question here is not about which instructional method is the most 
successful, expedient, or psychologically agreeable for an instructee; what matters is 
that they are on an epistemic par with respect to their ability to convey information 
to a recipient. 
Since nothing epistemologically significant seems to rest on an instructor’s 
choice of instructional form, the forms of instruction I have followed Hawley (2010) 
in identifying are on an epistemic par: no matter the grammatical form of A’s 
instruction, B can still come to know how to φ. To reject certain instructions on the 
grounds that they are not propositional is an ad hoc solution, apparently solely for 
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the purpose of maintaining a commitment to testimony’s necessarily being 
propositional. To my mind, this commitment is unjustified. As I argued in Chapter 1 
of this thesis, memory and testimony are analogous, and moreover, there is a 
longstanding picture of memory and perception as analogous.7 Both the philosophy 
of perception and the philosophy of memory include debates over the contents of 
perception and memory; as far as I can tell, there is no corresponding debate in 
testimony. That testimonial utterances ordinarily take propositional form seems to 
have served as evidence enough that testimony just is propositional; I return to this 
point and argue explicitly against it in Section 2.5 of this chapter. 
Ultimately, it seems that rejecting the claim that all instructions are testimony 
(in virtue of their non-propositionality) is not the way out of the triad. To reject 
triadic commitment (i), you would need to reject that instructions of Hawley’s form 
(1), in which A describes to B how to φ, count as testimony. But clearly, instructions 
of form (1) are testimony: A describes to B how to φ, and B comes to know how to φ. 
Since nothing epistemologically significant hangs on whether A uses this 
formulation or another, such as form (2), where A provides imperative instructions 
to B as to how to φ, we cannot reject (2) as a form of testimony without also rejecting 
(1).  And again, the only reason you would reject those non-propositional forms is if 
you had already accepted that testimony is necessarily propositional. As I will show 
in Section 2.5, however, this notion is unjustified, and rejecting (i) will cause you to 
run headlong into the larger question in the epistemology of testimony as to whether 
sources of propositional knowledge need themselves take propositional form. 
Bracketing this latter question, which I answer negatively in Section 2.5, 
rejecting (i) is not a satisfactory solution to the triad. Nevertheless, suppose you are 
unwilling to reject it. You have an alternative: you might claim that all instructions 
are propositional. This amounts to the denial of triadic commitment (ii), which holds 
 
7 See Green (2006) on the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception, and Sant’Anna 
(2018a) for an extended treatment of issues in the philosophy of memory and perception. 
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that some instructions are non-propositional. Let us consider this view next and 
investigate what denying it would mean. 
2.4. Commitment (ii): Some instructions are non-propositional  
The second prima facie plausible triadic commitment is that some instructions are 
non-propositional. The present section will be brief, for I take it as obvious that some 
instructions are non-propositional. Consider instructions given in the imperative 
mood, such as “Loop the yarn counter-clockwise around the right needle,” “Press 
Ctrl+Alt+Delete twice to restart your computer,” or “Pull the oxygen mask toward 
you, place it over your mouth and nose, and secure the strap over the back of your 
head.” Sentences of this sort are endlessly producible, but what they all have in 
common is that they are not truth-apt; i.e. they do not have truth conditions. 
Instructions in the imperative mood cannot be true or false; “to ask whether 
[imperatives] are true or false seems without any sense” (Jörgensen 1937, 289). 
We regularly instruct in the imperative mood, so it is at least prima facie 
plausible that some instructions are non-propositional. “Keep your hands at 10 and 
2” is an instruction as to where to place one’s hands on a car’s steering wheel, but is 
non-propositional and therefore not truth-apt. So, it seems that at least some 
instructions are non-propositional.   
One might, however, find this basic claim to be unpalatable, and so reject it. 
This brings us to the second possible solution to the inconsistent triad. Denying that 
some instructions are non-propositional amounts to some version of imperative 
cognitivism (henceforth, simply “cognitivism”). The core tenet of cognitivism is that 
all imperatives (and therefore instructions delivered in the imperative mood) express 
propositions. In this section, I consider different kinds of cognitivism and their 
strengths, but ultimately deny that rejecting (ii) is the best solution to the triad.  
Since cognitivists claim that all imperatives express propositions, they hold 
that all imperatives have truth conditions. On this view, although instructions are 
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delivered in the imperative mood, they in fact contain disguised propositions; this 
implies that instructions straightforwardly count as testimony. This solution will 
require commitment to a translation schema. Imperative translation schemata are 
meant to express what is contained in the meaning of imperatives; their role is to 
capture exactly, completely, and only what is meant by a particular imperative 
utterance. In this chapter, I consider five prominent translation schemata: Reports 
Theory, Desires Theory, Deontic Theory, Predictions Theory, or Elliptic Theory 
(Clark-Younger 2014). 8 Clark-Younger (2014) explains how each translation schema 
treats imperatives (usually of the command type); below, I adapt each one for 
instructions.  
Under Reports Theory (Jackson and Pettit 1998; Lewis 1970), imperatives are 
identical to reports of those imperatives. So, for A to instruct B to “Pedal!” is 
identical to A’s saying “I instruct that you pedal!” On this view, “Pedal!” is true iff A 
so instructs B. Desires Theory (Hare 1952), in contrast, holds that imperatives 
express a speaker’s desire that a certain state of affairs be realised. For A to instruct B 
to “Pedal!” is identical to A’s saying to B “I desire that you pedal!” “Pedal!” is true 
iff A really does desire that B pedal. Under Deontic Theory (Hamblin 1987), 
imperatives express “you should” statements. “Pedal!” is identical to “You should 
pedal!” so “Pedal” is true iff it is the case that B ought to pedal. Predictions Theory 
(Gibbons 1960) holds that imperatives express predictions about the future. “Pedal!” 
is identical to “You will pedal!” so “Pedal!” is true iff B will pedal. Finally, according 
to Elliptic Theory (Anderson and Moore 1957; Bohnert 1945), imperatives are 
shorthand for a declarative sentence that is the disjunction of two states of affairs. As 
Clark-Younger (2014, 67) puts it, “[Elliptic] Theory holds that commands are ellipses 
of disjunctive sentences of the form ‘you do x or else...’ The translation of ‘get off my 
 
8 These schemata apply to all imperatives, including commands, advice, instructions, and so on. I am 
only interested in instructions, which are grammatically identical to other kinds of imperatives, but 
have different pragmatics (Kaufmann 2012). Thus, even though a certain translation schema may suit 
some kinds of imperatives, I will go on to argue that none is suitable for instructions. 
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lawn!’ would be, perhaps, ‘either you get off my lawn or I’ll call the police,’ or more 
generally ‘either you get off my lawn or y’ where y stands for some unspecified 
unpleasant consequence. This will perhaps be a threat, but it might not be. This 
means that commands are true if either you obey them, or if the bad thing that was 
implicit in the command happens, or, presumably, both.” So, “Pedal!” is identical to 
“Either you pedal or y,” where y might be “the bike will not move” or “you will fall 
over,” or something along those lines, and is true iff one of the disjuncts is true. 
2.4.1 Reasons to be sceptical of imperative cognitivism simpliciter 
Cognitivism is prima facie a very attractive solution: it smoothly renders non-
propositional utterances into propositional statements with clear truth conditions. 
This is true regardless of the translation schema that we adopt. However, since I am 
about to argue that cognitivism will not provide the solution we need irrespective of 
the translation schema, I do not commit to a particular schema.  
Cognitivism fails to solve the problem on three counts. First, there are general 
reasons to be sceptical of cognitivism’s ability to explain even paradigmatic 
imperatives such as commands. Second, even if those concerns were assuaged, 
cognitivism struggles to explain instructions, largely because it struggles to explain 
soft imperatives of any kind. Third, even if it did not struggle to explain soft 
imperatives, cognitivism would still fail to provide an adequate account of how an 
instructee comes to gain beliefs about how to do things on the basis of a testifier’s 
word. Cognitivism, then, is triply damned. 
 To explain why this is the case, let us begin with the general criticisms against 
cognitivism. The short version of the criticism is that cognitivism results in what 
Parsons (2012) calls “unwanted validities” and “unwanted consistencies,” i.e. if 
imperatives are understood as having truth conditions and are incorporated into 
arguments of standard form (such as modus ponens), they sometimes come out as 
valid or consistent when they should not. 
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 To see what Parsons (2012) means, let us consider a case where A instructs B. 
Suppose A is teaching B how to float on her back in a swimming pool and says 
“Push your bellybutton upwards.” Let us consider, like Parsons, Reports Theory, on 
which this instruction would be equivalent to “I instruct that you push your 
bellybutton upwards.” But consider the following pair of instructions:  
A1. Push your bellybutton upwards. 
A2. Do not push your bellybutton upwards. 
A1 and A2 are clearly inconsistent: an instructee who received these instructions 
would, quite rightly, not know what to do. But the translations that result from 
Reports Theory do not bear this inconsistency. They would translate as follows: 
B1. I instruct that you push your bellybutton upwards. 
B2. I instruct that you do not push your bellybutton upwards. 
But B1 is not inconsistent with B2 in the way that A1 is inconsistent with A2. One 
can coherently report that one has given inconsistent instructions, which suggests 
that imperatives are not in fact identical to reports of those imperatives. The problem 
is not unique to Reports Theory, either: see Clark-Younger (2014) for a detailed 
account of how the problem of unwanted consistencies arises even if we endorse a 
different translation schema.  
 Let us also consider the problem of unwanted validities, again using A1 as 
our example. 
A1. Push your bellybutton upwards. 
Therefore, someone instructs something. 
On Reports Theory, this would translate as: 
C1. I instruct that you push your bellybutton upwards. 
Therefore, someone instructs something. 
The latter of these arguments is valid: it cannot possibly be the case that “I instruct 
that…” is true without forcing the conclusion to follow. And if cognitivism is true, 
   
58 
 
then the former is also valid. But the conclusion seems not to be about the same 
thing as premise C1: the first is about pushing one’s bellybutton upwards, while the 
second is about instruction. They lack the sort of relevance required for validity 
(Parsons 2012). So, this suggests that cognitivism fails. 
Clark-Younger (2014) introduces two other problems for cognitivism, but for 
the sake of brevity, I pass over a good deal of her expansion on Parsons’ (2012) view. 
I do, however, encourage the interested reader to consult Clark-Younger (2014), 
especially Chapters 5 and 6. The upshot is that cognitivism, regardless of the 
translation schema we adopt, will suffer from one or both of the problems of 
unwanted validities or unwanted consistencies; this already serves as a persuasive 
reason to reject cognitivism. 
2.4.2 Reasons to be sceptical about specific translation schemata 
But suppose that you are not convinced by what I have presented above: suppose, 
for whatever reason, you still think cognitivism is the way to go. You might think 
this is because the arguments I have considered so far are meant to apply to all 
imperatives, but especially orders and commands. But instructions are not 
interchangeable with imperatives; rather, they are a species of imperative, and exhibit 
certain features that set them apart from other kinds of imperatives. For one thing, 
instructions are a species of soft imperative, and along with requests and advice, bear 
an extra layer of difficulties when it comes to understanding what their 
propositional content is (Clark-Younger 2014). Extant translation schemata, though 
they are meant to explain imperatives and should in principle also explain 
instructions, fail to account for instructions. 
Reports Theory 
To see how the translation schemata fail to provide adequate accounts of 
instructions, let us begin with Reports Theory, under which instructions are identical 
to reports of those instructions. If A says to B, “Pedal!” then “I instruct that you 
   
59 
 
pedal!” is true iff A really is instructing B on how to ride a bike (or how to move 
forward, or how to climb to the top of the hill, and so on). But A’s utterance of 
“Pedal!” could be a number of different types of speech act: she could be commanding 
that B pedal (if A is, for example, B’s cycling coach), she could be requesting that B 
pedal (if A and B are riding a tandem bicycle and B is doing all the work), or she 
might be advising B to pedal (if B is coasting but would do better to continue 
pedalling). For a successful translation, Reports Theory requires that we know what 
type of communication A intends in order to determine the truth conditions of A’s 
utterance. 
 This distinction might seem unimportant; after all, even in paradigmatic 
testimony, we can happen to gain true beliefs from a testifier even if we 
misunderstand the testifier’s meaning. So it might not seem to matter whether B 
thinks A is instructing when she is really commanding, and so on. But if this is the 
case, then instructees are routinely gaining the wrong kinds of beliefs on the basis of 
an instructor’s instructions. (I address this worry in more detail in Section 2.4.3.) For 
now, suffice it to say that a difficulty translating the correct speech act poses a 
significant enough challenge for Reports Theory that we should reject it as a 
candidate. 
Desires Theory 
Let us next consider Desires Theory, under which instructions express an 
instructor’s desire. It is, however, not contained in the meaning of “Pedal!” that the 
instructor desire that the instructee pedal, so the translation is at best logically 
suspect. Furthermore, we might instruct people to do things that we do not actually 
desire that they do. For example, consider the wildly implausible (if dramatically 
compelling) scenario on the ABC drama Private Practice, in which pregnant medical 
doctor Violet Turner is assaulted by her former patient, Katie, who is convinced that 
the baby is rightly hers. When Katie (who has no medical training) begins to read a 
textbook to learn how to perform a C-section to retrieve the baby, Violet, realising 
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Katie fully intends to go through with it, insists that Katie follow her instructions so 
as to save the baby, even though Violet will likely not survive. In this scenario, Violet 
instructs Katie on how to perform a C-section even though Violet very clearly does 
not desire that Katie do so. 
The reader may, however, object to this example on the grounds that Violet 
does desire that Katie follow her instructions to perform the C-section: she desires it 
as a means to save her baby when it becomes clear to her that Katie is going to 
operate on Violet one way or another. So, you might think that Violet has an 
adaptive preference, and in that sense, when she instructs Katie to “Make the first 
incision here,” “I desire that you make the first incision here” is indeed the 
appropriate translation. I myself am not in this camp—I think it is fairly clear that 
under normal circumstances, Violet would not desire that Katie perform a C-section 
on her—but if the reader is convinced by the objection, let us consider an alternative. 
Suppose a YouTube video instructs viewers in how to change a flat bicycle tire. It is 
unlikely that the instructor has any desires regarding the viewer’s changing the tire, 
and yet that does not impede the instructor’s ability to instruct: what is more 
important is whether the instructor is giving good instructions, i.e. ones that, if 
followed, will lead the viewer to change a tire successfully. The first example is 
extreme, and the second is mundane, but the point stands: Desires Theory fails as a 
translation schema for instructions for the simple reason that instructions are not 
always given in accordance with an instructor’s desire.  
Deontic Theory 
Let us now turn to Deontic Theory, under which imperatives can be understood as 
expressing “you should” statements; i.e. “Pedal!” translates as “You should pedal!” 
Clark-Younger argues that Deontic Theory fails, since “the ‘shoulds’ must be 
thought of as all-things considered shoulds” (2014, 82), but it is far from clear that if 
instructions generate obligations, they are all-things-considered obligations. Let us 
explore this idea in more detail. Deontic Theory is consistent with Lewis’ (1969) 
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claim that imperatives generate an obligation, but that claim does not seem to 
translate well to instructions. Though commands or orders seem to generate 
obligations, instructions lack the same urgency and obligatory force.  Furthermore, it 
is not contained in the meaning of the instruction “Do X” that an instructee is now 
obligated to do X. Instructions, unlike their command counterparts, are obligation-
neutral. I can follow them or I can not, although my successful φ-ing may depend on 
my following the instruction to do X (and if there is an obligation that I φ, I may be 
obligated to do X, but the obligation does not come from the fact that I have been so 
instructed).  
But Deontic Theory is concerned with permissions and obligations alike, so 
we might think that it will suit us to understand instructions as expressing 
permissions rather than obligations. Indeed, if I ask you how to φ, you might well 
reply with something like “You can do it this way,” which quite clearly expresses a 
permission (and, moreover, is truth-apt). However, while it may be contained in the 
meaning of “Do X” that an instructee is permitted to do X, mere permission does not 
adequately capture the implicit assurance that doing X is a way to φ. Surely there are 
many things that I can do that are compatible with my φ-ing without being ways to 
φ: if I want to knit a lace shawl, I am permitted to drink a gallon of tea, to adjust the 
thermostat, to cook dinner, to feed my dog, to assemble a chest of drawers, to read 
philosophy, and so on, but none of these actions are ways for me to knit a lace shawl. 
Understanding instructions as expressing permissions, then, provides at best an 
incomplete solution: we need a way to capture the implicit guarantee that doing X is 
a way to φ. 
On some accounts of paradigmatic testimony (i.e. testimony-that), testifying 
involves an implicit invitation to trust (e.g., Hinchman 2005). When testifiers testify, 
they extend an invitation to a recipient to trust that what the testifier says is true. Of 
course, as we are well on the way to establishing by now, instructions in the 
imperative mood are not truth-apt, so the notion of an invitation to trust that what 
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the instructor says is true seems slightly odd. Nevertheless, it is not too difficult to 
imagine an analogue to sincerity. What it would look like in the instruction case? It 
would probably take a form like “Doing X is a way to φ [and my saying so is a 
guarantee that this is true].”  
This looks awfully close to a solution, but will not get us where we need to be. 
The role of a translation schema is to capture what is contained in the meaning of the 
instruction, and it is far from clear that the guarantee is contained therein. Rather, 
the guarantee acts more as an add-on to the meaning of the sentence, where the 
sentence itself means something like “You are permitted to do X” and the fact of the 
instructor’s saying so acts as the guarantee. For Deontic Theory (and indeed, any of 
the translation schemata) to be satisfactory, it must capture exactly and only what is 
contained in the meaning of the instruction. If the point of the translation schema is 
to translate a truth-inapt sentence to a truth-apt one, then no other changes should 
be acceptable; to impose the guarantee clause to make the permissions variant of 
Deontic Theory palatable is not the right way to go. Moreover, when we couple this 
failure with the challenges that the problems of unwanted consistencies and 
unwanted validities pose to Deontic Theory, we must conclude that the solution 
does not lie therein. 
Predictions Theory 
So much for Deontic Theory; perhaps the solution lies in Predictions Theory, which 
holds that instructions express an instructor’s prediction that the instructee will 
follow her instructions. On this view, “Pedal!” is identical to “I predict that you will 
pedal!” But it is not the case that instructors always predict that their instructees will 
follow the instructions. I might instruct an undergraduate philosophy class on how 
to complete a truth table, but that does not mean that I predict they will all 
successfully learn how to complete a truth table immediately after I teach them; in 
fact, I may predict that most of them will not immediately learn how to complete a 
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truth table purely on the basis of my instruction. (In addition to instruction, they will 
need practice, for example.)  
One way out of this, you might think, is to deviate from instructions for a 
moment and return to commands, another species of imperative, and say that 
commands issued contrary to a speaker’s predictions simply do not count as genuine 
commands; i.e. if a speaker commands something while predicting that the 
command will not be followed, then the speaker has not genuinely commanded 
anything. You might think that instead the speaker has merely expressed a wish, for 
instance. The problem is that the same solution does not seem to hold for 
instructions (Clark-Younger 2014). There seems to be no important reason that a 
speaker’s predictions have anything to do with the ontology of instructions and 
whether a given utterance counts as an instruction. At best, if I instruct you to do 
something, I might be predicting (and hoping) that you come to know how to do that 
thing, but I am not necessarily predicting that you will actually do it. 
Part of the reason that Predictions Theory fails is that the translations do not 
distinguish between types of imperative: “Pedal!” may be an instruction, a 
command, a request, a wish, or so on, but no matter which one it is, it will be 
translated as “I predict that you will pedal.” However, the differences among types 
of imperative are significant and any adequate translation schema should be able to 
account for those differences. Treating them as though they were all the same just 
means that our translation fails to capture something contained in the meaning of 
any given imperative. Furthermore, this last point holds true for all other translation 
schemata that we have considered so far except for Reports Theory, which itself runs 
into the problem of being able to identify what speech act is being performed in the 
utterance of any given imperative sentence. 




Let us finally consider Elliptic Theory. Elliptic Theory seeks to capture the 
“motivating force” of commands by understanding imperatives as disjunctions, 
where one disjunct is a prediction of the addressee’s action and the other is a 
prediction of the (usually negative) consequence of the addressee’s failure to fulfil 
the command. So, “Pedal!” becomes “Either you will pedal or you will fall over!” 
(for example). 
The main problem here is that Elliptic Theory introduces much more 
information than is in the command. Nothing about “Pedal!” implies that “Either 
you will pedal or you will fall over!” The information comes from the context but is 
not contained in the meaning of the sentence itself (Clark-Younger 2014). So, in 
addition to introducing extra information, it also runs the risk of introducing extra 
false information. You might not think this is a problem; after all, I have previously 
followed Lackey (2008) in arguing that there need not be a strict 1:1 ratio as to what 
is uttered and what is testified to. For instance, if you ask me if it is raining, and I 
reply that there is an umbrella in the closet, I have implicitly testified that it is indeed 
raining while also explicitly testifying that there is an umbrella in the closet.9 
Perhaps, you might think, the same can be true of imperatives, and rejecting Elliptic 
Theory on the grounds that it introduces information not contained in the meaning 
of the sentence is inconsistent with a view of testimony that allows that recipients 
can understand more from a testifier than what she explicitly says. You may 
furthermore claim that the ability for Elliptic Theory to introduce false information is 
not a problem because testifying is not factive.  
This objection is misguided because of the role that logical translation plays 
and the role of the recipient’s faculty of comprehension. There is a difference 
between the translation of an utterance and what a recipient might understand from 
 
9 This example is borrowed from Lackey (2008). 
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that same utterance. Translation must be exact; it’s not about inference or what 
follows from a statement. When a recipient interprets a piece of testimony, she might 
interpret in such a way that she introduces new information based on her 
background knowledge, the context of the exchange, or any of the other factors I 
addressed in Chapter 1. But this is not what translation is: translation ought to deal 
in only that information that is (logically) contained in the utterance. It is perfectly 
fine for an addressee to introduce new information psychologically, but a mistake 
for a translation schema to do the same. 
Even if you are unsatisfied by my response to this objection, it is worth noting 
the clear relationship between Elliptic Theory and Predictions Theory: Elliptic 
Theory is simply a matter of making a disjunctive prediction. As such, it will suffer 
from the same problems as Predictions Theory. Most significantly, the introduction 
of other information into the meaning of the instruction is a major worry, and since it 
is a ground to reject Predictions Theory, so too should it be a ground for rejecting 
Elliptic Theory. 
2.4.3 Reasons to be sceptical of cognitivism about instructions 
As Clark-Younger (2014) argues, the problems of soft imperatives, unwanted 
consistencies, and unwanted validities should lead us to conclude that cognitivism 
does not provide an adequate account of imperatives. We should, therefore, be 
sceptical about cognitivism in general. 
But suppose that the general reasons to be sceptical of cognitivism are not 
convincing in the case of learning from instructions. Suppose that you think, for 
whatever reason, that the objections to cognitivism fail and that cognitivism serves 
as an adequate explanation of instructions. You would then confront the 
consequence that one of two (equally implausible) things is happening if instructions 
are properly understood as declaratives in disguise. One possibility is that each 
imperative seems to constitute testimony about the wrong kind of thing: “Pedal!” 
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does not translate in such a way that it imparts propositions about how to pedal, but 
instead about the mental states of the instructor or her assertions about the world. 
The implication is that instructees are gaining the wrong kinds of beliefs (e.g., 
“Chloe wants me to pedal like this” rather than “This is how to pedal”). So, “Pedal!” 
conveys information that “Chloe wants me to pedal like this” when we think it is 
conveying information about how to pedal. 
The other possibility is that instructees are routinely failing to gain the 
knowledge expressed: the instruction is stated as an imperative, translated to a 
declarative, and then taken up as an imperative once more. This process is 
implausibly cumbersome; furthermore, it would indicate the routine failure of 
comprehensive capacities, since instructees would be required to gain knowledge of 
how to pedal (“Pedal like this”) even though the translation of the imperative is 
something like “I want you to pedal like this.” The simpler and more cognitively 
economical explanation is that instructees simply take up instructions in their given 
imperative form. If the solution to the puzzle lies in adopting cognitivism about 
instructions, it does not reside in these translation schemata.  
To sum up, the incorrectness of cognitivism about instructions is 
overdetermined. First, we have general reasons to be sceptical about cognitivism; 
second, we have specific reasons to be sceptical about cognitivism’s ability to 
account for instructions qua species of imperative; and third, we have even more 
specific reasons to be sceptical about cognitivism’s fit with how instructees form 
beliefs on the basis of an instructor’s word. 
The whole discussion about cognitivism notwithstanding, however, another 
reason that denying (ii) will not solve the inconsistent triad is that instructions 
simply do not always come in the imperative mood. We can instil knowledge-how in 
other people through other means; for example, sometimes we use the indicative 
mood, but “if B asks A how to balance on one foot without wobbling, nothing rests 
on whether A responds ‘you should put your finger on your nose’ [indicative] or just 
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‘put your finger on your nose’ [imperative]. Either way, B now knows what (s)he did 
not know before, namely, how to balance on one foot without wobbling” (Hawley 
2010, 400–401). In other words, exactly the same procedural knowledge can be 
imparted through an imperative or an indicative. That’s not a problem for 
cognitivism, which is only concerned about the relationship between imperatives 
and indicatives, but still poses a problem for us when it comes to figuring out exactly 
how it is that indicatives contain procedural information. 
However, even if we could account for the apparent insignificance of whether 
instructions are delivered as indicatives or imperatives, there is yet another layer of 
complication: not all ways of imparting knowledge-how are verbal, let alone 
categorisable as indicative or imperative. One notable example is when we tell 
people how to do things by showing, demonstrating, or ostending, where—to 
borrow Hawley’s example—A, when B asks how to balance on one foot with one 
wobbling, might answer simply by putting her finger on her nose. This kind of 
instruction is nonverbal and yet is clearly capable of instilling knowledge-how: B 
now knows how to balance on one foot without wobbling because A showed her 
how to do so. 
If we claim that imperatives really are propositional by accepting cognitivism, 
we run into at least one of three problems. Either we encounter the problems of 
unwanted validities and unwanted consistencies (Clark-Younger 2014; Parsons 
2012), we have to account for the apparent failure of cognitivism to explain 
instructions qua species of imperative, or we have to accept that instructees are 
routinely failing to gain the correct beliefs about what is being expressed. None is 
desirable. Furthermore, even if we accepted cognitivism, there are still 
epistemologically fuzzy cases that would fill the shoes of ordinary imperative 
instructions, and pose analogous problems. For example, cognitivism would be 
unable to account for things like demonstration, which conveys information that can 
be put in propositional form, but is not itself propositional. This leaves us exactly 
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where we started with a kind of instruction that is non-propositional. So, denying 
(ii), that instructions are non-propositional, will simply not get us to where we need 
to be, and will not present a viable solution to the triad. 
In the next section, I consider triadic commitment (iii): that all testimony is 
propositional. 
2.5. Commitment (iii): All testimony is propositional 
Like Sections 2.3 and 2.4, this section is devoted to a triadic commitment. In this case, 
the focus is on (iii), the claim that all testimony is propositional, which accords with 
the dominant voice in the literature. Received wisdom has it that testimony is, 
roughly, asserting a proposition as true (Adler 2017).  The assumption that testimony 
is propositional is understandable but misguided; nevertheless, it has been 
influential in the evolution of the epistemology of testimony. Let us consider the 
following canonical accounts of testimony, all of which focus on propositional forms 
of testimony.10 I set aside the question of whether each account is independently 
plausible, since the purpose of the present section is not to evaluate them but instead 
to show that the notion that testimony is propositional is common to all. It is worth 
noting, however, that there are compelling arguments for and against each account.11  
Fricker (1995), Audi (1997), and Sosa (1991) offer accounts of testimony that 
are attractive in their simplicity: namely, they claim that a subject S testifies that 
proposition p iff S’s statement that p is an expression of S’s thought that p (Lackey 
2008). Fricker puts it as “tellings generally” (1995, 397) but proceeds to explicate her 
argument in terms of telling that p. Audi describes testimony as “people’s telling us 
 
10 The arguments I have rehearsed here do not exhaust the views on testimony. They are, 
nevertheless, canonical in the literature and are characteristic of the types of views that pervade the 
field. While it is possible that there is a non-propositional account of testimony of which I am 
unaware, the accounts I have presented here nevertheless illustrate the ubiquity of the view that 
testimony is propositional. 
11 For a helpful overview of the debate, see Lackey (2008), especially Chapter 1, Gelfert (2014), and 
Lackey & Sosa (2006). 
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things” (1997, 406), but he, too, proceeds to rely on the notion of propositions as the 
form of testimony. Certainly, even if he would be content to expand the notion such 
that testimony (or testimonial utterances) need not take propositional form, the 
resultant account of testimonial justification that he develops frames everything in 
terms of believing that p, so there is clearly a propositional sense of testimony at 
work in his definition. Sosa understands testimony as “a statement of someone’s 
thoughts or beliefs” (1991, 219). Lackey groups these three views together to and 
says that what they commonly express is the view that “S testifies that p if and only 
if S’s statement that p is an expression of S’s thought that p” (2008, 20).  
Unlike the accounts of Fricker, Audi, and Sosa, Coady’s landmark account has 
an epistemic condition built into it. He argues that S testifies by making some 
statement that p iff: 
i. “S’s stating that p is evidence that p and is offered as evidence that p. 
ii. S has the relevant competence, authority, or credentials to state truly that p. 
iii. S’s statement that p is relevant to some disputed or unresolved question 
(which may or may not be whether p) and is directed to those who are in 
need of evidence on the matter.” (Coady 1992, 42) 
In a similar vein, Graham posits an account of testimony in which S testifies by 
making some statement that p iff: 
i. “S’s stating that p is offered as evidence that p, 
ii. S intends that his audience believe that he has the relevant competence, 
authority, or credentials to state truly that p, 
iii. And S’s statement that p is believed by S to be relevant to some question 
that he believes is disputed or unresolved (which may or may not be 
whether p) and is directed at those whom he believes to be in need of 
evidence on the matter.” (Graham 1997, 227) 
Here, too, I wish to emphasise the role of propositions in both Coady’s and 
Graham’s accounts: that the act of communication that matters is “S’s stating that p.” 
This kind of account seems to leave little room for non-propositional content to 
qualify as testimony. Moreover, that they have a built-in epistemic condition 
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challenges their viability as even an account of testimony-that, let alone testimony-
how. (I return to this point in Section 2.6.) 
By contrast, Lackey’s account of testimony is unique in its dual attention to 
the respective and complementary roles of speaker and hearer. On her view, S 
testifies that p by making an act of communication a iff (in part) in virtue of a's 
communicable content: 
i. “S reasonably intends to convey the information that p or 
ii. a is reasonably taken as conveying the information that p.” (Lackey 2008, 
35–36) 
The act of communication in question, a, amounts to the “intentional expression of 
communicable content” (Lackey 2008, 28), and can convey that p in one of three 
ways. First, a may be the utterance of a declarative sentence such that it expresses the 
proposition that p. Second, p may be an obvious (uncancelled) pragmatic implication 
of a. And third, it may express the proposition that q, and may convey that p so long 
as it is obvious (either to everyone in the exchange or to a normal competent 
speaker) that q entails p (Lackey 2008, 29). What is interesting about this account is 
that Lackey does not require that the act of communication take the form that p; it 
need only convey that p. I take this to mean that certain non-propositional acts of 
communication (such as a gesture) that convey that p might still constitute testimony 
under the right conditions. Nevertheless, whether it is expressed propositionally or 
non-propositionally, the content of the testimony seems for Lackey to be necessarily 
propositional. 
 In the end, it probably does not matter too much which of these accounts one 
endorses (though I return to the question in Section 2.6 of this chapter). What is 
central to each account is that testimony is a matter of transferring (or reproducing, 
or instilling) beliefs in the form of truth-apt propositions. And though they do not, in 
principle, preclude the possibility of non-propositional testimony, the notion that 
there is such a thing appears to be little more than an afterthought or idle question 
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kicked somewhere further down the theoretical road (see, for example, Chakrabarti 
(1994) and Jack (1994), who each suggest that instructions or commands might count 
as testimony, without engaging with this idea in depth).  
I suspect that the centering of propositionality in the epistemology of 
testimony is a self-perpetuating phenomenon, in that testimony is assumed to be 
propositional and then accounts of testimony and related phenomena inherit this 
assumption, to the point where testimony almost seems to be necessarily 
propositional and it is hard even to conceptualise what non-propositional testimony 
would be. Burge’s  “Acceptance Principle,” for example, is that “a person is a priori 
entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true and that is intelligible to 
him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so” (1993, 467). (Note Burge’s 
explicit focus on propositions.) The fixation on propositions probably goes some way 
toward explaining the intuitive oddness of the phrase “non-propositional 
testimony.” The assumption, however, is mistaken. 
 So far, we have found triadic commitments (i) and (ii) to be true. This brings 
us to the third, and, as I will argue, most viable solution to the inconsistent triad: the 
denial of (iii), that all testimony is propositional. Here, I describe why one might 
have come to endorse (iii), and the reason is simple: namely, many canonical 
accounts of testimony assume it. Although these accounts are suffused with the 
assumption that testimony is propositional, I think that the assumption is worth 
questioning, and indeed, rejecting. 
Before we can build an account of testimony that is neutral with respect to 
whether testimony is propositional, we need to ask what reasons we have to do 
away with the assumption that testimony is propositional. After all, this may seem 
like a rather ad hoc solution, presented solely in the interest of letting instructions 
into the testimony club. But I think there are compelling independent reasons to 
abandon the assumption that testimony is exclusively propositional.  
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I said above that it was an idiosyncrasy of testimony that it is taken to be 
necessarily propositional when other sources of propositional knowledge are not 
subject to the same restrictions. Even epistemologists who deny that perception is 
propositional still accept that perception can give us propositional knowledge. Why, 
then, is it so difficult to accept that testimony might also have non-propositional 
content? I also said above that there were such things as knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that, and that there was a way of instilling knowledge-that in another 
person. My opponent could then respond that testimony is just the way that agents 
instil propositional knowledge in other people. He may even grant that there is a 
way to instil knowledge-how in other people, but he may object to categorizing that 
way of instilling knowledge-how as testimony. 
One possible response is to say that the only reason for someone to deny that 
testimony-how genuinely counts as testimony is if he has already bought the view 
that testimony is necessarily propositional. (I am about to deny that very view.) In 
other words, someone who simply denies that testimony-how is testimony is 
probably doing so because they already have an unreflective or implicit commitment 
to the propositionality of testimony. However, the unreflective commitment 
notwithstanding, there appears to be no principled reason to claim that testimony-
how does not genuinely count as testimony. In the face of the evidence for triadic 
commitments (i) and (ii), and without a principled reason to defend (iii), it seems 
that the best way out of the inconsistent triad is to reject the claim that testimony is 
necessarily propositional. 
2.6. Some instructions should count as testimony 
If we were to suspend the notion that testimony is propositional and open the doors 
a little wider, I think we would build a much more robust account of testimony. 
Amending the conditions on testimony to include non-propositional utterances that 
convey information that the recipient did not previously know (or believe) results in 
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an account of testimony that more readily accommodates instances that intuitively 
constitute testimony without being too broad (i.e. it continues to exclude instances 
that ought not to count as testimony).  
Recall that we started with this inconsistent triad: 
i. All instructions are a kind of testimony. 
ii. Some instructions are non-propositional. 
iii. All testimony is propositional. 
As I showed above, the best way out of the inconsistent triad is to reject (iii), that 
testimony is always propositional. Since we already know that we must accept (i),we 
can conclude that (ii) is true. In this section, I offer some further considerations in 
support of (ii), which will serve to reinforce my argument that there is such a thing 
as testimony-how. 
 Let us return to the standard propositional accounts of testimony that I 
addressed in the previous section. If we were to suspend the proposition condition 
each account posits (even if it does so only implicitly), we will see that instructions 
otherwise satisfy the requirements of each. This, I think, shows that instructions 
really ought to count as testimony. 
Let us begin with the Fricker-Audi-Sosa view of testimony, which Lackey 
summarises as claiming that “S testifies that p if and only if S’s statement that p is an 
expression of S’s thought that p” (Lackey 2008, 20). As I have argued above, we 
ought to suspend the propositionality requirement. Let us therefore reformulate the 
view by replacing proposition p with some thought t about the world. In Lackey’s 
formulation, this sounds odd, as it requires an expression of S’s thought that t, but t 
is meant merely to signal a thought in either a non-propositional or propositional 
form. It becomes clearer when we consider the individual views, and not just the 
summary of each. The rest of the section is devoted to replacing uses of p in the 
standard accounts of testimony with t. Let us begin with Fricker (1995). 
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Recall that Fricker describes testimony as “tellings generally” (1995, 397). The 
language of p continues to play a large role in what follows of her argument. Slotting 
in t does not seem to pose any problem for Fricker’s view: tellings can certainly be 
thoughts about the world. For Audi, on the other hand, testimony is “people’s telling 
us things” (1997, 406) and results in “knowledge […] received by transmission” 
(1997, 410). Surely for him too, however, the things that people might tell us could be 
thoughts about the world. Finally, Sosa understands testimony as “a statement of 
someone’s thoughts or beliefs” (1991, 219). Again, there is no conflict with replacing 
the propositions Sosa has in mind with thoughts about the world.  
Why, then, should we not simply adopt one of these accounts, since they can 
so readily accommodate testimony-how? The answer is that there are many 
independent reasons to reject any of these accounts, so it is not an indication that 
reformulating them with t in place of p will get us very far as an account of 
testimony-how after all. For instance, the problem with any of the Fricker-Audi-Sosa 
views, as Lackey (2008) has pointed out, is that they are mind-bogglingly broad. 
Nearly every utterance gets in the door: idle wonderings, empty remarks about the 
weather, and talking to oneself count as testimony right alongside giving directions 
to strangers, testifying in court, and giving a lecture.  
It is therefore simply unremarkable that instructions count as testimony, for 
these views set the testimonial bar too low to begin with. So, it is all well and good 
that for any of these accounts, t fits into the formulations in p’s place, but those won’t 
serve as adequate accounts of testimony-how in virtue of the fact that they don’t 
serve as adequate accounts of testimony at all. Nevertheless, for those who are 
unconvinced by Lackey’s objections to the Fricker-Audi-Sosa view, we can end here, 
satisfied that such a view offers an acceptable account of testimony-how. 
But for those convinced by the objections to the Fricker-Audi-Sosa view, and 
who are dissatisfied by the prospect of putting testimony-how in those terms, let us 
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next consider Coady’s (1992) account. Recall that Coady argues that S testifies by 
making some statement that p iff: 
i. “S’s stating that p is evidence that p and is offered as evidence that p. 
ii. S has the relevant competence, authority, or credentials to state truly that p. 
iii. S’s statement that p is relevant to some disputed or unresolved question 
(which may or may not be whether p) and is directed to those who are in 
need of evidence on the matter.” (Coady 1992, 42) 
Similarly, Graham argues that S testifies by making some statement that p iff: 
i. “S’s stating that p is offered as evidence that p, 
ii. S intends that his audience believe that he has the relevant competence, 
authority, or credentials to state truly that p, 
iii. And S’s statement that p is believed by S to be relevant to some question 
that he believes is disputed or unresolved (which may or may not be 
whether p) and is directed at those whom he believes to be in need of 
evidence on the matter.” (Graham 1997, 227) 
What sets Coady’s and Graham’s views apart from others is that both impose an 
evidentiary requirement. In turn, this means that both Coady’s and Graham’s views 
alike are subject to the same criticism: that the imposition of this evidentiary 
requirement makes the account an epistemological one rather than an ontological 
one. By conflating testimony’s epistemology with its ontology, we lose the ability to 
distinguish the question of what testimony is from the question of whether a 
testimonial recipient knows that p on the basis of S’s testimony. 
 Furthermore, as an account of testimony-how, the Coady-Graham view will 
struggle to accommodate instructions in imperative form because of the evidentiary 
requirement. But this, you might object, is not evidence against the Coady-Graham 
view; instead, it is evidence that instructions simply should not count as testimony. I 
disagree, on the ground that there are many types of utterances that are (intuitively) 
testimony that will not count as testimony on the Coady-Graham view. Furthermore, 
the Coady-Graham view precludes false testimony from counting as testimony at all, 
because false testimony fails to meet the evidentiary requirement. This is a prime 
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example of a time when the conflation of the question of what testimony is with the 
question of what good vs. bad testimony is rears its ugly head. Because this view 
precludes such utterances, we have independent reason to reject it, so the fact that it 
struggles to accommodate instructions should not worry us: rather, it is a 
downstream consequence of a view that fails as an account of testimony simpliciter. 
 Finally, Lackey (2008, 35–36) argues that “S testifies that p by making an act of 
communication a iff (in part) in virtue of a's communicable content: 
i. S reasonably intends to convey the information that p or 
ii. a is reasonably taken as conveying the information that p.” 
On this view, a, the act of communication in question, is the “intentional expression 
of communicable content” (Lackey 2008, 28) and conveys that p (Lackey 2008, 29). 
This is the best general account of testimony because it avoids the undesirable 
breadth of the Fricker-Audi-Sosa view. It also avoids the evidentiary requirement 
that makes the Coady-Graham view untenable, and thereby allows us to distinguish 
the question of what testimony is from the question of what differentiates good 
testimony from bad testimony. Finally, Lackey’s view takes into account that both 
testifier and recipient are participants in testimonial exchanges, and in doing so 
enables us to understand testimony both as source of belief and as communication of 
information. In the next section, we will turn to Lackey’s account as a source for a 
broader account of testimony that can accommodate testimony-how.   
2.7. Instructions as testimony-how 
The chapter so far has been dedicated to defending the claim that testimony is not 
necessarily propositional, and that instructions are the typical case of testimony-
how. But I wish to explicate the notion of testimony-how further, and provide an 
account of testimony-how. I propose the following account of testimony-how: S 
testifies how to φ if S performs an act of communication that conveys information about how 
to φ. The influence of Lackey’s (2008) view of testimony should be clear, especially 
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given what I said in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The key difference is that where Lackey 
says that testifying depends on either S’s reasonably intending to convey the 
information that p or a’s reasonably being taken to convey the information that p, I 
take the relevant thing to be S’s conveying information about how to φ, or a’s 
reasonably being taken to convey information about how to φ. Put in the 
proposition-neutral terms I used in Section 6, S testifies t, where t is some thought 
about the world.  
2.7.1 Toward an account of testimony-how  
This invites us to revisit Lackey’s s-testimony and h-testimony. Recall from Chapter 
1 and Section 2.3 of this chapter that Lackey’s view of testimony is disjunctive. For 
Lackey, testimony can be either an intentional act on the part of the testifier, or a 
source of belief for a recipient. In this case, since we are concerned with instructions, 
an instructor testifies if she reasonably intends to convey information about how to 
φ, the testifier will be an instructor, and the recipient an instructee. So, let us adapt 
Lackey’s view, on which 
“S testifies that p by making an act of communication a iff (in part) in 
virtue of a's communicable content: 
i. S reasonably intends to convey the information that p or 
ii. a is reasonably taken as conveying the information that p.” 
(Lackey 2008, 35–36) 
Let us adjust it for instructions thus: 
S testifies t by making an act of communication a iff (in part) in virtue of 
a's communicable content: 
i. S reasonably intends to convey the information t or 
ii. a is reasonably taken as conveying the information t. 
This formulation of testimony-how allows us to include failed instructions, i.e. 
instructions where the recipient has not gained beliefs about how to φ, as well as 
peculiar cases, which I address below. 
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 Above, I discussed imperative instructions as the paradigm case of testimony-
how. But the view of testimony I posited above allows us to account for cases of 
many kinds other than imperative instructions, such as Hawley’s (1), (3), and (5), 
reproduced here: 
1. A describes to B how to φ  
3. A describes to B how A φs (or does something like φ-ing) 
5. A intentionally shows B how to φ, and B imitates A. 
Let us consider each of these cases in turn. 
Case (1) should obviously count as testimony, since A is likely to offer her 
description in propositional form. But whether this testimony counts as testimony-
how or testimony-that is somewhat less obvious, for it seems clear that A’s 
testimony is about how to do something, but less clear that it counts as testimony-how 
in the relevant way. In either case, the expanded, proposition-neutral account of 
testimony can accommodate Case (1), and we can leave the question of whether it is 
better understood as testimony-how or testimony-that to be decided once we have a 
clearer picture of what differentiates the two. 
Case (3) should also count as testimony, though, like in Case (1), whether it is 
testimony-that or testimony-how is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might qualify as 
testimony-that, if A means to describe to B how A (personally) φs: A is simply 
offering testimony as to the steps she takes to φ. On the other hand, if A means to 
describe to B how one φs, using herself as an example, it seems that this case might 
count as testimony-how. This is especially true if A is counting on B to interpret her 
testimony as such. 
On the face of it, Case (5) is slightly more unusual, but as long as we accept 
that testimony need not be spoken, but that non-verbal gestures carrying 
information might constitute the relevant kind of act of communication, then we find 
that Case (5) is testimony-how. Imagine that you (B) ask me (A), “How do you knit a 
C4L stitch?” and I reply, “Watch!” and take your knitting needles and demonstrate, 
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slowly, how to knit a C4L stitch. You observe intently, and after my demonstration, 
can flawlessly execute a C4L stitch, which turns out to be much simpler than you 
expected. You now know how to knit a C4L stitch precisely because I have 
instructed you, through demonstration, how to do so. 
 Let us also consider the more peculiar cases of Hawley’s, especially those 
where B comes to learn how to φ from A, even though A might not have intended to 
instruct B. In particular, let us consider cases (4) and (6): 
4. B overhears A talking to someone else [C] about how to φ (or about how A 
φs) 
6. B observes A φ-ing and imitates A. 
Here is an example of Case (4): Suppose an employee at a hardware store is 
instructing a customer in how to stain a deck. The employee says to the customer, 
“First, sand the wood so that it’s ready to absorb the stain. Stir the pot of stain and 
then apply it to the edges and corners of the deck.” Meanwhile, I am standing a few 
metres away, looking at paint chips for my kitchen, and overhear the employee’s 
instructions. Though I was not in need of instructions on how to stain a deck, I now 
know the first few steps I would need to complete if I decided that the deck needed a 
facelift. In this case, I (B) have overheard the employee (A) talking to the customer 
(C) about how to φ.  My intuition is that this case ought to count as testimony, but I 
shall pause for a moment here to consider Case (6) before discussing them both. 
Case (6) is importantly different from the others we have considered so far. 
Here is an example: Suppose I am with my friends and we are dancing the 
Macarena, which comprises a fixed, repeated sequence of simple dance moves. You, 
unfamiliar with the dance, see us dancing and copy our motions from a distance. 
The sequence is simple enough that after a few repetitions of the dance, you 
memorise the sequence and can dance fluently. Much later, you hear the song 
playing, and successfully dance the Macarena by yourself. You now know how to 
dance the Macarena, and you know how to do so precisely because I (and my 
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friends) knew how and you observed us dancing. In this case, you (B) observed me 
(A) φ-ing, and imitated me. Your knowledge of how to dance the Macarena 
counterfactually depends on mine. And yet, intuitively, this case should not count as 
testimony.  
What is different between the two cases? Both involve B learning how to φ 
from A even though A is not interacting directly with B. Why is it that one counts as 
testimony and the other does not? The answer lies in Lackey’s formulation, in which 
a, an act of communication amounting to “the intentional expression of 
communicable content,” (2008, 28) is a necessary condition for testimony.  
In Case (4), the hardware store employee performs this act of communication 
by intentionally instructing the customer (and, inadvertently, me) in how to stain a 
deck. The employee performs an act of communication, and in doing so, reasonably 
intends to convey information, and that act of communication serves as a source of 
belief for both the customer and me. The instructions therefore count as testimony. 
In Case (6), however, there is no such intentional expression of communicable 
content. Thus, even though my dancing acts as a source of belief for you, and you 
come to know how to dance the Macarena, this is not an instance of testimony.  
Adapting Lackey’s view for testimony-how can account for a diverse set of 
cases in which B learns how to φ from A. It can rule out those cases that ought not to 
count as genuine testimony, while providing an account of those that should. 
Moreover, the close connection between the accounts of testimony-how and 
testimony-that will facilitate future research seeking to expand the notion of 
testimony to include testimony-how. Let us explore this idea in more detail in the 
next section. 
2.7.2 Similarities between testimony-how and testimony-that 
It is also reassuring to note that testimony-how, as I have described it, bears a 
number of similarities to testimony-that. I offer three examples of these similarities 
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below. First, testifying does not entail knowing; second, testimony can be 
demonstrative or verbal (Audi 2013); and third, there might be some version of the 
reductionist/antireductionist debate applicable to testimony-how and testimony-that 
alike. That testimony-how and testimony-that are similar is not an argument that 
they are the same; nevertheless, the family resemblance suggests that the two are 
related in an important way. 
In Section 2.2.2, I accepted that one need not know that p in order to testify 
that p. The analogue is true in testifying-how: one need not know how to φ in order 
to testify how to φ. Consider this example from Hawley (2010): suppose you tell me 
that you can teach me how to carve a tomato rose, but unbeknownst to me, you do 
not actually know how to carve a tomato rose. Instead, you hack randomly at a 
tomato and luckily, it turns out to resemble a rose. I copy you, and it turns out that if 
I do what you did, I wind up with a tomato rose, too. Suppose I commit this method 
to memory and can now reliably correctly carve a tomato rose whenever I wish. 
Assuming there really is such a thing as testimonial knowledge-how, do I now know 
how to carve a tomato rose on the basis of your testimony? It would seem so, and 
this is hardly surprising. In both testimony-how and testimony-that, an agent can 
come to know something on the basis of a testifier’s say-so, even when that testifier 
does not know that thing herself. One may, of course, be concerned about the 
possibility of Gettiered knowledge-how (Stanley and Willlamson 2001; pace Poston 
2009), or concerned about epistemic luck (Shanton 2011), but the concern is mutatis 
mutandis the same as in the testimony-that case, and so provides no special worry 
here for testimony-how as a species of testimony.  
Another similarity is that both testimony-that and testimony-how can take 
either verbal or demonstrative forms. There is an analogy between the following 
kinds of cases:  
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A asks B where the door is, and B points toward the door. 
A asks B how to ride a bike, and B gets on a bike and shows A how to ride a 
bike. 
And between these cases: 
A asks B where the door is, and B says, “Just around the corner.”  
A asks B how to ride a bike, and B provides some detailed explanation of how 
to ride a bike. 
In any case, B has learned something from A on the basis of some expression of A’s 
knowledge. This accords with what Hawley says about the myriad ways B can learn 
how to φ from A, notably Case (5), which I discussed in Section 2.7.1. Moreover, 
there are similar considerations to be made about the significance of showing vs. 
telling; see, for instance, Habgood-Coote (2018b) on the relationship between the 
knowledge norm of assertion and the analogous knowledge-how norm of showing. 
Finally, there is probably some version of the reductionist/anti-reductionist 
debate applicable to testimony-how. Reductionism about testimony is the view that 
testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, while anti-reductionism is the 
opposite. It will depend on what we think knowledge-how really is, especially 
whether it involves justification, or whether it is instead subject to success conditions 
(Hawley 2003; Stanley 2011). More work needs to be done to determine the role that 
justification plays in knowledge-how, especially if we take knowledge-how to be the 
kind of thing communicable via testimony. I remain neutral on exactly what the 
conditions for justification are for testimonially-based knowledge-how, but suggest 
that epistemologists ought to look at testifier reliability and trustworthiness in the 
first instance (see Hawley 2003; Peet forthcoming, esp. HONEST BOMB case). 
 Again, I wish to emphasise that the similarities alone are not conclusive proof 
that testimony-how and testimony-that just are the same thing. Rather, the idea is 
that if the two were sufficiently dissimilar, we would be unlikely to find analogous 
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concerns arising for each. These analogues, then, act as evidence that testimony-how 
and testimony-that are similar in some relevant, important way. 
2.8. The memory-testimony analogy revisited 
All of this has a follow-on implication that this final section is devoted to exploring. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that memory and testimony are analogous; my argument 
pertained, however, only to declarative memory and (what I am now calling) 
testimony-that. In the initial analogy, it really did make sense to talk about the 
analogy in terms of propositions, or instilling beliefs that p in either another person 
or in one’s future self. In this chapter, however, I have argued that not all testimony 
is propositional. But this should not turn out to be a problem for us, because we 
already know that there is such a thing as procedural memory, or memory-how. 
 If we think of memory as the testimony of the past self, as Dummett (1994) 
did, we might say, crudely, that while declarative remembering is receiving 
testimony from the past self, procedural remembering is receiving testimony-how 
from, or being instructed by, the past self. This characterisation may not map onto 
the subjective phenomenal character of remembering-how, but that alone should not 
be reason to reject this hypothesis. Consider that the constructive nature of 
declarative memory, for example, does not map onto the subjective phenomenal 
character of remembering-that, but this does not cause us to reject the claim that 
declarative memory is constructive. In the declarative and procedural cases alike, we 
must hold in mind that memory at once feels like accessing an archive and at the 
cognitive level is a constructive process.  
 Procedural memory is often taken to be synonymous with non-declarative 
memory, but there are other types of non-declarative memory aside from procedural 
memory (Michaelian 2011a; Squire 1992; 2004; Squire and Zola-Morgan 1988; 
Tulving 2007; Werning and Cheng 2017). One might therefore think that if there is to 
be an analogy between the memory and testimony, there must be testimonial 
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counterpart for every kind of memory, including each subspecies of non-declarative 
memory. As an initial response, there may well turn out to be virtually countless 
ways that we convey information to others. For a start, Hawley (2010) names those I 
addressed in Section 2.3 and again in Section 2.7, but by her own admission, the list 
is far from exhaustive. There might be stronger connections and correspondences 
between certain kinds of non-declarative memory and certain kinds of testimony-
how. I set this aside as a project for future research, but I hope that the line of inquiry 
I have opened here can serve as a springboard into investigating these connections.  
2.9. Conclusion 
Here, I wish to reconnect the points I have made about testimony to my earlier 
points about memory. I suggest tentatively that, to the degree that we might think of 
memory as being akin to the testimony of the past self, we might think of procedural 
memory as being akin to the testimony-how of the past self. In much the same way 
that we learn from others how to do things, and to the degree that that learning rests 
on our instructors’ knowing what they are telling us to do, we might be able to 
perform certain actions precisely because our past selves instruct us in how to do so. 
I leave this only as a tentative suggestion for now, but suspect that an investigation 
into the psychology of procedural memory will reveal interesting connections 
between learning-how from others and from ourselves. 
There are two ways to account for testimony-how. One is to develop a specific 
account of testimony-how; the other is to develop an account of testimony that 
accommodates both testimony-how and testimony-that. I favour the former option, 
but it is my hope—though it may be overly optimistic—that developing a specific 
account of testimony-how will serve as a first step to developing a general account of 
testimony that does not privilege testimony-that over testimony-how, or vice versa. 
By making explicit the nature of testimony-how, I hope that we can begin to move 
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toward a broader understanding of testimony that more accurately captures what is 
really going on when we learn from others.12
 
12 I am grateful to Hannah Clark-Younger for helpful comments on this chapter, and to James 
McKeahnie for proofreading. 






In Chapter 1, I argued that memory and testimony were analogous; I showed that 
epistemologists should think about the two in the same way. Still, this 
characterisation does not go far enough. While the two are epistemologically 
analogous, thinking of them as merely analogous will inevitably prevent us from 
noticing that the two interact in several ways during ordinary life. I alluded to this in 
Chapter 1 when I pointed out that testimonial exchanges depend on the 
“informational richness” (Kenyon 2013) of the context in which they occur. As I 
claimed above, mindreading involves the attribution of mental states to another 
person, including their desires, motives, affective states, and background knowledge 
they already possess. Some of this information will come from the memory of the 
testifier; if, for example, I know you to be sensitive about a particular topic, I might 
tailor or truncate my testimony so that it is more palatable to you. In these ways 
(among others), memory can influence testimony. 
The claim that testimony influences memory, however, is a harder pill to 
swallow. Surely, the folk intuition goes, my memories are mostly intact and 
immutable (aside from forgetting over time), and any testimony I receive about an 
event will only serve to jog my memory for things I have forgotten, but knew at one 
point. The curious case of the Mandela Effect, 1 presented in this chapter, suggests 
otherwise. And as we shall go on to see in Chapter 4, there are far more toxic ways 
for testimony to be integrated into memory. For now, though, let us consider the 
Mandela Effect. 
 
1 The term “Mandela Effect,” as far as I can tell, was first used by self-described “paranormal 
consultant” Fiona Broome when she noticed the paradigm Mandela case (Broome 2009). 
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In recent years, a growing number of internet users have flocked to online 
fora such as Reddit to discuss Shazaam,2 a 1990s film starring the American comedian 
Sinbad as an incompetent genie who grants wishes to two children. Reddit users, or 
Redditors, reminisce about what the cover of the VHS looked like, and recall a scene 
where candy rains from the sky (u/DonnaGail 2017)3. Some report fond memories4 of 
quoting catchphrases from the movie with their siblings (Tait 2016), and one 
Redditor recalls having to watch the movie repeatedly to inspect the tape for defects 
as part of his job working in a video rental store (u/EpicJourneyMan 2016). None of 
this is unusual for a beloved children’s movie, but Shazaam is unlike other movies in 
one crucial respect: it does not exist.5 
Proposed explanations for the widespread memory beliefs about Shazaam—
such as the suggestion that Redditors are thinking of the 1996 film Kazaam, starring 
basketball player Shaquille O’Neal as a genie—are often met with resistance and 
denial. Some claim to remember both Shazaam and Kazaam: one Redditor remembers 
deciding not to see Kazaam because it looked like an imitation of Shazaam (Tait 2016), 
while another remembers ordering two copies of Shazaam but only one of Kazaam for 
his video store (Tait 2016). Even though Sinbad himself has repeatedly denied 
having starred in such a film, some Redditors are so confident that Shazaam is real, 
 
2 Variously spelled “Shazam,” “Shazzam,” and “Shaazam.” 
3 This citation style will seem foreign to readers unfamiliar with Reddit, but since the topic at issue 
requires frequent references to Reddit, here is an explanation: the prefix “u/” denotes that the name in 
question belongs to a user (rather than a thread or subreddit), and is followed by the username of the 
author of the relevant post. The prefix “r/” denotes a subreddit and is followed by the name of the 
subreddit. 
4 Where no confusion will result, I use the term “memory” and its cognates in a non-factive way. To 
call the representations in question “ME-memories” does not entail that the representations be 
veridical, but readers who insist on the factivity of “memory” can substitute “ME-memories” with 
“ME–apparent memories.” 
5 To complicate matters further, in 2019 during the writing of this chapter, a real film titled Shazam! 
was released, directed by David Sandberg and starring Zachary Levi. This film is not the one at the 
centre of the Mandela Effect controversy, so can be safely disregarded for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
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they have offered cash rewards for proof of its existence (Tait 2016). Needless to say, 
all searches for proof have come up empty-handed. 
 As bizarre as it might seem that hundreds of people who have never met 
might remember a film that does not exist, it turns out that this case is anything but 
isolated. Some Redditors claim to remember that Nelson Mandela died in prison in 
the 1980s, though he was released from prison in 1990 and died in 2013 after a high-
profile political career. But the belief that he died in the 1980s is not a matter of 
making a simple mistake about the facts, nor is it to remember correctly a falsehood 
that one was taught: the belief is supported by episodic memories, such as watching 
the news reports on television and discussing the event with family members or 
colleagues (Tait 2016).  
The Mandela case serves as the paradigm case of a phenomenon known as the 
“Mandela Effect,” wherein individual subjects who have not met offline develop 
highly similar memories of events that never occurred. Further examples of the 
effect are numerous and varied: some people remember watching evangelist Billy 
Graham’s funeral on TV well before his actual death in 2018 (Broome 2013), that the 
Monopoly mascot Rich Uncle Pennybags as wearing a monocle (u/TimmehTheShpee 
2018), Mother Teresa’s canonisation by Pope John Paul II in the 1990s while she was 
still alive (u/ThadeusOfNazareth 2016), Leonardo DiCaprio’s acceptance speech for 
the 1998 Academy Award for Best Actor for Titanic (Broome 2016), and so on. The 
memories in question are normally not intrinsically implausible: it is entirely 
possible that Sinbad could have starred in a movie called Shazaam, that Mandela 
could have died in prison in the 1980s, that DiCaprio won Best Actor for Titanic, and 
so on. Yet despite the subjects’ inability to provide any nonmnemic evidence that 
what they report is actually true, subjects retain a high degree of confidence in the 
veridicality of their memories.  
Discussions of the effect on Reddit have spawned the most detailed 
explanations available, ranging from the fanciful—that we are sliding between 
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alternate realities (u/AscendedMinds 2017)—to the more plausible but 
uninformative—“our memory isn’t as good as we thought” (u/Jhoobie 2017). The 
superficiality of the latter kind of explanation leaves something to be desired, so I 
offer this chapter as an alternative. 
Clearly, the Mandela Effect poses interesting questions for several branches of 
memory studies, but—perhaps owing in part to the novelty of the phenomenon—as 
far as I can tell, it has received very little scholarly attention. Furthermore, although 
both collective memory and memory errors are gaining popularity in the philosophy 
of memory, to my knowledge, there has been no explicit discussion about the nature 
of collective memory errors, no serious attempt to develop a taxonomy of collective 
memory errors, and no comparison between individual and collective memory 
errors.6 Space prevents me from delving too much into these topics, but I intend to 
broach the subject by focusing on the unusual case presented by the memory 
representations that the Mandela Effect comprises (henceforth, “ME-memories”). 
This discussion in this chapter unfolds against the background of two 
ongoing debates in the philosophy of memory: first, the debate over the ontology of 
collective memory, including whether collective memory is ontologically distinct 
from individual memory, and second, the debate over the ontology of individual 
memory errors and how to distinguish them. I argue that ME-memories are (i) 
collective, since the representations that constitute ME-memories are direct results of 
the interaction of multiple individuals; (ii) matters of memory, since subjects make 
claims about the past on the basis of what they seem to remember; and (iii) errors, 
since subjects remain convinced of the truth of their memories, despite being aware 
that the overwhelming majority of people do not share their memories and despite 
the absence of nonmnemic evidence of the relevant events. If we take the notion of 
 
6 One exception is Tanesini’s (2018) discussion of collective forgetting. It is not clear, however, that 
forgetting is properly understood as a memory error (Michaelian 2011b); even if it is, then it is an 
error of omission, while collective confabulation is an error of commission. 
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collective memory seriously, we should be prepared to take the notion of collective 
memory error seriously; combined with claims (i) through (iii), we reach the 
conclusion that ME-memories are instances of collective confabulation. This is the 
thesis I defend in this chapter.  
There is one problem worth addressing at the outset: it is not clear that ME-
memories are a homogeneous group. In addition to the Shazaam and Mandela cases, 
other examples are the cases of remembering the children’s book series title as 
Berenstein Bears (it has always been Berenstain Bears), and remembering that cartoon 
character Carmen Sandiego had a yellow trenchcoat (it has always been red). These 
cases are importantly different from either the Mandela or Shazaam cases: namely, 
for reasons we shall see in Section 3.5, they are not necessarily collective in any 
robust sense, since people could independently misremember the title’s spelling or 
the trenchcoat’s colour. Nevertheless, Redditors classify cases like these as instances 
of the Mandela Effect. Though I lack the space to discuss such cases at length, I will 
say that it is likely that the Mandela Effect encompasses several different kinds of 
memory phenomena. Some may be genuinely collective while others may not; some 
may be matters of misremembering, some may be matters of confabulation, and still 
others may be conspiracy theories masquerading as memory reports. The 
heterogeneity of the category should be unsurprising—after all, informal Internet 
fora are not known for insisting on conceptual clarity—but taxonomising the 
category is not the main project in this chapter. For now, it will have to be enough to 
say that at least some ME-memories are collective confabulations, and to focus on 
how these cases come about. I remain agnostic on the rest. 
Defending the claim that (some) ME-memories are collective confabulations 
requires showing that ME-memories are (i) collective, and (ii) confabulatory. In 
Section 3.2 of the chapter, I provide an overview of two prominent accounts of 
confabulation: reliability accounts and causal accounts. In Section 3.3, I argue that 
ME-memories are genuinely confabulatory under reliability accounts of memory 
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(Michaelian 2016a). However, the reliability account remains controversial. Causal 
theories dominate the landscape in the philosophy of memory, so I also show that 
one need not endorse reliability accounts to characterise ME-memories as collective 
confabulation. I do so by offering a modified version of my initial account that is 
consistent with causal theorists’ characterisation of confabulation. In Section 3.4, I 
discuss accounts of collectivity. Finally, in Section 3.5, I show that ME-memories are 
genuinely collective, regardless of the account of confabulation one endorses. 
3.2. Confabulation 
“Confabulation” is a broad term including diverse phenomena, including both 
mnemic and non-mnemic confabulation. Non-mnemic confabulation can occur when 
people are asked to explain their attitudes or choices: despite being unaware of their 
reasons, subjects may nevertheless offer a sincere (but often incorrect) explanation 
(Bortolotti and Cox 2009), such as explaining why they had chosen the pair of 
stockings they did among a set of four identical pairs (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). In 
this chapter, rather than non-mnemic confabulation, I focus on mnemic 
confabulation: one kind of case in which the memory process produces something 
other than genuine memory.  
I return to the details of confabulation shortly, but understanding the 
production of these non-genuine memories requires first understanding the 
production of genuine memories. Memory is now known to be a constructive 
process, wherein representations of events are not discretely stored, but 
reconstructed anew at the point of recall. Though several different accounts of the 
nature of constructive memory have been advanced, all converge on the central 
point that remembering is not the reproduction of a singular, discrete past event, but 
an act of reconstruction integrating information originating in several sources (De 
Brigard 2014; Michaelian 2011c; Robins 2016a; Schacter and Addis 2007). To use 
Bartlett’s words, “Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless 
and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out 
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of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past 
reactions or experience” (Bartlett 1932, 213). It is the reconstructive nature of 
memory that gives rise to confabulation and misremembering, whether they come 
about from reconstruction errors or filling in the blanks in the absence of relevant 
information. 
Examples of misremembering and confabulation will prove helpful for the 
present discussion. Misremembering is a common error, involving the introduction 
of some inaccurate details into an otherwise accurate representation. Brewer and 
Treyens (1981), for example, conducted an experiment in which participants were 
exposed to a typical office scene. When those participants were later asked to recall 
what they had seen, many reported having seen a stapler, even though no stapler 
had been present. This is a characteristic example of misremembering: participants 
were able to represent a stapler because they had accurately represented the rest of 
the scene (Robins 2016a). By contrast, confabulations—what Schnider (2018) calls 
“normal false memory,”7 or confabulations produced by subjects without memory 
disorders, as opposed to clinical confabulations—are more egregious errors. Loftus 
(1997b) showed how easily confabulations can be provoked in a study in which 
participants were asked to describe four childhood stories, three of which had 
actually happened and one of which—about being lost in a shopping mall at about 
age 5—was invented. In later interviews, when asked about the false event, 25% of 
participants reported fully or partially remembering the event (Loftus 1997b). 
Mnemic confabulations, loosely described, are apparent memories for events that the 
subject did not experience. 
Roughly speaking, there are four families of accounts of mnemic 
confabulation: false belief, epistemic, reliability, and causal. Each provides a 
different set of conditions for confabulation, but a representation might 
 
7 Schnider (2018) is concerned with falsidical confabulation, but I use an account that allows for 
veridical confabulation. 
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simultaneously meet different accounts’ criteria. For this reason, it may turn out that 
different accounts agree that a given representation is a confabulation while 
disagreeing about why that is so. I consider each type of account in turn. 
3.2.1 False belief accounts 
False belief accounts, as far as I can tell, have not received much uptake in 
philosophical literature, and are mostly confined to psychology. A number of 
different formulations have been proposed (e.g., Berlyne 1972; Feinberg 2001; 
Talland 1961; 1965; see Hirstein (2005), Chapter 8 for a summary), but all tend to 
agree that confabulations are sincere but false memory beliefs.8 The main problem 
with false belief accounts is that they are simultaneously too broad, in that nearly 
any false belief qualifies as a confabulation, and too narrow, in that a confabulation 
that happens to be true does not qualify as a confabulation. The narrowness should 
concern us; as Hirstein points out, “A patient who gets a question right after 
supplying wrong answers to the previous six has not miraculously stopped 
confabulating” (2005, 199). The falsity condition alone is therefore inadequate to 
distinguish confabulations from non-confabulations, especially since we want to 
allow for the possibility of veridical confabulation. For brevity’s sake, I end my 
discussion of false belief accounts here; nevertheless, it is worth noting that even if 
one were to endorse false belief accounts, ME-memories—such as recalling a news 
report about Mandela’s death in the 1980s—would qualify as confabulations simply 
because they are false.  
3.2.2 The epistemic account 
Where false belief accounts posit falsity as a necessary condition for confabulation, 
for epistemic accounts, falsity is neither necessary nor sufficient for confabulation: 
what is more important is the fact that the belief is ill-grounded (unjustified), that the 
 
8 In fact, several accounts define confabulations as false statements or utterances, not mere beliefs, 
which makes the definition more restrictive still: such characterisations rule out the possibility of 
unstated but believed confabulations. 
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ill-groundedness of the belief is unknown to the subject, and that the subject should 
know that the belief is ill-grounded (Hirstein 2005). Note that the expectation that 
the subject should know that the belief is ill-grounded implies that she can know that 
her thought is ill-grounded, and yet because subjects are frequently not in a position 
to access the reasons for the ill-groundedness of their beliefs, it is not clear that 
confabulation is best defined in terms of ill-groundedness (Bortolotti and Cox 2009). 
If a subject lacks access to the reasons for her belief’s ill-groundedness, then the 
representation would not qualify as a confabulation, and yet this seems 
unsatisfactory. Yet, the epistemic account is at a loss to explain such representations, 
and so, like false belief accounts, epistemic accounts are impoverished. I suspect, 
however, that the epistemic account—its shortcomings notwithstanding—would 
classify ME-memories as confabulations because they are ill-grounded beliefs whose 
ill-groundedness should be available to the subjects; i.e., subjects gain undefeated 
defeaters for their beliefs from external evidence, such as the testimony of others. 
Yet, subjects are culpably unresponsive to those undefeated defeaters. Thus, the 
representations in question qualify as confabulations. 
3.2.3 Causal and reliability accounts 
The false belief account tells an unsatisfactory story about confabulation. The case 
against the epistemic account is much less decisive; nevertheless, there are too many 
unanswered questions raised by the epistemic account for it to be useful in this 
analysis. For these reasons, I end my discussion of those accounts here and instead 
focus on reliability and causal accounts. Causal accounts dominate the theoretical 
landscape in philosophy of memory, but because causal and reliability accounts of 
confabulation have evolved in conversation with each other, I consider them side-
by-side.  
I begin with Robins’ (2016a) causal account, which builds on the classic causal 
theory of memory (Bernecker 2010; Martin and Deutscher 1966). According to the 
causal theory, a subject remembers that p at some time t2 if her present 
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representation that p bears an appropriate causal connection to her past 
representation at some previous time t1 that p (Bernecker 2010).  Robins develops a 
taxonomy of memory errors based on two conditions inspired by the causal theory: 
“retention of information from a particular past event and construction of an 
accurate representation of that event at the time of retrieval” (Robins 2016a, 445); 
since mnemic causation is normally understood as the retention of information, the 
retention condition is essentially a causal condition. Successful remembering, Robins 
argues, requires the satisfaction of both the retention and accuracy conditions: i.e., 
the information in the representation must have been retained from a particular past 
event, and the representation produced must be accurate with respect to the event. A 
failure to satisfy one or the other condition gives rise to various memory errors: 
failure to satisfy the accuracy condition brings about misremembering (inaccurate 
but retained representations), failure to satisfy the retention condition brings about 
relearning (accurate but not retained representations), and failure to satisfy either 
condition brings about confabulation. In other words, confabulation is a 
representation that is not produced from retained information, and is inaccurate 
with respect to the past. 
On the face of it, the taxonomy is exhaustive, but it fails to distinguish 
between veridical relearning and veridical confabulation (since both would be 
accurate but not retained) (Bernecker 2017; Michaelian 2016b). Bernecker (2017) 
denies that relearning is a memory error at all and advances a modified causal 
account. Where Robins proposes that confabulation is a matter of a lack of retention of 
information from a particular past event, Bernecker proposes that confabulation is a 
matter of a lack of an appropriate causal connection to the past. The causal connection 
condition is slightly more permissive than the retention condition, since retention is 
just one way of several possible ways to satisfy the causal connection condition. 
Replacing the retention condition with an appropriate causal connection condition 
yields a taxonomy in which both successful remembering and misremembering bear 
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an appropriate causal connection, but the former is accurate while the latter is not. 
Denying that relearning is a memory error allows Bernecker to distinguish between 
veridical and falsidical9 confabulation: both lack an appropriate causal connection to 
the past, but the former is accurate and the latter is not. 10 
Causal accounts, however, are not the only contenders in the philosophy of 
memory. Michaelian (2016b) advances a reliability account of memory errors based 
on the simulation theory of memory, according to which there is no essential 
difference between memory and imagination; to remember, as it turns out, is just to 
imagine the past (Michaelian 2016a).11 Like its causal counterparts, the reliability 
account includes two conditions: reliability and accuracy, wherein successful 
remembering satisfies both conditions, misremembering satisfies the reliability 
condition only, veridical confabulation satisfies the accuracy condition only, and 
falsidical confabulation satisfies neither condition. Otherwise put, the reliability 
theorist replaces the causal theorist’s causal connection condition with a reliability 
condition. Reliability theorists take a reliable system to be one that is functioning 
properly, so to claim that the system is unreliable is essentially to claim that the 
system is malfunctioning. The reliability theorist’s argument in a nutshell, then, is 
this: a system is malfunctioning iff it is unreliable, confabulations are produced by 
unreliable systems, so confabulations (whether accurate or inaccurate) are produced 
by malfunctioning systems. In other words, the reliability theorist claims that a 
confabulation is a representation produced by an unreliable (or malfunctioning) 
 
9 “Falsidical” will be a new word to some readers. It is becoming more common in the memory 
literature to use the term to describe apparent memories with false content. The rationale, I believe, is 
to indicate that the content is false without committing oneself to the view that the apparent memory 
is thereby not a (real) memory, as is suggested by the term “false memory.”  
10 For the remainder of the chapter, I rely on Bernecker’s version of the causal account of 
confabulation, since it can account for both veridical and falsidical confabulation. 
11 Indeed, there are other interesting views of memory. Fernández (2018) proposes a functionalist 
theory of memory, according to which a memory state is the kind of state that tends to be (but is not 
necessarily) caused by a previous experience of the event represented. I leave the development of a 
functionalist account of confabulation as a task for future research. 
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memory system, where reliability does not require causation and is instead 
understood as a tendency to produce accurate representations. 
So the question here is really this: is confabulation distinguished from 
successful remembering and misremembering by the lack of an appropriate causal 
connection to the past, as the causal theorist says? Or by unreliability in the memory 
system, as the reliability theorist says? The two accounts are on equal footing in that 
they are both able to distinguish among remembering, misremembering, and 
veridical and falsidical confabulation, so the debate will have to be decided on other 
grounds—grounds that I will not consider in the remainder of this chapter. For my 
purposes, it does not matter whether one endorses a reliability account or a causal 
account: as I show in Section 3.4, both accounts will characterise ME-memories as 
collective confabulations. The explanations of the mechanisms giving rise to ME-
memories, however, will differ.  
3.3. Are ME-memories confabulatory? 
Arguing that ME-memories are confabulatory hinges on the claim that memory 
plays a central role in their formation. The astute reader may have noticed the 
striking resemblance between ME-memories and conspiracy theories, and would be 
justified in wondering whether ME-memories are really matters of memory at all. 
Both ME-rememberers and conspiracy theorists insist that reality is other than it 
appears and offer evidence—even if it is weak evidence—in support of their claims. 
For example, the organisation Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth (AE911Truth) 
disputes the conclusion that the impacts of the aircraft combined with the resultant 
fires were responsible for the collapse of the Twin Towers, claiming instead that the 
collapse was caused by a controlled explosive demolition (McDowell and 
AE911Truth Staff 2015). Similarly, ME-rememberers might dispute that Mandela 
was released from prison and did not die until 2013 by appealing to their memories 
of having read newspaper articles about his death in prison in the 1980s. The two 
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seem so similar as to appear to be the same thing. So, perhaps memory is a red 
herring; memory might play a central role in ME-memories, but it would be a 
mistake to think that they are worthy of philosophical attention as a unique 
phenomenon. Ultimately, the objection goes, ME-memories are ordinary conspiracy 
theories into which memory figures prominently. 
But this objection is mistaken, for it obfuscates an important difference 
between ordinary conspiracy theories and ME-memories: while conspiracy theorists 
offer alternate explanations for observable events, ME-rememberers propose different 
events altogether. For example, AE911Truth does not dispute the observable 
events—namely, that the Twin Towers were struck by aircraft and subsequently 
collapsed—but they do dispute that the impact from the aircraft caused the collapse. 
They offer a different causal explanation for the collapse (namely, controlled 
demolition). By contrast, ME-rememberers do dispute events by, e.g., denying that 
Mandela died not in 2013 but in the 1980s and in prison; they offer different evidence 
for their claims about events. Granted, the evidence comes solely from their 
memories, and they are unable to provide any non-mnemic evidence to support 
their claims. For example, they might dispute Mandela’s 2013 death (an event) by 
claiming to remember having read a newspaper article about his 1980s death 
(mnemic evidence) but searches for the newspaper articles themselves (non-mnemic 
evidence) yield nothing. So, ME-memories are not merely memory-flavoured 
conspiracy theories; the Mandela Effect is a unique phenomenon in its own right. 
Interestingly, however, explanations of the Mandela Effect itself or 
explanations of the particular memories might themselves constitute conspiracy 
theories. For example, one might use the very existence of the Mandela Effect as 
evidence that parallel universes are real, or that we are living in a simulation, or that 
the government is systematically erasing records of the past and brainwashing our 
fellow citizens. Such a conspiracy theorist would not dispute that some remember 
Mandela’s death in the 1980s and others remember his death in 2013, but would 
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attribute the dissonance to the existence of parallel universes. Similarly, one might 
claim that one reason so many people seem to remember Shazaam is because it really 
did exist, but the poor audience reception harmed Sinbad’s career so severely that 
the studio erased all trace of its existence (u/squidink20 2018). In this case, there is no 
dispute over whether Shazaam actually existed, but instead a proposed explanation 
for its absence. Both of these examples should qualify as conspiracy theories, but 
note that the reason they qualify is that the explanations of the events differ; there is 
no dispute over the event itself. So, we can think of the Mandela Effect as involving 
two stages: at the first stage is the production of collective ME-memories themselves, 
while the second stage is a contingent downstream conspiracy theory to explain the 
Mandela Effect or the ME-memories themselves. 
Having provided the necessary detail on what I take both collective memory 
and confabulation to be, and having defended the mnemicity of ME-memories, I 
now turn to the first of my two main aims: to show that ME-memories qualify as 
confabulations. I begin with the reliability account in Section 3.3.1, since it offers the 
most developed account of which representations qualify as confabulations and 
turns out to shed more light on the mechanisms by which those representations 
arise. In Section 3.3.2, I show that ME-memories meet the causal theorist’s criteria for 
confabulation, so even if one rejects reliability accounts in favour of causal accounts, 
ME-memories still qualify as genuine confabulations. For now, however, I restrict 
my discussion to reliability accounts.  
3.3.1 ME-Memories according to the reliability account 
Recall that the reliability theorist classifies a representation as a mismemory when a 
properly functioning memory system produces an inaccurate representation, and as 
a confabulation when the system malfunctions. What this means for my purposes is 
that ME-memories will qualify as confabulations just in case they are produced by 
malfunctioning memory systems. The memory system in question is of a different 
kind than that in individual memory; where discussions about individual memory 
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are typically only interested in the function of the individual memory system, 
discussions about collective memory must attend not only to the individual-level 
processes, but the group-level processes responsible for producing group 
representations. Malfunctions at either level constitute malfunctions in the memory 
system, and therefore the reliability theorist would classify any resultant 
representations as confabulations (regardless of accuracy). 
 I propose that the collective memory systems, i.e., the collection of processes 
and individuals, that produce ME-memories are indeed malfunctioning, and that the 
malfunction lies at the group level. But if this is true, it only tells half the story, for 
ME-memories are produced, in part, by individual representations. If what I have 
proposed is right, then identifying the processes that give rise to ME-memories will 
require investigation of both the individual and group levels. In the following two 
subsections, I analyse these levels and identify the phenomena that precipitate ME-
memories. 
Individual-level factors giving rise to the Mandela Effect 
The natural story to tell about collective confabulation is that it is simply a matter of 
confabulating together, but this story is mistaken. Under reliability accounts, 
confabulation is the product of a malfunctioning memory system. A malfunctioning 
system is one that functions unreliably, and so routinely fails to produce accurate 
representations; such a system does not behave according to its normal ‘rules’ and 
could thus produce a representation of nearly anything. Although it is possible in 
principle that multiple subjects could happen to confabulate the same thing, given 
the huge range of possible representations a malfunctioning memory system could 
produce, the odds of this happening in practice are vanishingly small (Hirstein 
2005). But suppose that by chance, two subjects really did confabulate the same 
thing: this would still not explain ME-memories, for such a case would be an 
instance of merely shared and not genuinely collective remembering (more on this in 
Section 3.4), assuming that the subjects’ interaction has not contributed new content 
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to the group representation. It is possible that the interaction among confabulators 
does contribute new content, but ME-memories are so widespread that this would 
fail to provide an adequate explanation of the appearance of ME-memories. So, if 
collective confabulation is not merely the result of interaction among confabulators, 
what explanation is left to the reliability theorist? 
I argue in this subsection that collective confabulation involves 
misremembering at the individual level. To see how this might be the case, let us 
now shift focus from confabulation to misremembering, paradigmatically 
exemplified by the DRM Effect (Deese 1959; Roediger and McDermott 1995). In 
DRM-style experiments, subjects are presented with a list of related words such as 
hospital, nurse, medication, and gurney, and then when they are later asked to recall 
the words on the list, they report words that were not listed (such as doctor), but are 
thematically consistent with the presented words. Subjects are able to do this 
precisely because they have retained information12 about related words that 
appeared on the list: the system reliably predicts words, getting some wrong and 
some right. Classifying the false memories as confabulations is tempting, but to do 
so would be to overlook the fact that the false memories are the products of a 
properly functioning memory system (Robins 2016a). If the memory system were 
malfunctioning, we would expect the reported but unlisted words to be thematically 
inconsistent with the words presented.13  
 
12 One need not appeal to the causal theory to offer this explanation of the DRM Effect. The reliability 
theorist can also explain the DRM Effect by appealing to retention, since the reliability theory does not 
deny that information is ever retained; it merely denies that information is always retained (Michaelian 
2016a; 2016b). 
13 Here lies an objection. The version of the reliability theory upon which I rely takes misremembering 
to be the product of a properly functioning memory system that has produced an inaccurate output, 
but this should not be taken for granted. De Brigard (2014), for instance, argues that the function of 
the memory system is not merely remembering, but episodic hypothetical thinking (EHT). On this 
view, the system aims not at producing accurate representations of the past, but instead at producing 
plausible reconstructions of what might have been. If this is right, then accuracy is not a good indicator 
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At the individual level, the Mandela Effect appears to have a similar structure 
to the DRM Effect: subjects seem to remember an event that did not occur, but they 
do so because they have retained information about similar events that really did 
occur. For example, Sinbad really did have a film career, there really was a movie 
about a genie, and the words “shazaam” and “kazaam” are similar enough that 
sliding between the two is unsurprising; Nelson Mandela really was in prison and 
really did die (although not until 2013), and there were plenty of news reports about 
Mandela during the 1980s; DiCaprio has been nominated for several Academy 
Awards, although not for his otherwise critically-acclaimed performance in Titanic 
(which itself was also highly nominated). Examples like these align with what we 
already know about how a properly functioning memory system could seem to 
recall some false details precisely because it has retained information about related 
events. Rather than being due to a malfunctioning memory system, the individual 
representations that feed into the ME-memory are unlucky byproducts of properly 
functioning memory systems.  
Misremembering is produced by a properly functioning memory system, and 
so the representations produced are guided by the memory system’s function 
(namely, to get at the truth). So, if two subjects with properly functioning memory 
 
of whether a system is functioning properly, since success at producing plausible hypothetical 
representations is not judged by accuracy. I suggest as a tentative response that discounting accuracy 
as a means to distinguish among genuine remembering and memory errors will prove to be a difficult 
move, as doing so renders the EHT view of memory unable to distinguish between genuine 
remembering or misremembering and confabulation: the content of the resultant representations 
might be inaccurate, but the inaccuracy cannot be attributed to a malfunction in the memory system 
(Robins 2017). If appealing to the cognitive process responsible for producing the representation fails 
as a means to distinguish errors, then the alternative is to appeal to the content of the representations 
and assess them for reasonableness. This strategy is undesirable, however, in that it will fail to catch 
mundane cases of confabulation (those that do not stand out by being sensational), and in that it 
“would invite a return to the unsavoury [psychiatric] practice of pathologizing deviance” (Robins 
2017). In light of these considerations, we have good reason to preserve the notion of accuracy as an 
aim of the system, insofar as the process the system is executing is remembering (as opposed to 
imagination or counterfactual thinking, for instance). Therefore, it really is appropriate to take a 
properly functioning memory system to be one that reliably produces accurate representations of the 
past. 
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systems remember the same event, and if a properly functioning memory system is 
one that aims to produce accurate representations of the past, and if aiming at 
accuracy guides the representations produced, then it is relatively likely that two 
people could remember the same event in similarly inaccurate ways. An example 
will help to illustrate this point: two people might both seem to remember having 
seen a car collision resulting from one car running a stop sign rather than a yield 
sign. They remember the same inaccurate details, because their remembering is 
guided by aiming at truth. By contrast, a malfunctioning memory system is one that 
does not reliably—although it may occasionally—generate accurate representations. 
Because the resultant representations are not sensitive to the accuracy-aiming 
features of a properly functioning memory system, the likelihood of different people 
confabulating the same representation is down to chance—imagine that two people 
could seem to remember the same details about a collision that never occurred at all! 
The point here is that different subjects might spontaneously and independently 
misremember the same details as a result of memory’s architecture. Let us consider 
how this works in the Shazaam case: is far more conceivable that two people could 
happen to remember the same inaccurate details about a movie that does exist (i.e. 
Kazaam), than it is that two people independently produced matching 
representations of a movie that does not exist. In both cases, the former is more 
likely, since a properly functioning memory system may nevertheless produce a few 
inaccuracies based on other remembered events. Although subjects are remembering 
inaccurately, the inaccuracies do not appear to result from malfunctioning memory 
systems; in other words, they are misremembering. 
I claimed above that the reliability theorist would classify ME-memories as 
collective confabulations, i.e. collectively held representations produced by a 
malfunctioning memory system. So far, the story has only demonstrated how 
misremembering plays a role in collective confabulation; I have not identified any 
particular malfunction, and hence no confabulation. It is at this point that we must 
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consider the processes that unfold at the group level. Although I have argued that 
the Mandela Effect involves no malfunction at the individual level, in the next 
section I argue that there is a malfunction at the group level. It then follows that the 
collective ME-memory is a genuine confabulation: a representation produced by a 
malfunctioning memory system. 
Group-level factors giving rise to the Mandela Effect 
Let us return to the example of the car collision. Suppose, as above, that a witness 
misremembers a yield sign as a stop sign. Now, suppose that she later discusses the 
collision with other witnesses. When she mentions the stop sign, then if the other 
witnesses have remembered successfully, they might correct her by saying that it 
was a yield sign. But another possibility is that her interlocutors have taken her 
(inaccurate) testimony to heart and inadvertently incorporated the stop sign into 
their own representations: they have been influenced by the Misinformation Effect 
(Loftus 1997b; Loftus and Pickrell 1995; Loftus, Burns, and Miller 1978). If this is the 
case, the other witnesses might not correct our misrememberer, precisely because 
they are now also misrememberers with compatible representations. Whether the 
first witness is corrected or not, in both cases, the group representation tends toward 
convergence, although the convergence might be on an inaccurate representation 
rather than an accurate one. 
But this does not appear to be what is happening in the Mandela Effect. In the 
above example, the group has converged on a representation of an event that did 
happen, but ME-memories are representations of events that did not happen. ME-
memories are more akin to a scenario in which one witness to a car collision 
remembers a stop sign instead of a yield sign, another witness remembers a black car 
instead of a blue one, and still another witness remembers that the collision took 
place on a Thursday instead of a Wednesday. And of course, because people tend to 
misremember in similar ways, several witnesses may conceivably independently 
remember each of these details inaccurately. If these witnesses share their memory 
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of—or, in other words, testify about—the event in question, they may influence each 
other’s representations such that the group representation they produce is so 
different from the actual event that it can hardly be said to represent that collision at 
all. In a case like this—and in the Mandela Effect—we are not seeing convergence on 
not just one, but multiple misremembered details. But why is it in these cases that 
we do not see a tendency toward accuracy? What features of interaction drive the 
formation of collective representations of events that never happened? 
Let us pause here to recapitulate what I have said so far. I have claimed that 
the Mandela Effect is a matter of confabulation, which results from a malfunctioning 
memory system. I have also claimed that there is no malfunction at the individual 
level, and that the inaccuracies in question are mismemories, not confabulations. 
While for individual confabulation, the malfunction must lie in the individual 
memory system, the same is not true of group memory systems, since group 
memory systems, unlike individual memory systems, involve processing at both the 
individual and group level. I propose that the malfunction lies at the group level. 
Claiming that there is a malfunction at the group level—or indeed, claiming that 
there is a malfunction in any system—presupposes that there is some function that 
the system would normally execute, but has failed to do so. This forces us to answer 
the obvious question: what is the system’s function? The short answer is 
convergence on true beliefs about the past. The longer answer will take some setup.  
One initial worry that I should address before proceeding is that there may be 
no function at all; that it is an outright mistake to claim that groups have functions. 
And this may indeed be the case for most groups, but it is not obvious that the set of 
individuals that produce ME-memories are indeed groups of this kind. Some groups 
are merely nominal, such as the set of people on the same flight. Such a group lacks a 
function, although the members are engaged in the same activity (e.g., going to 
Beijing). But groups like these are constituted arbitrarily. By contrast, groups that are 
deliberately constituted—e.g., scientific teams, juries, committees, sports teams, 
   
106 
 
political parties—typically do have functions, such as winning a match or gaining 
economic and legislative control of a region. Groups like these seem to behave more 
as systems: where the actions are not just aggregations of individual actions, but 
involve group coordination and cooperation (Tollefsen 2015). Indeed, Staley goes so 
far as to insist that “collectives can only exist, and hence can only act, […] on the 
basis of shared aims” (2007, 322). Though this claim is very strong, it probably still 
points in the right direction: if not for a function (or intention or goal), it is unclear 
what would have motivated the members to assemble. Like sports teams, the 
systems that produce ME-memories (“ME-systems”) are indeed deliberately 
constituted: the members find and engage with each other precisely because they 
share similar mismemories about the same events, not because they arbitrarily begin 
interacting. Otherwise put, the only reason these people even talk to each other is 
because they care about what happened. Thus, ME-systems appear to have some 
function. 
If ME-systems have functions, they can malfunction. But there is an important 
difference between individual remembering and collective remembering. In the case 
of individual memory systems, it is easy to see how the function of the system can be 
understood in terms of the system’s tendency to produce accurate representations 
(pace De Brigard 2014; see footnote 12 of this chapter). The same is not necessarily 
true of distributed memory systems, in which memory processing “spans not only 
the embodied brain and central nervous system, but also the environment with its 
social technological resources” (Barnier et al. 2008, 33). Although collective 
remembering can result in the production of accurate representations of the past, it 
also serves other purposes, such as promoting social bonds and reinforcing group 
membership and collective identity (Harris et al. 2014). If we imagine that the 
function of a distributed memory system is not to produce accurate representations 
of the past, but to fulfil one of these other social functions, our judgments about the 
reliability of the distributed memory system might change radically. Suppose a 
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married couple revises their memories about a past disagreement for the sake of 
harmony in the marriage. An example like this illustrates that a distributed memory 
system might fail to produce accurate representations of the past while promoting 
social bonds. If we take the latter, social function to be the function of the distributed 
memory system, then the failure to produce accurate representations should not 
figure into our judgments about whether the system is functioning reliably. So, the 
question is: are ME-systems more like individual memory systems, or more like 
distributed memory systems? What should we take the function to be: the 
production of accurate representations, or something else? 
Suppose that ME-systems have a different function from individual memory 
systems. Perhaps ME-systems function to reinforce group membership; if this is the 
case, failing to produce accurate representations of the past would not act as 
sufficient justification for inferring that ME-systems are malfunctioning. If there is no 
malfunction, then ME-memories would not qualify as confabulatory according to the 
reliability account. The problem with the supposition, though, is that ME-systems 
exhibit different characteristics than typical distributed memory systems, and these 
characteristics invite caution in abandoning the notion of an epistemic function. For 
instance, one idiosyncrasy of ME-systems is that although the members could in 
principle come together offline, given the distribution of individual mismemories, 
this would be extremely unlikely: they would need to find each other offline by 
chance. ME-systems come together only online: their members must seek each other 
out, unlike the witnesses to a car collision who are brought together by chance. ME-
memories are like DRM Effect memories in that they are products of properly 
functioning individual memory systems, but they are unlike DRM Effect memories 
in that any given ME-memory is unlikely to be widely shared, so for ME-
rememberers to find each other requires that the members seek each other out. 
Indeed, in a typical case, the members have come to the online forum for the express 
purpose of finding out whether others remember the same past event, and the main 
   
108 
 
aim of discussion in the forum is to figure out whether the event in question really 
did occur. In other words, the ME-system has an explicitly epistemic function: to 
gain knowledge of the past. Many systems do not have genuinely epistemic aims, 
but it is not difficult to imagine ordinarily functionless interactions to have epistemic 
functions deliberately imposed upon them. For example, although the function of 
casual conversation is ordinarily to reinforce social bonds, some conversations have 
epistemic functions deliberately imposed upon them, as when someone asks a 
passer-by for directions.  So, although it may sound odd to claim that this group 
interaction has a function, we can see that there are plenty of ordinary offline 
interactions that do seem to have functions imposed on them: for example, 
courtroom proceedings, academic conferences, or strategic planning meetings for a 
business. It seems that interaction within ME-systems could be of the same kind. 
Furthermore, the claim that the members are seeking to reinforce social bonds rings 
hollow here, since the members typically do not know each other offline and 
therefore have no pre-existing social bonds to reinforce. The systems in question 
would not even exist had the members not had the epistemic goal that motivated 
them to seek others who could confirm their beliefs. 
Because ME-systems seem to have functions imposed on them, and because 
group formation happens as a direct result of the epistemic (not social) goals of the 
constituent members, we can treat ME-systems as having the function of enabling 
their members to get at the truth. In a sense, ME-systems are more like scientific 
communities, with epistemic goals including convergence on the truth (more on this 
in Section 3.5.2).14 And although there may be other distributed memory systems 
that we consider to be properly functioning despite their failure to get at the truth, 
owing to the fact that they reliably fulfil some other function (such as reinforcing 
social bonds), it is the case that the success of ME-systems is indicated by their 
 
14 In fact, interactions within scientific communities are subject to the same kind of considerations that 
give rise to ME-memories, including a desire for agreement and group solidarity (Staley 2007). 
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reliability in getting at the truth. Yet, ME-systems systematically fail to perform this 
function, so we can infer that they are unreliable.  
The problem with this inference, it might be objected, is that ME-systems 
typically only come together for the express purpose of discussing a single ME-
memory, and exist for only a short time before dissolving. Because of their short 
lifespans, and because patterns are only established after repeated executions of the 
function, it is impossible to identify a pattern of reliability in a particular ME-system. 
In other words, the worry is that since ME-systems do not function long enough to 
establish a pattern, we can only observe a one-off inaccuracy rather than actual 
unreliability. Without unreliability in the system that produced a representation, the 
representation fails to qualify as a confabulation, or so the objection goes.  
It might be true in many cases that a single system does not demonstrate 
unreliability, but there are a few things to be said in response to this objection. First, 
although many ME-systems are fleeting, some are persistent; i.e. the same group 
members might discuss several different ME-memories (in fact, some Redditors 
appear in multiple different but related Mandela Effect threads). A system of this 
kind might demonstrate a pattern of unreliability if it is systematically failing to get 
at the truth. But the second point is that even if we assume that all ME-systems are 
fleeting, we can generalise across ME-systems. Doing so shows that as a type, ME-
systems systematically fail to get at the truth, and thus we can use information about 
the type to give us indirect insight into tokens of the type: namely, that individual 
ME-systems themselves are unreliable. And third, considering the patterns of 
interaction that propel the formation of ME-memories will enable us to infer that 
ME-systems are unreliable, since these patterns of interaction will routinely guide 
the system toward convergence, often at the expense of the representation’s 
accuracy. (I return to this point in Section 3.5, where I discuss features of group 
interaction.) 
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In short, under reliability accounts, ME-memories qualify as confabulations. 
At the individual level, they are simple mismemories, but the routine failure of the 
epistemic group indicates a malfunction in the interaction among group members. 
Since confabulations are produced by malfunctioning memory systems, and since 
there is a malfunction in the collective memory system responsible for producing 
ME-memories, ME-memories are indeed confabulations. 
This leads us to another objection. My opponent may wonder why ME-
memories should be characterised as collective confabulation and not collective 
misremembering. Misremembering—paradigmatically exemplified by the DRM 
Effect—involves inaccuracy, but is produced by a properly functioning memory 
system (on the reliability view) or bears an appropriate causal connection to the past 
(on the causal view). It might seem as though the examples of ME-memories I have 
offered are quite close to the truth: there really is a movie about a genie granting 
wishes to children, and the titles Kazaam and Shazaam sound alike. It might appear as 
though the ME-memory is simply a matter of getting a few details wrong, and this, it 
seems, should not be enough to force us to characterise the representation as a 
confabulation. They seem more like inaccuracies introduced precisely because the 
memory system is working properly, just as is the case in the DRM Effect. It may 
seem as though ME-memories should therefore be understood as collective 
mismemories.  
But to characterise them as such would be to miss a fundamental point in the 
reliability theorist’s story: that mismemories arise when a properly functioning 
memory system produces an inaccurate representation. What is key here is that the 
misremembering/confabulation distinction does not map onto the 
accuracy/inaccuracy distinction; rather, it maps onto whether the memory system is 
functioning properly. As I argued earlier in this section, it appears that the memory 
system in question is malfunctioning; if so, then the system’s outputs are 
confabulations, regardless of their accuracy with respect to the truth. At this point, 
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the reader may wonder why it is that the systems in question routinely produce 
“nearly true” representations; after all, this is not what we would expect from a 
malfunctioning memory system. The answer lies in the fact that the collective 
representation inherits information from the individual-level mismemories. Because 
the individual-level systems that produce these mismemories are not 
malfunctioning, and because the resultant representations are largely veridical, the 
collective representation will inherit both accurate and inaccurate features of events. 
Hence, a collective memory system could routinely produce “nearly true” 
representations even though it is malfunctioning.  
 Appealing to function will be unsatisfactory to the causal theorist, for whom 
the distinction between remembering/misremembering and confabulation depends 
not on function or malfunction, but on the existence of an appropriate causal 
connection to the past. While it is tempting to use a representation’s inaccuracy as 
evidence of its confabulatoriness, the causal theorist denies that inaccuracy is what 
determines which representations count as confabulations. ME-memories qualify as 
mismemories if they have both an appropriate causal connection and are inaccurate. 
ME-memories do not meet this condition, however. As I will argue later in Section 
3.3.2, ME-memories lack the appropriate causal connection. Therefore, the causal 
theorist cannot characterise individual ME-memories as mismemories, even though 
their proximity to the truth makes this verdict a tempting one. Instead, the causal 
theorist must characterise individual ME-memories as confabulations, but the story 
as to how collective ME-memories arise will be slightly different from the reliability 
theorist’s. 
3.3.2 ME-Memories according to the causal account 
The reliability theorist can explain ME-memories by claiming that they result from 
individual-level misremembering combined with a group-level malfunction—in 
other words, ME-memories emerge when misrememberers interact. But this 
explanation fails the causal theorist, for whom what differentiates memory errors is 
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not whether the system that produced them is functioning properly, but whether 
they bear an appropriate causal link to a previous representation (Bernecker 2017). If 
ME-memories lack such a connection—and as I argue in this subsection, they do—
they are confabulations. The purpose of this subsection is to tell a story about how 
the causal theorist can explain the appearance of ME-memories. 
Let us return to a central question guiding what I have said so far in this 
subsection: what would the causal theorist need to say that the representations in 
question are confabulations? Importantly, the causal connection between the past 
event and the present representation must be inappropriate. The causal theorist who 
wants to call classify cases such as Shazaam as confabulation has two main options: 
first, to deny that there is an appropriate causal connection between the individual 
representations and the original event, and second, to deny that there is an 
appropriate connection between the individual representations and the group 
representation of the event. (You might think here that there is no such thing as a 
group representation at all. I address this notion in Section 3.4.) 
 The causal story begins in the same place as the reliability story, with 
inaccurate representations of events that really did happen. We start with 
representations of Kazaam, of news reports of Mandela in prison, and so on, but then 
details—such as the title or actor in the movie, or whether Mandela died or not—
change, such that the representation is transformed into a mismemory. At this point, 
a misremembering subject who encounters evidence contrary to her apparent 
memory may seek assurances that her memory is intact, and upon searching online 
for what she remembers, she will find others who have reported similar 
mismemories. Like the reliability theorist, the causal theorist will appeal to 
memory’s reconstructive nature to explain the preponderance of these mismemories 
(De Brigard 2014). 
 Once misrememberers congregate online, they share their own apparent 
memories about the event in question and integrate information from others’ 
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testimony into their own representations, a phenomenon that aligns with Schnider’s 
description of the mechanism that gives rise to everyday confabulation: 
“modification of the memory trace by the association of post-event information” 
(2018, 183). The ways that the topics are introduced influence both the content of and 
subjects’ degree of confidence in the reported memories: if subjects are asked leading 
or suggestive questions by others, subjects’ memories of certain events are distorted 
even before the memory is brought to mind, reproduced with strong or moderate 
conviction, and re-encoded (Schnider 2018, 182). 
In the Mandela Effect, it appears that members’ post-interaction 
representations depend much more heavily on the testimony of others than they do 
on any one past event. So, while the individual representations may have initially 
borne an appropriate causal connection to an actual past event—after all, there really 
was a movie about a genie, and the representation of that movie seems at least 
partially causally responsible for the present representation—and may even 
continue to bear a causal connection to the past, the notion that the link is 
appropriate is implausible. Although the initial representations bore an appropriate 
causal connection, this ceases to be the case once the causal connection has been 
mutated by the integration of post-event information in the form of testimony from 
other misrememberers. With the causal connection condition unmet, these cases will 
be classified as confabulations by the causal theorist.  
But is the causal theorist to say that others’ testimony renders the causal 
connection inappropriate? I think so. To see why, compare Shazaam to a car crash. 
Suppose several witnesses independently misremember different features of the car 
crash, and upon interaction, converge on a representation that turns out to be 
accurate. The question of the appropriateness of the causal connection is orthogonal 
to the question of the representation’s accuracy, and so the verdict about the 
confabulatoriness of the car crash case should match the verdict about Shazaam, and 
ought to differ only as a function of the accuracy of the group representation. In 
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other words, if the causal theorist classifies the car crash as a case of genuine 
remembering, she should similarly classify Shazaam as a case of misremembering. If 
she classifies the car crash as a case of veridical confabulation, she should classify 
Shazaam as a case of falsidical confabulation. 
What would the causal theorist say about the car crash case? It depends. The 
fact that the representation is accurate rules out the possibilities that the 
representation is collective misremembering and that it is collective falsidical 
confabulation, so the representation must be either genuine remembering or 
collective veridical confabulation. Which one it is will be determined by whether 
there is an appropriate causal connection between original event and group 
representation. So, to determine whether there is one, let us follow the 
representation right from the original event to the group representation it ultimately 
becomes. 
First, there’s the original event – say that what really happens is a white van 
runs a yield sign and hits a blue car at low speed. So then what? Suppose that three 
individual witnesses (prior to interaction) remember the following: Witness 1 
remembers a white van running a stop sign and hitting a blue car at low speed, 
Witness 2 remembers a white van running a yield sign and hitting a black car at low 
speed, while Witness 3 remembers a white van running a yield sign and hitting a 
blue car at medium speed. In a sense, each witness has gotten the facts more or less 
right, but each has made an error attributable to ordinary constructive remembering, 
and which bears an appropriate causal connection (for example, Witness 2 
remembers a black car precisely because she saw a blue car). Before interaction, each 
witness misremembers the collision. 
Suppose now that the witnesses interact with each other. Suppose also that 
they are responsive to the fact that their errors are outnumbered (e.g., Witness 1, 
who incorrectly remembers a stop sign, is responsive to the fact that two others 
remember a yield sign, and updates his belief accordingly). In such a case, all the 
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individual-level errors will be corrected, such that the group representation is 
veridical: Witness 1’s mismemory of the stop sign, Witness 2’s memory of the black 
car, and Witness 3’s memory of the higher speed of the collision are all corrected by 
the testimony of the other witnesses, which all trace back to the original event 
through what is clearly an appropriate causal connection. No problem here for the 
causal theorist: the collective representation is both accurate and appropriately 
causally linked to the past, so it qualifies as successful remembering.  
But what if the witnesses interact in such a way that their errors survive 
interaction and make it into the collective representation? Suppose that during 
interaction, Witness 1 is especially insistent that the van ran a stop sign and not a 
yield sign, and that error makes it into the collective representation, such that the 
group representation is of a white van running a stop sign and hitting a blue car at 
low speed. 
Here we meet a problem, and it comes down to the question of how to 
individuate events. If we individuate events narrowly, i.e. that a white van runs a 
yield sign and hits a blue car at low speed, this case will count as confabulation, 
because it was simply not the case that a white van ran a stop sign and hit a blue car. 
The question is whether the event and the representation are causally related; 
trivially, there is no causal connection to an event that never occurred. By virtue of 
the lack of causal connection, the representation qualifies as a confabulation. 
Broader individuation is trickier: it depends on how many errors (and what 
kind) are tolerable. If we individuate the event more broadly—for example, we 
demarcate the relevant event as being a car collision—then it looks more like 
misremembering. The collision did happen, after all, but when the witnesses recall 
the event, they get some of the details wrong. So, there is a causal connection to a 
past event, i.e. the car collision, but the representation lacks accuracy. By Bernecker’s 
lights, this qualifies as misremembering. 
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So, let us return to the question of Shazaam. What I have said so far depends 
on a fairly broad individuation of the past event in question, but the case for 
confabulation becomes that much stronger should we individuate the event more 
narrowly still. Suppose that the event in question is not whether there really was a 
movie about a genie, but instead whether there really was a movie about a genie, 
that was called Shazaam and starred Sinbad. The same integration of post-event 
information will unfold, but with this narrow individuation, the need to appeal to 
that integration to explain the erosion of the causal connection disappears: the event 
simply did not happen, so there is no causal connection to erode. 
Still, it seems like a broad individuation of events is going to be the wrong 
avenue for the causal theorist to take. Witness 1 isn’t insistent that a white car ran a 
stop sign and hit a blue car at low speed; most of those features are already agreed upon 
by the other witnesses. Witness 1 insists that a white car ran a stop sign and hit a blue 
car at low speed. So, it seems that this small aspect of the event is what is at stake 
here, and the causal history of that small aspect matters very much. The causal 
theorist cannot appeal to the whole representation’s causal connection to the event 
when what is at stake amongst the rememberers is this narrow feature. In a sense, 
what the rememberers disagree about already presupposes a narrow individuation 
of events. So, the causal theorist will need to adopt a similarly narrow individuation.  
If this is right, then what really matters is the causal connection of the stop 
sign to the past event, and trivially, there can be no causal connection to an event 
that never happened. Thus, since there is no causal connection, the causal theorist 
must conclude that the representation is a confabulation. The causal theorist might 
be perfectly happy for appropriate causal connections to make their way through 
testimony, but surely testimony about something that didn’t happen won’t qualify 
as an appropriate causal connection. So, to the extent that the collective 
representation depends on this specious testimony, it lacks the appropriate causal 
connection, and is therefore confabulatory.  
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But beyond an appeal to intuition, how are we do defend the claim that the 
causal chain is deviant? Consider the case of Kent, who experiences a car accident, 
recounts the story to his friend Gray, and then gets into another accident in which he 
sustains an injury causing loss of memory of the first accident (Martin and Deutscher 
1966). Gray repeats the account Kent offered to him, and Kent comes to represent the 
collision once more, and later forgets that Gray has testified as to the details of the 
event. Here, Kent’s representation of the car crash is veridical, so it cannot count as 
either falsidical confabulation or misremembering, since those are necessarily false. 
That leaves us with veridical confabulation or genuine remembering as the 
alternatives. Martin and Deutscher deny that Kent is remembering, so he must be 
confabulating, though veridically. Simply put, the representation lacks an 
appropriate causal connection, and is veridical, and is therefore veridical 
confabulation.  
Whatever the verdict in Kent’s case may be, it ought to match to the verdict in 
our own car crash example above. If the causal connection is lacking in Kent’s 
scenario, then it is lacking in our own car crash example as well. Simply put, the car 
crash example is an instance of confabulation; the first iteration is veridical 
confabulation, the second falsidical. Recall that veridical confabulation and genuine 
remembering differ from each other in exactly the same way that falsidical 
confabulation and misremembering differ from each other (i.e. they are not matters 
of accuracy, but instead matters of whether the representation is appropriately 
causally connected to the event). Thus, if the second iteration of the car crash 
qualifies as falsidical confabulation, then so too should ME-memories. 
Thus, whether the past event is individuated broadly or narrowly, the causal 
connection condition is unmet: either the subject is representing an event that simply 
did not occur, in which case there can be no causal connection, or the causal 
connection is specious, travelling through a tendrilous chain of mismemory and 
others’ testimony through several subjects to a past event, such that the causal 
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connection can hardly be said to be appropriate. Either way, at the individual level, 
the causal theorist will characterise the representations in question as confabulations. 
What happens is that individuals form mismemories that are then distorted by 
testimony from other witnesses, producing representations whose deviant causal 
chain renders them confabulatory. That those confabulations come about as the 
result of interaction among group members means that the representations are 
genuinely collective, and thus collective confabulation. 
 In short, in either the reliability or causal case, the fact that ME-memories 
seem to be fairly close to the truth is inconsequential to determining whether they 
are confabulations as opposed to mismemories. The confabulatoriness of a 
representation is determined not by accuracy but by the reliability of the system that 
produced it (according to the reliability theorist) or by the representation’s causal 
connection to the past (according to the causal theorist). Thus, while it is tempting to 
say that ME-memories are mismemories rather than confabulations, neither the 
reliability nor the causal theorist will arrive at such a conclusion; instead, both will 
classify ME-memories as genuinely confabulatory. This brings us halfway to the 
conclusion that the Mandela Effect is collective confabulation. 
3.4. Collective Memory 
Just as the purpose of Section 3.2 was to provide an overview of the main accounts of 
confabulation, the purpose of this section is to provide some background on what I 
take collective memory to be. What follows in this section will set the stage by 
providing the criteria that ME-memories must meet to qualify as a genuinely 
collective phenomenon. 
Theiner (2013) argues that if a property of a system is to be considered 
emergent (sensu Wimsatt’s (1986) mechanistic approach to emergence), it must be the 
case that interactions among the system’s components affect that property 
(Michaelian and Sutton 2017). So, an operation performed by a system with a given 
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set of components that interact in a certain way will produce different results than a 
system with some components exchanged for others, or different interactions in 
place. So if the group members—in this case, individual rememberers—interact in 
cooperative or inhibitory ways, the output of the system will be affected. In other 
words, the fact that a given process is unfolding in a collective context has a unique 
and important impact on the output of that process. In a similar vein, Huebner 
(2014) argues that we can attribute collective mental states as long as the 
computations performed by the group through the exercise of whatever mental 
capacity we attribute to it are more complex than those performed by its members.  
In both Wimsatt’s/Theiner’s and Huebner’s approaches, the main point for 
my purposes is that collective mentality emerges through interaction among group 
members. Of course, not all group interaction is created equal, and the degrees of 
interactivity differ from one group to the next (Michaelian and Sutton 2017). In the 
case of remembering, we can identify two key processes in which we might expect to 
observe interaction: encoding (the point of committing a certain experience to 
memory) and retrieval (the point of accessing the encoded representation),15 either of 
which can be parallel or interactive. A parallel process is one in which group 
members perform some task (e.g., encoding or retrieving) alongside one another but 
with no real interaction, and an interactive process is one in which group members 
interact while performing the task in ways that influence the output of the task (e.g., 
what is encoded or retrieved). This yields four possible combinations in the 
parallel/interactive encoding/retrieval framework: parallel encoding with parallel 
retrieval, interactive encoding with parallel retrieval, parallel encoding with 
interactive retrieval, and interactive encoding with interactive retrieval (Michaelian 
and Sutton 2017). 
 
15 This is a necessarily simplified view of the stages of remembering, but will suffice for my purposes. 
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 The most robustly collective forms of emergence16, interactive encoding and 
interactive retrieval, can be found in transactive memory systems (TMSs). In TMSs, 
the members’ metacognitive knowledge and cooperative and inhibitory interactions 
are critical to the successful functioning of the system. But is it not merely that these 
interactions are critical to the successful functioning of the system; owing to these 
interactions, the computations performed by a TMS are more complex than those 
performed by its members (Huebner 2016). Both Theiner’s and Huebner’s claims 
appeal to the interactivity within TMSs to show that TMSs are capable of 
remembering content different from what any individual group member remembers. 
In other words, interaction produces a group representation that is quantitatively 
greater17 than the representation produced by an individual; the interactions among 
components of the system influence the output of the system, which on either 
Theiner’s or Huebner’s views suggests that TMSs are genuinely collective. As we 
will see in the next section, ME-memories are likely not this robustly collective—I 
argue that they are matters of parallel encoding and interactive retrieval—but are 
collective nonetheless. 
 Collective memory should be distinguished from shared memory. For this 
chapter, I largely rely on Michaelian and Sutton’s (2017) line on collectivity, 
according to which, while collective memories are shared representations resulting 
from interaction among group members, shared memory lacks the interactive 
 
16 I am not wedded to any particular technical understanding of emergence; the view I have in mind is 
fairly generic. 
17 In addition to quantitative forms of emergence in TMSs, there are qualitative forms of emergence: 
Harris et al. (2017; 2014), for instance, identify several kinds of emergence in collaborative 
remembering in long-married couples who “go episodic.” These dyads exhibit the same type of 
quantitative emergence mentioned above, meaning that information that neither individual could 
recall alone becomes available due to interaction during retrieval. But they also exhibit qualitative 
forms of emergence, such as enrichment of the emotional features or the vivacity of what is 
remembered. Furthermore, members’ interpretations of a given event might be transformed when 
they remember together. It seems clear, then, that remembering together is not just a matter of adding 
up what is remembered apart. I leave aside the topic of qualitative emergence in ME-systems, but 
offer the cursory observation that ME-system members’ convictions in their representations increases 
with interaction, so it is plausible that ME-systems exhibit other qualitative forms of emergence. 
   
121 
 
component at either the encoding or retrieval stages (Michaelian and Sutton 2017). In 
other words, collective memory is a matter of parallel encoding coupled with 
parallel retrieval. To understand the difference, consider what it would be like to 
reminisce about a landmark football game with a friend who had attended it with 
you. You would likely remind each other of this pass or that goal, bringing up 
different details to each other that you had forgotten. Compare this scenario with 
one in which another spectator, someone you had never met and never would meet, 
were sitting on the other side of the stadium during the game. You and the unknown 
spectator might represent exactly the same features of the game—even 
simultaneously—but this match is obviously not a result of interaction between the 
two of you. This latter scenario is an example of shared remembering. Although 
your representation matches the unknown spectator’s, there is no sense in which the 
memory is anything more than shared; interaction has not played any role in 
producing the representations.  
I return to the distinction between collective and shared memory toward the 
end of this chapter, but it will not be too important for what follows next. Crucially, I 
take a collective phenomenon to be one in which interaction among group members 
influences the output of the process, such that the output is transformed from what 
would have resulted had any individual performed the process alone. In the next 
section, I use the claims I have advanced here to show that ME-memories are 
genuinely collective. I argue, in other words, that in-group interaction contributes to 
the formation of ME-memories. 
3.5. Are ME-memories collective? 
I claimed above that remembering is collective when new information emerges due 
to the interaction among group members (for example, new details, new qualitative 
information like emotional richness, or new understandings or interpretations of 
past events). In the case of the Mandela Effect, we are lucky to have a record of the 
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group interactions readily available for analysis: namely, the forum threads in which 
these ME-memories appear. It is clear upon reading these threads that members 
contribute new information that is readily adopted by other members, as when one 
Redditor writes: 
 “I read your synopsis and it’s very close to what I remember. I actually 
owned a copy of this movie that my mom bought from a video store 
because it was only like $1. One additional scene that I do remember 
involved a car and the kids wanting the genie to come with them 
somewhere but he couldn’t sit in the car so he was riding on top of it 
like it was a flying carpet and they were like “No, you can’t do that 
either! That’s dangerous/someone will see you!” Cause he kept like 
almost hitting trees and things and sliding around (which never made 
sense cause if he’s a genie couldn’t he use magic? Idk [I don’t know]. 
Lots of plot holes in this masterpiece) and people weren’t supposed 
to see him or whatever. So then he disappeared and they were like 
“Where’d he go?” And they couldn’t find him again until they got out 
at their destination and he was in the trunk and his body was all like 
twisted around weird and the kids thought it was so funny. I was just 
curious to see if you remembered anything like that?” (u/manafrmhvn 
2018, emphasis added) 
Another Redditor replies: 
“I don’t want to inadvertently add to the “Mythos” surrounding this 
film by adding things that I am not 100% sure about, which is why I 
have never referred to the movie as “Shazzam” or any variation 
thereof for eaxample [sic] (it was a one word Title and the genie may 
have used it as a magic word but I can’t say for sure that was the name 
of the movie). 
I can say that yes, there was a whole segment of the film that involved Sinbad 
hiding and trying not to be seen, and the car scene sounds familiar and I 
think had to do with the dad accidentally taking the bottle to work 
with him but I can’t elaborate much more than that other than I think 
the dad nailed a presentation or meeting because the genie helped 
him without him knowing. 
I really think the movie was never finished being edited in post 
production and it was hurriedly released when the Rights to it 
changed hands to take advantage of Sinbad’s popularity at the time. 
   
123 
 
I actually wouldn’t be surprised at all to find out the movie was 
originally filmed in 1989-90 before he was a big star...and another 
thing, might be nothing - but I could have swore [sic] the kids actually 
called him “Sinbad” in the movie...though I guess if it was “Shazam” 
it’s pretty close phonetically.” (u/EpicJourneyMan 2018, emphasis 
added) 
These interactions illustrate how individuals (falsely, though likely sincerely) report 
familiarity with the information offered by others, and contribute their own 
memories or interpretations of the event. The individual narratives are woven 
together in such a way that ultimately, the group-level ME-memory is a composite of 
that information and is greater in detail than the representations produced by any 
one individual. In fact, Redditor u/shazaamthemovie compiled a list of ‘known’ 
information about Shazaam based on “stuff that multiple people from various 
sources remember” (u/shazaamthemovie 2017), including the suspected release date, 
starring actors, a description of the VHS cover, and details about particular scenes. 
Furthermore, as I claimed above, the interactions among ME-system members lead 
to the emergence of—at minimum—new details, even though these interactions are 
malfunctional. It is also possible that qualitative forms of emergence come about in 
ME-systems, but I leave that possibility aside for now. But if it is true that interaction 
leads to new information, then it follows that the group-level ME-memories are 
genuinely collective. 
3.5.1 Group-level malfunction 
My earlier explanation of the group-level malfunction (Section 3.3.1) was inspired by 
the simulation theory (Michaelian 2016a), but my explanation of the mechanisms 
that bring about this malfunction is compatible with the causal theory. Indeed, the 
causal theorist will likely need to appeal to these same mechanisms to explain how 
interaction among group members influences the resultant representation, and thus 
how individual mismemories are transformed into individual confabulations. The 
causal theorist need not characterise anything in the mechanistic story as a 
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malfunction, however, and—like the causal theory of memory itself—can remain 
agnostic about the notion of good functioning. 
To understand how interaction shapes representations, consider a subject 
with a properly functioning memory system. The reconstructive nature of 
remembering might result in the subject’s misremembering a certain event; 
ordinarily, this will not give rise to a particularly interesting collective phenomenon, 
since the subject might not relay the mismemory to anyone else. Suppose, however, 
that the subject does relay the memory in an offline environment: it is likely that her 
mismemory will be corrected by her (successfully remembering) peers. But her belief 
may be insensitive to correction, and if this is so, she may seek confirmation of the 
veracity of her memories elsewhere. It is possible that she might find such 
confirmation offline, but given that the distribution of mismemories is likely to be 
fairly scattered, her odds of encountering someone else with the same mismemory 
are low. Thus, even if she herself is unwilling to give up the mismemory, she is 
unlikely to convince others of its truth and it will remain a one-off inaccuracy: she 
will be the only one in her epistemic community who holds that mismemory. 
But suppose our subject turns online to seek the confirmation that she is 
unable to find in her offline epistemic community. If enough other people with 
sufficiently similar mismemories have had their own offline failures to find 
confirmation of the veracity of their representations, they, too, may have turned to 
online discussion fora such as Reddit to seek such confirmation there. Since the 
members of such fora compose concentrated groups of misrememberers, the chances 
of in-group correction are significantly lower. The formation of the group of 
misrememberers triggers the operation of a variety of mechanisms, ultimately 
resulting in the reinforcement and enrichment of the individual subjects’ 
mismemories. This, in turn, gives rise to a collective representation of the event.  
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3.5.2 Features of interaction 
What exactly are the mechanisms at play here?18 The first is one that I have already 
hinted at: the widespread phenomenon of online echo chambers,19 in which “most 
available information conforms to pre-existing attitudes and biases” (Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, and Cook 2017, 359). In fact, the subreddit r/MandelaEffect allows users to 
filter posts by “skeptic” or “no skeptic” tags (u/Denominax 2017); conceivably, this 
facilitates the segregation of “believers” from skeptics. Even in other threads that do 
not explicitly forbid the expression of skeptical views, members who do express 
skepticism are strongly ostracised, as demonstrated by the response to a particular 
sceptical comment20 on a thread titled “254 Confirmed Mandela Effects: List” 
(u/ezydown 2017). U/melossinglets challenges the comment with: 
“firstly,why dont you go to your precious google and look up the 
meaning of the word "skeptic"...then,once youve let that set in and 
marinate a little,see if you reckon that that definition correlates nicely 
with "a bunch of people coming in and simply telling everyone they 
disagree with that they are wrong and trotting out the exact same 
"cover-all" excuse for hundreds and hundreds of folk theyve never 
met in their life,basically making one huge assumption about all of 
their various experiences and painting them all with the same 
brush".....im not entirely sure it will.....but cool,whatever.” 
(u/melossinglets 2017) 
U/melossinglets’ comment is characteristic of responses to skeptical views and 
illustrates one of the epistemic problems embedded in groups like this. First, there is 
a selection bias in that only people who share mismemories about certain events are 
 
18 I intend this subsection only as a first step toward identifying the mechanisms at play in producing 
ME-memories. It is not meant to serve as a definitive list. 
19 Here, one might argue that the echo chamber problem—i.e. the tendency to engage only with media 
that serve to confirm one’s previously-held beliefs—is overstated (Dubois and Blank 2018; Garrett 
2017). This may be the case, but the studies in question make this point with respect to politics. There 
may be some important differences between how echo chambers affect political discourse and how 
they affect collective remembering. Furthermore, my claim is not that echo chambers alone can 
explain the Mandela Effect, but that echo chambers exacerbate certain features of interaction—
features that could, both in principle and in practice, be found offline as well as online—that are 
operative in the production of ME-memories. 
20 The original comment has been deleted, but the subsequent comments clearly indicate that the 
original comment expressed a skeptical view. 
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likely to find each other in the first place, so the balance of beliefs is tipped toward 
inaccuracy rather than accuracy. Those who deny these mismemories are forced out 
of the group, whether by formal penalty (such as a moderator ban on the user) or by 
social exclusion. Furthermore, in collectives of ideologically-aligned subjects, “as a 
form of ‘identity self-defense,’ individuals are unconsciously motivated to resist 
empirical assertions […] if those assertions run contrary to the dominant belief 
within their groups” (Kahan 2012, 408).  In a ME-system, this heavily decreases the 
likelihood of correction and goes some way toward explaining the absence of a 
tendency toward convergence on the truth: simply put, members withhold dissent in 
favour of preserving group membership and solidarity. In a similar vein, we should 
bear in mind that groups aim not only at truth, but at agreement: members may act 
as though they believe things—i.e. they may accept aspects of propositions without 
believing them, so as to facilitate action (Tollefsen 2015), and therefore it might be the 
case that the group believes something that no individual member believes21. 
Speaking about scientific publications, Rehg and Staley (2008, 10) call this 
“heterogeneous consensus, in which a collaboration agrees to the publication of an 
evidence claim, while disagreeing on the premises offered in that publication as 
support for the claim.” For instance, in a huge collaboration involving 450 (!) 
individual researchers, those who endorsed the findings of that collaboration 
overwhelmingly reported that the conclusion was “basically correct,” but disagreed 
on other points pertaining to the conclusion (Staley 2007). Similarly, ME-system 
members are willing to endorse the general ME-memory even if certain aspects of it 
conflict with their own representations. Once a cohesive group has been established, 
members might be encouraged to continue to endorse their apparent memories for 
the sake of group stability and continuity. This is especially true for minority 
views—when one individual seems to be the only one who holds a certain belief, 
 
21 There is a rich and vast literature on exactly this topic, but space limitations prevent me from 
engaging with anything but a generic version of the claim. For more, see e.g., Hakli (2006; 2007), 
Tuomela (1992), and Wray (2001). 
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finding others who also hold that belief can galvanise it and make those believers 
that much less willing to renounce that belief. 
 Once the group is established, members discuss the details of the event in 
question. In fact, this is the express purpose of many such fora: the subreddit 
r/MandelaEffect, for instance, has a permanent post with the instructions, “Do you 
believe you've discovered a new Mandela Effect? Post it in the comments below to 
see if anyone else has experienced it too! Make sure you include why you think it 
could be a Mandela Effect and as many details as possible so people can respond and 
discuss with what they remember” (u/AutoModerator 2018, emphasis added). The 
entire point is to engage in collective remembering, evidenced by the 
straightforward invitation for members to imagine their own experiences and to 
contribute details to the group representation (u/DonnaGail 2017). Consider the 
following report from one Redditor:  
“Three of my coworkers and I were talking about a product we have, 
and the name sounded similar to Sinbad. We ended up discussing the 
actual movie called Sinbad, and then it led to discussing the 
comedian. I listened to this exact conversation go down between the 
three of them: 
1: ‘Yeah, he was in a movie! Umm ... he was like a genie or something.’ 
2: ‘Oh yeah, I remember that. It was called .... Shazam? Oh wait, that 
was Shaq.’ 3: ‘No, no. That was Kazam. Different movie.’ 2: ‘Oh okay. 
Man, I haven’t seen Shazam in so long.’ 
I had no influence on the discussion. One sort of knows about the 
Mandela Effect, but I confirmed after this conversation that he had no 
idea that there was anything about the existence of Shazam.” 
(u/Fae_Leaf 2018) 
The contributed details cue other members to contribute what they remember, too, 
eliciting additional details from each other, and so on and so forth, gradually 
producing and refining a collective representation. This cross-cueing is particularly 
important, especially when the information being presented is false. If this is the 
case, we observe the Misinformation Effect: “the impairment in memory for the past 
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that arises after exposure to misleading information” (Loftus 2005). When 
participants present information about their own mismemories, this information—
even if false—is incorporated into the memories of others.  
 Echo chambers, the prevention of expressions of skepticism, the invitation for 
individuals to offer their memories to the group, the misinformation effect: all of 
these are mechanisms that contribute to the formation of a collective representation 
of an event. It should also be noted, however, that in principle, none of what I have 
said is particularly unique to online environments. The onlineness of the interactions 
exacerbates the echo chamber problem, to be sure, but echo chambers of many kinds 
are found offline as well, since friend groups are often composed of like-minded 
people who already share viewpoints or attitudes, and in which discussing 
controversial issues rings of “preaching to the choir.” And the other mechanisms I 
have identified will be exacerbated by the homogeneity of the ME-systems, but are 
still functional in offline environments. So, although the only cases of the Mandela 
Effect that I have observed have been online, there is no reason in principle that they 
could not emerge offline. Due to my point above about the offline distribution of 
mismemories, such emergence is unlikely, but if by chance several misrememberers 
were to find each other offline, we have no reason to think that a Mandela Effect-
style interaction is impossible.  
3.5.3 Large-scale or small-scale? 
There is one final point to be made about collectivity and the Mandela Effect. Most of 
the features of interaction I have identified have pertained to small-scale groups, 
such as siblings, long-term friends, and intimate couples. In these cases, members 
interact directly with one another; it is this feature that enables the features of 
interaction I describe. By contrast, ME-systems seem to be comparatively much 
larger, and so one might wonder whether it is legitimate to apply concepts from 
research into small-scale groups to ME-systems, which are apparently large-scale. So 
the question here is this: if we are not willing to take the notion of large-scale 
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collective memory seriously, are we entitled to talk about collective confabulation, 
especially given that ME-systems seem to be so large-scale?  
The answer is yes. Recall that what is necessary for a phenomenon to qualify 
as collective is that a group’s constituent members interact in such a way that there is 
some degree of emergence. We see the most robustly collective kind of interaction in 
TMSs, where encoding and retrieval are both interactive. Though we do not see this 
kind of interaction in ME-systems, we still see parallel encoding and interactive 
retrieval, which, although weaker than the form TMSs exhibit, is sufficient for 
collectivity. The nature of an online forum enables direct interaction among 
members, such that the interaction is much more like the kind we would see in small 
offline groups; in other words, because members can interact directly with each 
other online, the group behaves less like a large-scale group and more like a small-
scale group, even though the group may appear too large to function as such. The 
point is this: because ME-systems are sufficiently interactive—i.e., because the 
interaction shapes the representation produced—it is indeed legitimate to borrow 
features of interaction that have been identified in small-scale cases and apply them 
to the specific case of ME-systems. 
3.6. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by thinking that, if one takes seriously the notions of collective 
memory and memory errors, there must be such a thing as a collective memory 
error; nevertheless, there seems to be no discussion of such a thing in the literature. 
The relatively recent phenomenon known as the Mandela Effect serves as a 
fascinating example of the kind of thing we would expect if we were to imagine 
what a collective memory error might be. I have shown in this chapter that the 
Mandela Effect can be explained as collective confabulation, regardless of whether 
one endorses a reliability account or a causal account of confabulation. For the 
reliability theorist, the widespread misremembering of real events at the individual 
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level coupled with a malfunction at the group level produces a group-level 
confabulation. For the causal theorist, the group representation inherits the 
confabulatoriness of widespread confabulations at the individual level. In both cases, 
interaction at the group level promotes quantitative (and probably qualitative) 
emergence, such that the system remembers more than what any individual 
remembers. The phenomenon is thus genuinely collective. 
I conclude with an exploratory note. As I said above, it is likely that the group 
representations that fall under the Mandela Effect umbrella are not a homogeneous 
group. Remembering Berenstein Bears instead of Berenstain Bears, or remembering 
that Carmen Sandiego had a yellow trenchcoat instead of a red one are cases that 
seem importantly different from fabricating an entire movie that never existed. One 
important difference between these and Shazaam are that they seem to be errors 
about simpler (i.e. more atomistic) things: there are only so many mistakes one can 
make when it comes to the spelling of “Berenstain,” but as we have seen, the 
mistakes one can make about a film are seemingly endless. So, it seems much more 
likely that several individuals could independently produce the same representation 
without any interaction whatsoever. This may, therefore, be a case of shared 
misremembering: a matter of a reliably functioning individual memory system 
producing an inaccurate representation, or a representation appropriately causally 
connected to the past, that is shared but not influenced by interaction among 
misrememberers. This is just a proposal, however, and what types of memory errors 
these are and whether they are genuinely collective remains to be determined; 
nevertheless, I hope that my forays into this project serve as a catalyst for this kind of 
research.22 
 
22 I am grateful to audiences at the 2017 New Zealand Association of Philosophers’ conference, the 
2017 Philosophical Perspectives on Memory conference, the University of Otago philosophy 
postgraduate seminar, the 2018 Mental Time Travel: Origins and Function workshop, and the 2018 
Australasian Association of Philosophy/New Zealand Association of Philosophers’ joint conference 
for feedback that greatly contributed to the development of this chapter. I am also grateful to Zach 
Swindlehurst for proofreading. 






The point of Chapter 2 was to develop a more inclusive account of testimony by 
proceeding from the observation that we can learn from others even when their 
testimony is non-propositional. The aim of doing so was to make sense of what was 
really at work when we learn from others. The present chapter approaches the same 
problem from a completely different angle: here, I continue to focus on how we 
might learn from others. Like the Mandela Effect advocates of Chapter 3, we are all 
more or less susceptible to incorporating information from others into our memories. 
While the Mandela Effect serves as a fun, bizarre example of this phenomenon, this 
chapter identifies an ethically and epistemically noxious way that we might learn 
from others. Perhaps most frighteningly of all, when it happens to us, we might not 
even realise that it is happening, and in some cases, the consequences can be grave. 
 Epistemologists who work on testimony are familiar with having to explain to 
laypersons that when we use the term “testimony,” the phenomenon we describe is 
not restricted to the courtroom. Though legal testimony, of course, qualifies as 
testimony in the epistemological sense, there are many other kinds of 
communication that fall under the umbrella of testimony. Still, it is worth paying 
special attention to this legal sense of testimony, since what epistemologists say 
about it has stark practical ramifications for people’s lives. In particular, testimonial 
injustice, when perpetrated against formal (i.e. courtroom) testifiers, can have grave 
practical consequences in addition to the epistemic consequences inherent to all 
forms of epistemic injustice.  
The past decade or so has seen an explosion of literature on the topic of 
epistemic injustice, catalysed by Miranda Fricker’s (2007) book Epistemic Injustice: 
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Power and the Ethics of Knowing.1 Her conceptualisation of epistemic injustice as a 
“kind of wrong done specifically to someone in her capacity as a knower” and as 
taking the two distinct forms of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice has 
been highly influential in the resulting discussion.  
Fricker (2007) offers the following example of testimonial injustice: In the film 
The Talented Mr. Ripley, set in the 1950’s, Marge Sherwood suspects that the 
disappearance of her fiancé Dickie is the responsibility of Tom Ripley. Upon 
expressing her suspicion to Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf, he dismisses her by 
saying, “Marge, there’s female intuition, and then there are facts” (Minghella 1999). 
As it turns out, Marge was correct: Tom Ripley was indeed responsible for Dickie’s 
murder, and Greenleaf’s gender-motivated dismissal of Marge’s concerns was a case 
of testimonial injustice. He explicitly invokes stereotypes about women as 
excessively intuitive and insufficiently rational in order to discredit Marge and 
ultimately reject her testimony. Had Greenleaf taken Marge as seriously as he would 
have a man, the police might have turned their attentions to Ripley sooner.  
In testimonial injustice, a testifier lacks the social power required for their 
testimony to receive an appropriate level of credibility, and their testimony is 
therefore rejected by a more socially powerful recipient. The testimony is rejected on 
the grounds of prejudices related to the testifier’s social type. Though I do not 
outline them here, Fricker offers other examples that are parallel to the case of Marge 
and Greenleaf, such as that of Tom Robinson’s trial in To Kill a Mockingbird. 
Testimonial injustice brings about two kinds of harms: epistemic and practical. 
Primarily for Marge, for example, she is not taken seriously as a knower or giver of 
knowledge, explicitly because she is a woman. Secondarily, she suffers the practical 
harm of not receiving answers about her husband’s disappearance. On Fricker’s 
 
1 While Fricker’s (2007) book sparked this explosion, many of the ideas contained therein were first 
articulated by other scholars—particularly women of colour. (See McKinnon (2016) for critical 
remarks on the genealogy of the concept of epistemic injustice.) 
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view, the epistemic harm is inherent in testimonial injustice, while the practical harm 
is not.  
If what I claimed in Chapter 1 is correct and memory and testimony are 
indeed analogous, then the next step is to investigate whether analyses of 
downstream phenomena of one are applicable to the other. I began this project in 
Chapter 2 when I suggested that there was room to understand testimony-how as 
analogous to memory-how, and continued it in Chapter 3 by thinking about the 
interaction between memory and testimony in collectives. In Chapter 4, I focus on 
the phenomenon of epistemic injustice as it manifests in testimonial and memorial 
contexts. Epistemic injustice is a distinct kind of wrong that can be inflicted upon an 
agent specifically in her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007). On Fricker’s view, 
epistemic injustice comes in two forms: hermeneutical injustice and testimonial 
injustice. Though Fricker’s work implies that hermeneutical and testimonial injustice 
exhaust the species of epistemic injustice, subsequent work has identified other 
distinct species, such as contributory injustice (Dotson 2012), conceptual competence 
injustice (Anderson 2017), and interpretative injustice (Peet 2017). In this chapter, I 
centre the discussion on testimonial injustice and bracket the others as promising 
areas for future consideration in light of what we know about the nature and 
epistemology of memory. 
The aim of this chapter is to use the concept of testimonial injustice and the 
analogy between memory and testimony to develop an account of memorial injustice, 
in which—roughly speaking—a subject consciously or unconsciously rejects her own 
memories for unjust reasons. The exact details of this phenomenon will have to be 
worked out as the chapter progresses, but as a first approximation, let us consider an 
example of what memorial injustice might look like. 
Suppose that a racialised suspect is arrested on suspicion of having 
committed a crime that he did not, in fact, commit. After extensive police 
interrogation, the suspect confesses, falsely, to the crime. The pressure and hostility 
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of the interrogation has engendered self-distrust such that the suspect discards his 
initial beliefs about the time in question and comes to believe what he is told by the 
interrogators. He comes to believe that he committed the crime even though he did 
not, and despite objective evidence that he is innocent (Chapman 2013).  
Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) identify three kinds of false confessions: 
voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalised. Voluntary false confessions 
are those in which subjects voluntarily incriminate themselves without external 
pressure, and can arise in the absence of an interrogation. These might be offered to 
gain notoriety or to shift suspicion off the guilty party. In contrast, coerced-
compliant and coerced-internalised confessions both occur in interrogation settings. 
Coerced-compliant confessions happen when a subject is aware that the 
interrogators are convinced of his guilt, and so might plead guilty to avoid a long 
trial or to receive a reduced sentence, or simply to escape an unpleasant and 
aggressive interrogation. Finally, coerced-internalised confessions happen when 
“innocent people, subjected to misleading claims about the evidence, become 
confused, question their own innocence, infer their own guilt, and sometimes 
confabulate false memories to support that inference” (Kassin 2014, 114). Of the 
three types of confessions, the third is of special interest to us, for it requires a subject 
to come to adopt beliefs about his committing the crime. This is in contrast to the 
first two kinds, wherein the subject confesses but there is no corresponding doxastic 
shift: the suspect knows that he is confessing to a crime he did not commit. Indeed, as 
Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1982) claim, false confessions of this type occur when a 
subject develops “such a profound distrust of their own memory that they become 
vulnerable to influence from external sources” (Kassin et al. 2010, 15, emphasis 
added). In fact, a subject’s questioning and ultimately rejecting his memories of the 
past and deferring to the accusations from the interrogators are a perfect example of 
memorial injustice.  
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For this example to be helpful, however, we shall need some clarification. 
Crucially, the individuals at stake in this phenomenon are not the interrogators and 
the suspect; rather, they are the suspect’s past and present selves. That the suspect is 
also testifying to the interrogators is a red herring; the important phenomenon is 
whatever is happening in the suspect’s internal mental life. In other words, what we 
care about is not the interaction between suspect and interrogator, but the increasing 
levels of internal epistemic self-distrust that manifest in the suspect’s mind about his 
own memories. So, in the case of the false confessor, the memorial injustice is an 
experience internal to the suspect. The interrogators do not directly perpetrate the 
injustice, though their behaviour and questioning might catalyse it. In other words, if 
a suspect sincerely and accurately testifies that his activities on the night in question 
were such-and-such, and the interrogators disbelieve him, this is not an instance of 
memorial injustice, but of ordinary testimonial injustice. The memorial injustice 
obtains when the suspect himself begins to reject his own memories. 
Importantly, memorial injustice is distinct from injustice with respect to 
testimony about the past – this would just be a species of testimonial injustice.2 
Because I focus only on individual memory, I bracket questions about collective 
memory (but see Tanesini (2018) for an account of collective memorial injustice)3. In 
this case, the rememberer will also have to be the perpetrator of the injustice, 
because others don’t have access to her mnemic mental states except through 
testimony, and it will be too difficult to dissociate the epistemological problems with 
 
2 This line contains the implicit metaphysical assumption that individual memory occurs within one 
person. I comment on the metaphysics of a rememberer in Section 4. For now, however, as I have 
done in previous chapters, I bracket metaphysical concerns about characterising this view in terms of 
past and present self. I use it merely as shorthand to refer to the individual at the time of encoding 
and at the time of recall. I remain neutral on metaphysical concerns about personal identity. 
3The term “memorial injustice” is also used by Tanesini (2018), but we have different (though 
compatible) meanings in mind. I use the term to refer to an internally-committed injustice, while 
Tanesini uses the term to refer to social rejection of collective memory, especially through the removal 
or destruction of artefacts (e.g., statues) that scaffold cultural or societal memory. 
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reports about the past that arise from their origin in memory from their expression in 
testimony.  
In other words, if a rememberer reports on the past and a hearer rejects her 
testimony, it is not always obvious what causes the rejection: a hearer’s identity 
prejudice (so an ordinary case of testimonial injustice), a hearer’s rejection of 
memory as providing reliable grounds for knowledge about the past, or normal 
good epistemic reasons to reject testimony. For example, I might reject your 
testimony about the past not because I have assigned a credibility deficit to you, but 
because I am generally skeptical about the justificatory force of memory. In this case, 
it does not appear as though I have committed any injustice because your identity is 
not a factor in my assessment of your credibility as a testifier (in fact, your credibility 
has not come into at all; all that matters in this case is my belief that testimony is 
generally unreliable). Alternatively, I might fail to consider you to be a reliable 
rememberer; though I believe you are being sincere, I doubt that what you say is true. 
If this is the case, then what I am doing is doubting your reliability in testifying as to 
your memories; such a case is already adequately covered by Fricker (2007). 
Disentangling these phenomena is both difficult and unnecessary for my purposes, 
since the phenomenon at issue is not memory reports (i.e. testimony about one’s 
memories), but an individual’s internal mental experience of remembering and then 
accepting or rejecting her memories. In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, I set 
aside the unique considerations about memory reports and epistemic injustice, since 
there are two stages at which an agent might judge whether she ought to accept a 
given memory or piece of testimony: one at the point of the rememberer’s recall, and 
another at the point of the recipient’s entertaining the testimony. The central case at 
issue for memorial injustice will therefore be an ordinary case of individual 
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remembering, where the source is the past self and the receiver is the present self.4 In 
the case of our false confessor, it is important to note that the memorial injustice 
obtains not when the interrogators reject his testimony, but when he himself begins 
to doubt his own memories.  
All this brings us now to the main point of this chapter: memorial injustice, I 
claim, is a species of epistemic injustice in which, owing to a self-assigned identity-
prejudicial credibility deficit or excess, a subject unfairly rejects or accepts a memory. 
Importantly, the self-assigned identity-prejudicial credibility deficit or excess is an 
internalised assessment based on dominant views about members of the subject’s 
social group. In the false confessor’s case, owing to his internalised views about the 
(un)trustworthiness of members of his social group—further exacerbated by the 
hostile interrogation—he unjustly assigns himself a credibility deficit. He therefore 
distrusts his own memories, and ultimately comes to agree with what the 
interrogators already assume. This distrust is a direct result of internalising the 
negative stereotypes of members of his social groups, such that he ultimately 
distrusts and rejects his own memories, which he otherwise has a default epistemic 
entitlement to trust. 
The thrust of the argument that I make in this chapter is this: memory and 
testimony are analogous, there is such a thing as testimonial injustice, so there is 
such a thing as memorial injustice, and memorial injustice comes about as a direct 
result of the memorial analogues of the phenomena that precipitate testimonial 
injustice. I proceed in this chapter as follows. In Section 4.2, I begin with a summary 
of the current state of the testimonial injustice literature, and show that no as yet 
identified species of epistemic injustice can accommodate memorial injustice. In 
Section 4.3, I recapitulate some of the claims I made in Chapter 1 about the 
 
4 Indeed, as interesting as it would be to look at the unique dimensions of memory reports and 
epistemic injustice, the project I have in mind here precedes such a discussion. Without 
understanding how an epistemic injustice can be fully internal, we cannot proceed to any meaningful 
discussion of how epistemic injustice plays out in the case of memory reports. 
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importance of mindreading to producing and interpreting testimony, and consider 
the ways in which metacognition in memory plays a similar role to mindreading in 
testimony, and argue that both are contributing factors to testimonial injustice. I then 
describe how memorial injustice might come about from specious metacognitive 
errors, which leads me to develop an account of memorial injustice toward the end 
of the section. Finally, in Section 4.4, I explore the possible harms that might result 
from memorial injustice. 
4.2. Epistemic injustice 
Fricker (2007) begins by defining epistemic injustice as occurring when someone is 
wronged in their capacity as a knower. She focusses on two kinds of epistemic 
injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. The literature has developed 
considerably beyond the two forms of epistemic injustice identified by Fricker: 
notably, Dotson (2012) identifies contributory injustice, Anderson (2017) identifies 
conceptual competence injustice, and Peet (2017) identifies interpretative injustice. 
 I will elaborate on the details of each of these species of epistemic injustice 
shortly, but will begin by pointing out that all species of epistemic injustice have in 
common that they are instances of wronging someone qua knower. Indeed, this is 
epistemic injustice’s defining feature. But beyond this defining feature, there are 
general features that all species of epistemic injustice share. Importantly, epistemic 
injustice is, at its heart, the result of the exercise of identity power.  
In some cases, Fricker says, identity power, which leads to identity prejudices, 
is exercised by individuals (such as in the case of Marge Sherwood). But Fricker is 
careful to emphasise that if certain attitudes are pervasive and prevalent in a given 
society, there may be instances in which no agent need exercise power for a 
testimonial injustice to take root; that is, nobody needs to do or say anything 
explicitly to inflict the injustice on someone (15). If someone is silenced by the mere 
fact of her social type in such a way that she is prevented from testifying altogether, 
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she too suffers a testimonial injustice. Dotson (2011) calls this phenomenon 
testimonial smothering. The distinction between active and passive exercises of 
identity power shows that injustices can be agentially or socially inflicted, and that 
someone can suffer an injustice without anyone explicitly (even if silently) 
discounting her testimony. That injustices can be agentially or socially inflicted will 
also be significant in the upcoming discussion of memorial injustice, for it gives rise 
to the possibility of an agent falling victim to memorial injustice against herself, 
absent an external agent, by internalising identity power on behalf of—that is, in 
keeping with the interests of—a comparatively privileged group. In other words, as I 
will elaborate in Section 4.4, even if there is no external agent perpetrating the 
injustice against an agent (say, our false confessor), the prevalent structures of 
identity power might nevertheless bring about an epistemic injustice, including 
memorial injustice.  
One feature worth noting is that each type of epistemic injustice epistemically 
harms not only the victims, but the perpetrators or the epistemic community as a 
whole, through harming individuals as knowers and routinely preventing the 
advancement of the epistemic community by limiting contributions from certain 
members of society. I identify such harms to the broader epistemic community as I 
proceed through the different species of epistemic injustice. 
Now that I have specified the general features of epistemic injustice, the rest 
of this section is devoted to discussing the key features of each form of epistemic 
injustice: hermeneutical injustice, contributory injustice, interpretative injustice 
conceptual competence injustice, and testimonial injustice. As we shall see 
throughout Section 4.2, though memorial injustice is consistent with the general 
features of epistemic injustice, none of the as yet identified forms of epistemic 
injustice can adequately capture the uniquely memorial dimensions of memorial 
injustice. 
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4.2.1 Hermeneutical injustice 
I address hermeneutical injustice first. For Fricker, hermeneutical injustice arises 
when, owing to an epistemic lacuna, members of a marginalised5 group are 
prevented from contributing to epistemic resources. They are thereby rendered 
unable to comprehend—much less articulate—their own experiences of 
marginalisation. 
 Fricker (2007, 149–50) offers the example of Carmita Wood, who experienced 
sexual harassment in the workplace in the 1970s, before the conceptual resources to 
convey her experience had been developed. She left her job as a result of the sexual 
harassment, and, after being unable to find new employment, when she applied for 
unemployment benefits, she found herself unable to specify on the form why she 
had left her previous job. Women who had experienced sexual harassment had not 
been taken seriously as knowers and consequently been prevented from 
contributing to the pool of collective conceptual resources; thus, the language and 
concept to articulate the experience did not yet exist, so she could only write that the 
reason was “personal.” Presumably, the unemployment office found the answer 
unsatisfactory, because Wood was subsequently denied unemployment benefits. 
Therefore, in addition to her epistemic marginalisation, she suffered the practical 
harm that was the financial blow of not receiving the unemployment benefit. Later, 
upon attending a consciousness-raising meeting, Wood learned that her experience 
in the workplace was not unique; collectively the group named the phenomenon 
“sexual harassment.” Today, that critical concept is widely known. 
 Unlike testimonial injustice, which involves two agents (more on this later), 
hermeneutical injustice is a “purely structural notion” (Fricker 2007, 159), not 
 
5 For the sake of simplicity and consistency with the literature, I retain Fricker’s language of 
marginalisation, but I wish to make it clear that what really matters is power. It is possible for an 
otherwise unmarginalized person to lack power in a certain social situation, and for that person not to 
become marginalized by that lack of power. For that reason, such a person might still be subject to an 
epistemic injustice absent marginalisation; in other words, marginalisation is not a necessary 
ingredient for epistemic injustice.  
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perpetrated by any one agent. It is a result of the cultural or societal failure of 
dominant groups to recognise marginalised persons as legitimate knowers, and to 
disregard their experiences such that the necessary conceptual resources to describe 
and articulate features of their existence, are absent. The injustice does not make 
itself known until a “more or less doomed attempt on the part of the subject to 
render an experience intelligible, either to herself or to an interlocutor” (Fricker 2007, 
159).  
 Hermeneutical injustice has the peculiar consequence of epistemically 
depriving not only the marginalised group, but the dominant6 group. In the case of 
Carmita Wood, for example, while she was able to articulate her experience to the 
other attendees of the consciousness-raising group, society at large remained 
ignorant owing to the hermeneutical lacuna where “sexual harassment” ought to 
have been. As a result, they failed to form (presumably true) beliefs about the world, 
although they did not encounter the same moral or practical harms that Wood 
herself did. Though the situation was likely worse for Wood, the hermeneutical 
injustice still epistemically disadvantaged those who could not understand her 
experience. 
 While hermeneutical injustice is a genuine form of epistemic injustice, it does 
not adequately capture what is going on in the false confessor’s case. He does does 
not lack the appropriate conceptual resources to understand her own memories. The 
resources are in place and he has an adequate grasp on them, but he still fails to take 
his own memories seriously. So, since the reason he does not form the relevant 
beliefs is not a result of a lack of conceptual resources, the example is not a case of 
hermeneutical injustice. Thus, hermeneutical injustice cannot provide a way to 
understand the case. So, let us proceed to another species of epistemic injustice. 
 
6 Similar considerations to footnote 5 apply here: what matters is not dominance per se but 
comparative power. In this case, the dominant group is whatever group’s is more powerful in a given 
situation, and is therefore better positioned to have their interests widely understood and recognised. 
   
142 
 
4.2.2 Contributory injustice 
Where hermeneutical injustice arises when the culture lacks the appropriate 
conceptual resources to express the experiences of marginalised groups, contributory 
injustice (Dotson 2012) arises when the conceptual resources are available, and a 
marginalised person is able to comprehend and describe her experience, but the 
testimonial recipient’s wilful ignorance prevents appropriate uptake. Like Dotson, 
Pohlhaus (2012) expands on Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice to advance an 
account of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, which falls within an “epistemology of 
ignorance” (Mills 1997, 18). Wilful hermeneutical ignorance refers to “instances 
where marginally situated knowers actively resist epistemic domination through 
interaction with other resistant knowers, while dominantly situated knowers 
nonetheless continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the world” (Pohlhaus 2012, 
716). The link between wilful hermeneutical ignorance and hermeneutical injustice 
should be clear: widespread wilful hermeneutical ignorance amongst the dominant 
group will systematically produce hermeneutical lacunae. These lacunae, in turn, 
give rise to hermeneutical injustice whenever a marginalised person needs to invoke 
the very conceptual resources they have been prevented from contributing to the 
collective pool of knowledge. 
 Where contributory injustice differs from hermeneutical injustice is in the 
availability of conceptual resources. Hermeneutical injustice arises when a person 
tries to communicate something that relies on conceptual resources that (unjustly) do 
not exist; in contrast, contributory injustice arises when “an epistemic agent’s willful 
hermeneutical ignorance in maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced 
hermeneutical resources thwarts a knower’s ability to contribute to shared epistemic 
resources within a given epistemic community by compromising her epistemic 
agency” (Dotson 2012, 32). In other words, the necessary conceptual resources are 
available, but members of the dominant group fail to take seriously interlocutors 
who rely on those resources, and to engage with the resources themselves. 
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 Let us revisit the case of the false confessor. We see here that contributory 
injustice will also not provide an adequate framework for understanding his 
situation. Recall that the reason the false confessor’s case did not qualify as an 
instance of hermeneutical injustice was because the relevant conceptual resources 
existed, and hermeneutical injustices arise from epistemic lacunae. Hence, without a 
lacuna, there can be no hermeneutical injustice. This alone, of course, does not 
preclude his case from qualifying as an instance of contributory injustice, since 
contributory injustice involves wilful ignorance of the relevant resources, though the 
resources themselves are in place. For the internalised false confession to qualify as 
an instance of contributory injustice, the confessor would need to be trying to 
remember something, but her present (remembering) self would need to be wilfully 
misunderstanding the meaning of his memories. This does not seem to be the case, 
either, since it is not the case that he simply doesn’t understand his memories, but 
that he does not trust them. It seems that he ought to be able to trust his own 
memories, and yet something in his social situation prevents him from what is 
otherwise a justified default epistemic self-trust (Burge 1993; Zagzebski 2012). In 
other words, absent a strong epistemic reason to reject his own memories, the best 
explanation for this rejection is that he has internalised a morally specious self-
distrust. Since contributory injustice cannot account for the false confessor’s case, we 
shall need to search further afield for an explanation. 
4.2.3 Conceptual competence injustice 
Anderson (2017) has identified another form of epistemic injustice: conceptual 
competence injustice. Conceptual competence injustice arises where “a member of a 
marginalised group is unjustly regarded as lacking conceptual or linguistic 
competence as a consequence of structural oppression” (Anderson 2017, 210). To 
illustrate the phenomenon, Anderson offers the example of a white, male, first-year 
graduate philosophy student who attends a philosophy of language seminar given 
by a philosophy graduate student who is a woman of colour. During the seminar, 
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the woman of colour asserts, “Natural kind terms are not rigid designators,” which 
the first-year graduate student takes to be false. Based on his implicit beliefs about 
women of colour typically not excelling at metaphysics and the philosophy of 
language, and on his own understanding of Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, the first-
year graduate student assigns a lower degree of credibility to the presenter than he 
does to himself and judges the presenter to be less competent with the relevant 
concepts. As a result, the first-year graduate student fails to engage seriously with 
the speaker’s arguments or presentation. Anderson puts the point nicely when he 
says that even though the presenter’s understanding of the relevant concepts is more 
advanced, “the first-year student—under the influence of covert social norms of 
credibility ascription that propagate and sustain the epistemic oppression of women 
of colour and facilitate the epistemic privilege of white men – takes himself to have 
the greater conceptual competence” (Anderson 2017, 211). In other words, the first-
year student endorses (even if subconsciously) the negative social expectations about 
the competence of women of colour when it comes to metaphysics and the 
philosophy of language, and thereby judges that he is more competent than she is. 
 Anderson points out that in doing so, the first-year student undermines 
himself epistemically because he fails to take on board an argument that ought to 
challenge his own understanding of the concept of rigid designation, as he would do 
if he were engaging with a presenter whom he judged to be at least as conceptually 
competent as he was. Moreover, he epistemically harms the speaker by treating her 
not “as a source of insight, but rather as someone who can be ignored” (211), and 
risks further damaging his willingness to assign an appropriate level of credibility to 
himself (he may overestimate his credibility) or to others (he may underestimate 
their credibility).  
 Here emerge some points of contact with the false confessor’s case, although, 
as we shall see, not enough to convince us that conceptual competence injustice is 
the right way to understand it. The false confessor may well, for instance, have 
internalised and deployed negative implicit beliefs about his own trustworthiness, 
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such that he takes himself to be a less reliable knower than he really is. However, I 
doubt that conceptual competence injustice captures the whole story. For one thing, 
as the name suggests, conceptual competence injustice is primarily a matter of 
misjudging competence. In contrast, in the false confession case, the issue is not that 
the confessor judges himself to be incompetent with respect to the application of 
certain concepts. Instead, he judges himself to be untrustworthy because he is 
dishonest. Thus, conceptual competence injustice cannot explain the mental 
phenomena giving rise to false confessions, and we shall need to explore other 
species of epistemic injustice to find one that does.  
4.2.4 Interpretative injustice 
Where hermeneutical injustice concerns the existence of conceptual resources, 
contributory injustice concerns the availability of conceptual resources, and 
conceptual competence injustice concerns faulty assessments of competence with 
respect to the application of conceptual resources, interpretative injustice (Peet 2017) 
has nothing to do with conceptual resources whatsoever. Instead, “interpretative 
injustice occurs when the wrong content is assigned as a result of prejudicial 
stereotypes influencing interpretation, regardless of what concepts are available in 
our public language” (Peet 2017, 3427). In other words, interpretative injustice arises 
when prejudicial stereotypes cause a recipient to mishear or to misunderstand a 
testifier. 
 Peet claims that interpretative injustice is most likely where our interpretation 
is guided by stereotypes. This is especially so where the cognitive load on the 
recipient is the highest: for example, “in cases involving context sensitivity, loose 
talk, unfamiliar dialects or accents, noisy environments, and implicature” (Peet 2017, 
3423). Assigning the wrong content to an utterance can take two different but related 
forms: first, a recipient may take the testifier to have said something other than she 
did (i.e. the recipient misunderstands or mishears the actual words of the testifier’s 
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utterance), or second, a recipient may take the testifier to have meant something 
other than she did.  
Here is a real-life example of interpretative injustice: in 2013, Ambridge Area 
High School in Pennsylvania went into lockdown when a receptionist 
misunderstood a student’s outgoing voicemail greeting (Strauss 2013). The outgoing 
greeting was the student’s own recording of the sitcom The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air’s 
theme song, which is a rap song that includes the lyric “Shooting some b-ball 
[basketball] outside the school.” The receptionist who heard the outgoing message 
believed the student was saying “Shooting some people outside the school,” and 
interpreted the message as a threat. The school went into lockdown, but when the 
misunderstanding was discovered, the lockdown was lifted and the student 
eventually cleared. Though reports indicate that the recording was somewhat 
garbled and unclear, the receptionist’s predisposition to associate threats of violence 
with rap music7 and to jump to the interpretation “Shooting some people outside the 
school” is consistent with Anderson’s description of interpretative injustice.8 (After 
all, if the message were very unclear, the receptionist would not have any special 
reason to jump to an interpretation of a threat of violence than any other, neutral 
interpretation.) 
If9 the student really did record “Shooting some b-ball outside the school,” it 
is possible that owing to the association between rap music and violence, the 
receptionist heard “Shooting some people outside the school.” In this case, the 
receptionist relied on prejudicial stereotypes about rap music and violence, which 
caused a misunderstanding of what the student’s message really said. There were 
also practical consequences to this misunderstanding. The obvious consequence was 
 
7 There may also be a racial dimension to the assumption, since rap music is predominantly produced 
by Black artists in the US, and there are widespread stereotypes of Black men as violent or aggressive. 
However, as I was unable to find any information regarding the student’s race, whether this 
association figured into this particular instance of interpretative injustice is unclear.  
8 In any case, even if the facts of this particular case are incorrect or incomplete, we can treat it as a 
hypothetical example illustrating interpretative injustice. 
9 I say “if” because there was never a definitive answer as to what the student had actually recorded. 
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that the school (and indeed, all schools in the county) went into lockdown. However, 
the student was also held accountable for a threat he did not make, and he was taken 
into police custody. The student’s father pointed out that his son may have been 
cleared, but asked, “How is he supposed to go back to school and face his 
classmates?” (O’Shea 2013). 
One obvious problematic consequence of interpretative injustice is that, like 
the student in the Fresh Prince debacle, victims of interpretative injustice are held 
accountable for assertions they did not make. Peet (2017) offers a more extended 
discussion of this possibility, but I will point out briefly that if a testifier claims that 
p, but is taken to have said q (where p is true and q is false), then the testifier may be 
unfairly judged to be incompetent in that domain. Moreover, if the same testifier 
routinely falls prey to this practice, then she may be judged to be incompetent across 
domains, or even globally incompetent. Alternatively (or additionally), she may be 
judged to be thoroughly dishonest or insincere. Neither incompetence nor 
dishonesty is desirable when one wants to be taken seriously as a knower. 
The false confession, however, cannot be explained by interpretative injustice. 
This is because the subject’s distrust in his memory does not arise from a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of the memory. There is no unjust or incorrect 
interpretation at play here. Rather, he interprets his memories correctly, but 
whatever he thinks he remembers, he rejects as wholly or at least substantially 
inaccurate. For the false confessor, the question is about the content of the memory 
itself, not its interpretation or what evidence it provides for his knowledge of the 
past; thus, interpretative injustice cannot fully explain his memory distrust or the 
consequent false confession. Since interpretative injustice fails, our best hope, I claim, 
lies in appealing to testimonial injustice.  
4.2.5 Testimonial injustice 
The point of the preceding subsections has been twofold: first, it has been to explore 
the state of the epistemic injustice literature. Second and more importantly, however, 
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the point has been to show that the example of what I call memorial injustice cannot 
adequately be described by the extant accounts of species of epistemic injustice. 
Given that—as I have argued in Chapter 1—memory and testimony are analogous, 
our best hope for understanding memorial injustice lies adjacent to testimonial 
injustice. Testimonial injustice has a few key features that require attention, since the 
remainder of the present discussion will be focused on testimonial injustice as it 
relates to the account of memorial injustice I develop toward the end of the chapter.  
Importantly, testimonial injustice takes place between at least two different 
people. In a paradigmatic testimonial exchange, there is a testifier and a recipient. 
The participants in such an exchange will often occupy different strata of social 
privilege or power (for example, they may be of different genders, races, or classes). 
For Fricker, the root of testimonial injustice is a negative prejudice that the hearer 
holds about some aspect of the speaker’s identity that causes the hearer not to grant 
the speaker’s testimony the credibility that it would otherwise merit. In Fricker’s 
language, this is known as an “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” (2007, 28).  
Most fundamentally, testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker’s credibility 
is diminished due to a prejudice or prejudices held by the hearer, or in other words, 
when a speaker’s testimony is rejected on non-epistemic grounds. In cases such as 
these, were the same testimony to come from another speaker who is not a member 
of a marginalised group, it would not be rejected unless there was something in the 
content of the testimony itself to render it suspect. In Fricker’s words, testimonial 
injustice is an “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” (28, emphasis added), meaning 
that due to a prejudice pertaining to the identity of a testifier—for example, their 
race, gender, or class—a hearer wrongly assigns the speaker a credibility deficit. 
That is, a hearer takes a testifier to be less credible than she really is simply because 
of the testifier’s social type. In having such a credibility deficit assigned to her, the 
force of the testifier’s testimony is damaged and the testimony is consequently 
rejected. In other words, the testimony is rejected not for good epistemic reasons 
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pertaining to the content of the testimony, but instead for non-epistemic reasons 
pertaining to the identity of the testifier.  
To say that the central case of testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility 
deficit is not to say that the only cases of testimonial injustice are matters of 
credibility deficit. Identity prejudices can also cause credibility excesses, where a 
testifier is granted more credibility than she ought to be. A senior academic who asks 
a junior colleague for feedback on a paper draft may unfairly be assigned a 
credibility excess by the junior, who then does not offer comments as critical or 
incisive as they would have been if he had engaged with someone he took to be a 
true epistemic peer. In this case, the senior academic suffers epistemically due to an 
unfairly inflated level of credibility (Fricker 2007, 18–19). Fricker, however, interprets 
this as a one-off error that is unlikely to have broader epistemic or social 
consequences for the senior academic; indeed, more often than not, credibility 
excesses are more advantageous than they are disadvantageous. While credibility 
excesses may place an undue or undesired epistemic burden on the recipient, 
credibility excesses do not constitute the same epistemic insult or devaluation of 
epistemic personhood that credibility deficits do (Wright forthcoming). Fricker then 
sets aside credibility excess and maintains that identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is 
at the heart of the central case of testimonial injustice.  
Testimonial injustice offers us the best starting point for understanding 
memorial injustice, but it alone cannot explain phenomena like gaslighting or false 
confessions. Typical cases of testimonial injustice do not change the testifier’s mental 
states; while the recipient fails to give appropriate uptake to the testimony, in a 
typical case, this failed uptake does not affect the testifier’s credence in the proffered 
testimony. Gaslighting and false confessions, however, do change the mental states 
(or at minimum, their doxastic attitudes) of the testifier by bringing about epistemic 
self-distrust, and testimonial injustice alone cannot explain how this is the case. So, 
while memorial injustice may have strong links to testimonial injustice, testimonial 
   
150 
 
injustice still fails to offer a satisfactory account of the phenomenon. Yet, it seems 
clear that an epistemic injustice of some kind has taken place, since the agents are 
wronged distinctly in their capacities as knowers. When an aggressive interrogation, 
for example, brings about epistemic self-distrust such that a suspect comes to believe 
(falsely) that he committed the crime in question, there is certainly some harm to the 
suspect’s status as an epistemic agent. Not only does he suffer a testimonial injustice 
from the interrogators, he suffers a damaging blow to his assessment of his own 
credibility—and one that has potentially catastrophic consequences, such as 
wrongful conviction.  
The rest of this chapter is devoted to developing an account of how memorial 
injustice arises and the implications it has for epistemic agents, and epistemology 
writ large. The account will also be able to characterise phenomena such as 
gaslighting and internalised false confessions. Before I progress to developing this 
account, however, it is worth dedicating some space to discussing credibility 
excesses and deficits in greater detail, for they will play a significant role in the 
following argument. 
4.2.6 Credibility excess and deficit 
The lack of attention Fricker pays to credibility excesses has not gone unquestioned 
in the subsequent literature. José Medina (2013) takes issue with Fricker’s (2007) 
characterisation of the central case of testimonial injustice as being a matter of 
credibility deficit, and along with Elizabeth Anderson (2012) points to credibility 
excess as posing just as serious a threat to epistemic practices as do credibility 
deficits. “Prejudice,” Medvecky (2018, 1397) says, “can also be positive prejudice—it 
can be unreasonably supportive of some individual’s knowledge.” In other words, it 
might artificially lend credibility to a testifier who would not otherwise deserve it. 
For example, when high-profile scientists Neil deGrasse Tyson and Bill Nye made 
disparaging remarks about the value of philosophy, those who took them seriously 
overestimated Tyson’s and Nye’s knowledge about philosophy. It is true that Tyson 
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and Nye are experts in science, but neither has any special knowledge about 
philosophy and so are not in a position to make authoritative claims about it. 
Nevertheless, their status as scientists gave rise to positive prejudices that caused 
inflated credibility assessments; thus, they were more likely to be believed when 
they made claims about philosophy. Genuine credibility in one domain (science) 
granted them artificial credibility in another (philosophy). This is how credibility 
excesses work.10 
Credibility excesses can be damaging to epistemic practices in several ways: 
first, like the senior academic who does not get sufficiently critical comments from 
the junior colleague, credibility excesses can hamper an individual’s epistemic 
progress. Second, credibility excesses allow privileged testifiers to make claims with 
lower levels of scrutiny than they would otherwise require, thereby increasing the 
risk of spreading misinformation. Third, they quash the claims made by less-
privileged testifiers who offer testimony that contradicts, competes with, or is 
otherwise incompatible with the testimony of testifiers who are assigned credibility 
excesses. In this third sense, credibility excesses can thus lead to the unjust rejection 
of less-privileged testifiers’ testimony, even if the recipient holds no negative 
prejudices about the social identity of a less-privileged testifier. 
Both credibility excesses and deficits come about as results of prejudices. 
Unsurprisingly, credibility deficits often result from negative identity prejudices 
held by the testimonial recipient, while excesses result from positive prejudices. The 
next question, then, is where these identity prejudices originate. One prominent 
suggestion has been that stereotypes play an important role in the development of 
identity prejudices. Let us consider, alongside Fricker, how something like 
stereotyping might affect a testimonial exchange. Stereotypes are, generally 
 
10 The phenomenon of experts in one field wading into another field in which they are not an expert 
and passing judgment nevertheless has been called “epistemic trespassing” (Ballantyne 2019) and 
“cross-expertise poaching” (Nichols 2017). I think the role of credibility excess in this phenomenon is 
both apparent and fascinating, but I leave the question for future research. 
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speaking, widely-held collective assumptions about the natures of certain groups, 
and are typically deeply resistant to counter-evidence (Blum 2004). Importantly, 
though, an agent need not endorse, agree with, or consciously accept a stereotype for 
them to fall prey to its normative force, and this is true whether or not the agent is a 
member of the group targeted by the stereotype.11 For example, a woman is not 
immune to internalising sexist stereotypes simply because she is a woman, nor is she 
immune to deploying them against herself or other women (Bearman, Korobov, and 
Thorne 2009; Liebow 2016; Szymanski et al. 2009). What this means is that, if 
stereotypes are at the root of identity-prejudicial credibility excesses or deficits, then 
a member of a targeted group is not thereby insusceptible to making an unjust 
credibility assessment of a fellow member of that group. This fact will be important 
later, when we begin to make sense of how it could be the case that an individual 
could be unfairly biased against (or for) herself simply in virtue of her membership 
in a targeted group. 
The preceding discussion of credibility excesses and deficits gives rise to an 
objection. You might think that to say there are such things as credibility deficits or 
credibility excesses requires positing that there is such a thing as a correct or 
appropriate degree of credibility. You may also think that determining whether an 
agent has suffered a credibility deficit or been granted a credibility excess cannot be 
done if the appropriate degree of credibility is unknown. There are three points to be 
made in response. First, this objection runs the risk of conflating the epistemological 
with the ontological, when they ought to be kept separate. The question of whether 
an injustice has occurred is different—but related—to the question of what the 
appropriate method is for determining whether an injustice has occurred. In other 
words, even if we have no way of identifying the appropriate level of credibility to 
assign to a testifier, this does not entail that there is no appropriate level of 
 
11 For more in-depth discussions of this phenomenon, see works on stereotype threat and implicit 
bias, e.g., Gendler (2011), Saul (2013), Steele (1997), Steele and Aronson (1995; 2004), and Steele, 
Spencer, and Aronson (2002).  
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credibility; to conflate the two is to conflate the epistemological question with the 
ontological question.  
Second, the notions of credibility and excess here are relative. Where Fricker 
(2007) argues that credibility is not a distributive good, Medina (2011; 2013) responds 
that credibility is a comparative good. To see the difference, consider this analogy: 
height is not a distributive good, in that for one person to be tall does not require 
that another person be short; nevertheless, the concept of height can still serve as a 
point of comparison between the two. Credibility, Medina claims, is the same. Just as 
there need not be any standard or norm of height in order for us to understand that 
some people are tall and some people are short, the same is true of credibility: in 
many cases, we will be able to tell whether someone has enjoyed a credibility excess 
or suffered a deficit even in the absence of a reference to an independent standard.  
Third, even if we were to say that there were some standard or appropriate 
level of credibility, the problem of vagueness arises here. Here, again, an example 
will be helpful. Let us compare credibility levels with voting: clearly, a toddler is too 
young to vote. On the other hand, surely a 35-year-old is old enough to vote. 
Knowing that the toddler is too young and the 35-year-old old enough does not 
necessarily entail knowing exactly what the “right” voting age is.12 Similarly, in the 
credibility case, neither identifying clear cases of excess and deficit nor making 
claims about them requires knowing or being able to determine exactly what the 
appropriate level of credibility is: the issue a matter of degrees. The issue of whether 
there really is such a thing as an appropriate or correct level of credibility is an issue 
that certainly requires an extended philosophical treatment and analysis, but for 
now, I follow other epistemic injustice scholars in bracketing the question. Any work 
on epistemic injustice that relies on the notions of credibility excess or deficit will 
 
12 I owe this example to Fabien Medvecky. 
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eventually have to answer to the question of appropriate levels of credibility, but 
doing so is not my project in this chapter.  
I leave the questions of whether there is such a thing as an appropriate level 
of credibility, and how to determine what it is, as directions for future research. I 
hope it is enough to say, at this point, that a credibility excess arises when an agent is 
granted more credibility than she would have been given if she were another 
speaker of a different but epistemically irrelevant13 social type, and a deficit when 
she is granted less, and that these misattributions of credibility are the result of 
prejudices on the part of the receiver toward an aspect of the source’s identity. From 
this point to the end of the chapter, I take for granted that there is such a thing as a 
testimonial injustice, and that it is a matter of having one’s testimony unduly 
rejected owing to an identity prejudice on the part of the hearer. 
The point of this long foray into the species of epistemic injustice may seem 
tangential or irrelevant, but I doubt this is genuinely the case. Importantly, no 
species of epistemic injustice that has been identified so far in the literature can 
completely and adequately capture and characterise the unique phenomena at issue 
in memorial injustice. Though some of the issues at stake are not entirely unique to 
memorial injustice, the phenomenon stands alone in that it is internal to one 
epistemic agent, although it is true that the actions of external agents, such as hostile 
interrogators, can precipitate or exacerbate the effects of memorial injustice. The 
similarities between memorial injustice and other species of epistemic injustice 
suggest that memorial injustice can move into the house, so to speak; the differences 
suggest it should get its own room.  
There is, however, one final feature of memorial injustice that must be 
highlighted before we can proceed. Importantly, one thing that distinguishes 
 
13 For considerations on whether and when a knower’s social types are epistemically relevant, see the 
literature on standpoint epistemologies, e.g., Code (1981), Collins (1986; 1990), Harding (1991; 1992), 
Hartsock (1983), hooks (1984) and Smith (1974; 1987). 
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memorial injustice from other species of epistemic injustice is that its epistemic 
harms are even more acutely targeted: while epistemic injustice, broadly speaking, is 
always a matter of wronging someone in her capacity as a knower, memorial 
injustice is unique in its potential to precipitate a doxastic shift in victims. In other 
words, memorial injustice has the power to alter the beliefs of the victim. Consider 
the innocent false confessor who, despite evidence to the contrary, and despite 
having no recollection of committing any crime, incriminates himself after a long 
and hostile interrogation. What makes this case different to, say, a garden variety 
testimonial injustice is that in the latter case, a subject might testify and have her 
testimony rejected, but the rejection does not alter her doxastic attitudes. Memorial 
injustice is different. It arises when a subject comes to doubt her own memories so 
profoundly that she rejects them, and may, instead, rely on external cues to fill the 
void that remains.  In false confession cases, for example, subjects who suffer from 
memory distrust (Gudjonsson 2003) are more susceptible to accepting 
misinformation and confabulating harmonious representations than their 
counterparts who are optimistic about the reliability of their memories (van Bergen 
et al. 2010). This phenomenon exemplifies the kind of doxastic shift I mentioned 
above: the involuntary modification of one’s own memories to accord with cues 
from external sources. 
The upcoming discussion proceeds from the claim that, as I argued in Chapter 
1, metacognition and mindreading play analogous roles in remembering and 
testifying, respectively. I proceed from Hyde’s (2016) claim that testimonial injustice 
is at its core a failure of mindreading, and apply the claim, mutatis mutandis, to 
metacognition in memory. Ultimately, I show that metacognition can fail in ways 
analogous to those in mindreading, and that those failures can be both epistemically 
and morally specious. The basic thrust of the argument is that if an agent rejects her 
own memories on the basis of a morally or epistemically specious failure of 
metacognition (in a way analogous to a failure of mindreading in testimony), then 
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she has perpetrated a memorial injustice. Starting in the next section, I develop an 
account of memorial injustice, beginning with the relationship between 
metacognition and mindreading. 
4.3. The case for the existence of memorial injustice 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that memory and testimony are analogous. 
Principal support for this claim comes from the evidence that both memory and 
testimony are reconstructive processes, where cognitive labour is performed by 
source and receiver alike to produce a representation or message fit for uptake. I also 
argued in Section 1.4 that a variety of noise-like phenomena can contribute to what is 
remembered; in this chapter, mindreading and metacognitive credibility assessments 
might fill this niche. The purpose of the present section is to revisit the analogy 
between memory and testimony to provide support for the argument in what 
remains of this chapter. Specifically, I wish to revisit the question of mindreading 
and metacognition and the role each one plays in producing a final message. To this 
end, I consider the types of errors one might make during the production or 
interpretation of messages, especially errors pertaining to mindreading and 
metacognition. The aim of this section, then, is to begin to work toward developing 
an account of memorial injustice. 
The first step is to explore what kinds of error lead to credibility deficits and 
excesses. Mindreading is the obvious target, since it is through mindreading that we 
assess others’ background knowledge, motives, desires, intentions, and, importantly, 
credibility. Thus, errors in mindreading can produce erroneous credibility 
assessments, thereby precipitating testimonial injustice. I proceed in this section as 
follows: first, I revisit those features of the memory-testimony analogy that 
encourage us to turn our attention toward mindreading and metacognition. Second, 
I describe the relationship between metacognition and mindreading, and argue that 
we are justified in thinking that the two are relevantly similar when it comes to 
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epistemic injustice. Third, I consider evidence about error in metacognition and 
mindreading. Finally, I advance an account of memorial injustice.  
Let us begin by returning to the memory-testimony analogy. In memory, the 
past self at the point of encoding is responsible for selection, abstraction, 
interpretation, and integration, while the present self is responsible for 
reconstructing memory content (Alba and Hasher 1983). In testimony, the testifier is 
responsible for performing an act of communication, and the recipient is responsible 
for interpreting that act of communication (Grice 1975; Lackey 2008; Scott-Phillips 
2015; Sperber and Wilson 1986). In both cases, source and receiver make judgments 
about the other’s background information, mental states, motives, and competencies 
that influence whether and how the memory or testimony is taken up. Making these 
judgments requires a great deal of cognitive labour, both conscious and unconscious. 
Crucially, mindreading in testimony and metacognition in memory contribute 
important information that influences the resultant belief (Michaelian 2011c; 2012a; 
Scott-Phillips 2015; Shanton and Goldman 2010). 
When it comes to memory and testimony, one need not accept that 
mindreading and metacognition just are the same cognitive process, or even that 
they are different applications of the same cognitive mechanism. One need only 
accept that mindreading and metacognition play relevantly similar roles in forming 
beliefs; for that reason, the relationship between the relevant cognitive mechanisms 
(or the relationship between the applications of the same mechanism) is somewhat 
inconsequential. Nevertheless, it is worth spelling out a specific viewpoint on the 
issue. 
One view is that third-person mindreading is prior to first-person 
metacognition; in other words, metacognition is simply the result of turning our 
mindreading capacities back on our own minds (Carruthers 2006; 2009; Gazzaniga 
2009; Gopnik 1993; Wegner 2002; Wilson 2002). As Carruthers (2009) puts it, this 
view entails that there is no significant difference between metacognition and 
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mindreading, since the two are simply the same capacity with different targets. If 
this is right, then we should observe similar failures in both mindreading and 
metacognition. This view emerges against a background of ongoing intellectual 
debate rather than consensus, however, and it is important to acknowledge that if 
mindreading and metacognition are wholly different mechanisms, we have much 
less reason to think that the two should behave analogously. Nevertheless, the view 
that they are entirely different is a minority view, and there is general convergence 
on the point that either mindreading and metacognition are two different 
applications of the same mechanism, or that one underpins the other. I encourage 
the concerned reader to consult Carruthers’ (2009) comprehensive review of the 
different views of the relationship between metacognition and mindreading to 
assuage those worries. The next two subsections are dedicated to exploring how 
error in mindreading and metacognition figure into epistemic injustice. 
4.3.1 Mindreading error in testimony 
Coming to accept another’s testimony requires several components to fall into place. 
First, the testifier must perform some act of communication; second, the act of 
communication must be intelligible to the recipient; and third, the recipient must 
judge the content of the testimony to be worthy of acceptance. This last step requires, 
in part, that the recipient judge the testifier to be sufficiently credible. As Hyde 
(2016) puts it, “since testimonial injustice involves a failure to accurately perceive 
another as credible, we ought to consider such failures as failures of mindreading.” 
She also cites evidence that mindreading is crucial to social interaction (Gallese 2001; 
Goldman 2005; Meltzoff 2005). Hyde claims that the faulty credibility assessments 
that engender testimonial injustice result from breakdowns of mindreading. 
 One initial worry here is that appealing to a failure of mindreading might 
only explain some cases of testimonial injustice. Ostensibly, I can read on your face 
whether you are being dishonest (though I might be incorrect in my conclusion), but 
there does not seem to be a good reason to think that I can similarly read on your 
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face that you are competent in the relevant domain. So, something else must be able 
to explain the remaining cases. If this is correct, then the argumentative move I am 
trying to make here—to say that memorial injustice is akin to testimonial injustice—
is in jeopardy, because the failures of metacognition and mindreading are 
disanalogous.14 If mindreading failure can only explain testimonial injustice arising 
from erroneous assessments of another’s sincerity, then we have no principled reason 
to think that analogous metacognitive failures will do anything to explain memorial 
injustice based on erroneous assessments of one’s own competence. 
 Responding to this objection will require a little more understanding of what 
mindreading is and how it works. Mindreading is the cognitive capacity (or set of 
cognitive capacities) by which we ascertain others’ mental states, intentions, beliefs, 
desires, and so on (Ravenscroft 2016). On one understanding, mindreading is deeply 
vision-based. Successful mindreading is done by observing facial expressions and 
gestures, and interpreting those in a way that supports an inference about the 
speaker’s mental states. For example, if I see a person injure themself and cringe in 
pain, I too might cringe in response. This is an example of low-level mindreading 
(Hyde 2016; Shanton and Goldman 2010). However, there also exists high-level 
mindreading, which is “more complex [than low-level mindreading] and tends to 
involve propositional attitudes” (Shanton and Goldman 2010, 531). In simulation-
based high-level mindreading,15 subjects isolate or temporarily discard their own 
beliefs, generate a series of pretend inputs about another person’s mind, run a 
simulation, and produce a pretend output. This kind of mindreading does not 
necessarily depend on visual cues in the way that low-level mindreading does. 
Where, for me to have the right sort of mirror neuron reaction—the kind integral to 
low-level mindreading—when I see you drop a hammer on your foot requires me to 
 
14 Thanks to Jordi Fernández for raising this worry. 
15 The difference between low- and high-level mindreading is orthogonal to the contest between the 
theory theory of mindreading (Churchland 1988; Fodor 1987; Sellars 1955) and the simulation theory of 
mindreading (Goldman 1992; Gordon 1986; Harris 1989; Heal 1986). Both theory theory and 
simulation theory agree that low- and high-level mindreading exist. 
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see you cringe and then generate my own response to your pain, high-level 
mindreading depends instead on my information about your initial states, such as 
your beliefs and desires. I can ascertain these states in myriad ways, and thus I do 
not necessarily depend on witnessing your facial expressions or gestures to obtain a 
set of inputs for my mental simulation. I can attribute certain mental states to you 
that afford you more or less credibility, perhaps because I attribute to you more or 
less competence in the relevant domain. Thus, we can avoid the above worry about 
whether appealing to the role of failures of mindreading in testimonial injustice will 
provide a suitable argumentative route to the role of failures of metacognition in 
memorial injustice. 
 Note that high-level simulation-based mindreading can produce incorrect 
outputs “for a variety of reasons. A mind reader might lack pertinent information 
about his target’s initial states (preferences, beliefs, and so on) or he might fail to 
‘quarantine’ or inhibit his own genuine states when doing a simulation” (Shanton 
and Goldman 2010). These factors might lead a person to attribute lower credibility 
to a testifier than she should, since she might fail to take her seriously as a competent 
knower. 
Hyde claims that even low-level mindreading is not immune to error, 
pointing out that while newborn babies show no preference for race, by three 
months of age they exhibit a preference for own-race faces, and by nine months of 
age some infants’ facial recognition works only within their own race. She claims, 
following Kelly et al. (2005) and Bar-Haim et al. (2006), that this narrowing of facial 
recognition ability is acquired and results from limited exposure to and interaction 
with members of other races. Hyde says, “if newborns maintained [their initial] lack 
of race-preference as their mindreading abilities develop, then it is possible that they 
may be less affected by social stereotypes, both because of their own mindreading 
abilities, and because of their having regularly experienced persons of many races 
fulfilling other-than-stereotypical behaviour” (865). By adulthood, people are in fact 
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less capable of low-level mindreading of members of other races, which, Hyde 
claims, contributes to testimonial injustice. 
Now that we have examined how failures of mindreading can provide the 
appropriate conditions for testimonial injustice to take root, let us consider how 
similar failures of metacognition can give rise to memorial injustice, including 
internalised false confessions. 
4.3.2 Metacognitive error in memory 
Recall from earlier in this chapter that I hold that mindreading and metacognition 
play sufficiently similar roles in testimony and memory, respectively. Importantly, 
metacognition plays two roles: first, it regulates cognition, and second, it provides 
knowledge of the contents of cognition (Moshman 2018; Nelson and Narens 1994; 
Schraw and Dennison 1994; Schraw and Moshman 1995). Metacognition can 
contribute to whether an agent endorses or rejects the outputs of cognitive processes, 
including memory (Michaelian 2012b); this will become particularly significant 
when we consider the role of metacognitive error in producing memorial injustice.  
The upshot for the present section is that if testimonial injustice is a failure of 
mindreading, and metacognition is to memory as mindreading is to testimony, then 
memorial injustice is a failure of metacognition. Otherwise put, memorial injustice 
arises when a subject makes a metacognitive error that results in the unjust rejection 
(or endorsement) of memory outputs.  
Metacognition, like perception, is an innate capacity, but is not thereby 
immune to influences from culture or theory. Proust and Fortier (2018) identify 
metacognitive variations across cultures, suggesting that while metacognition is a 
natural cognitive capacity, the roles metacognition plays, the epistemic norms it 
enforces, and the errors for which it monitors vary greatly across (and within) 
cultures. Cross-cultural variation aside, the outputs of metacognition vary greatly 
depending on a variety of other factors. Interestingly for our purposes, 
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metacognition varies on affective state (Efklides 2015): students who were in a 
negative mood were less confident that they had achieved their goal score on an 
exam (Lane et al. 2005). In an experimental setting, van Bergen (2011) found that 
negative feedback from an experimenter increased students’ memory distrust and 
internalised false confessions. What this means for the false confessor is that in guilt-
presumptive interrogations where suspects endure sustained hostility, it may be 
only a matter of time until memory distrust creeps in and false confessions become 
more likely. 
Perhaps the best way to think about the role of metacognitive failures in 
memorial injustice is to adopt the source monitoring framework analysis of false 
confessions, proposed by Henkel and Coffman (2004). Proceeding from observations 
from Kopelman (1999) and Schacter (1999), Henkel and Coffman claim that 
internalised false confessions may be due, at least in part, to source monitoring 
errors. Source monitoring is the ability to identify the origin of a particular mental 
representation (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay 1993). For instance, I can usually 
tell whether I am remembering something or imagining it.16 I can also remember 
who told me that joke or in what tabloid I read that gossip column, whether I know 
so-and-so’s philosophical argument because I read it in a journal or saw them give a 
presentation, and so on. All of these capabilities are applications of source 
monitoring. Henkel and Coffman argue that internalised false confessions come 
about because suspects incorporate the testimony of the interrogators into their 
representations of the past, and misattribute the information to their memory. The 
phenomenon is not limited to internalised false confessions, either: many of the 
therapeutic techniques employed in the recovery of so-called “repressed memories” 
of childhood sexual abuse are now known to increase the likelihood of false memory 
generation (Henkel and Coffman 2004; Loftus 1997a; 1997b).  
 
16 Maybe. It’s complicated (De Brigard 2014; Michaelian 2016a). 
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To compound matters, according to Gallo and Lampinen (2015), retrieval 
monitoring itself—the “search and decision process that people use to regulate 
accuracy at the time of retrieval” (389)—is influenced by one’s beliefs about one’s 
own metamemory capacities (where metamemory is metacognition of memory). One 
suggestion that Gallo and Lampinen have for preventing false memories is that 
remembering subjects seek corroboration of their memories; however, this will prove 
difficult in an interrogation context, where hostile interrogators not only fail to 
corroborate a suspect’s memories, but present conflicting information instead. 
Moreover, what this means is that if one has already had one’s ability to remember 
accurately challenged, one might already have suffered a blow to his beliefs about 
his own metamemory capacities. If this is the case, then subjects are doubly damned: 
not only are they making a source monitoring error, they are more likely to make a 
source monitoring error because their confidence in their source monitoring abilities 
is under threat.  
Shaw and Porter (2015) were able to generate, in a controlled laboratory 
setting, full episodic false memories of committing a crime. In some cases, 
participants accept that they are guilty due to the new, introduced “evidence,” 
though they still have no memory of the crime. In more extreme cases, the 
introduced information provides the basis for  confabulated details of the crime, 
thereby generating a false memory (Shaw and Porter 2015). There are some obvious 
connections here to my claims about collective confabulation in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, and about the integration of information from other sources into one’s 
memory; indeed, as Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1996) found, subjects who were 
more prone to confabulation were also more prone to internalised false confessions. 
Compared to the Mandela Effect, however, here the mental intrusion seems to be 
much more sinister. (I return to this point in Section 4.4 of this chapter.) 
So far in this section, I have shown that metacognition can fail in a way that 
allows confabulated incriminating representations to stand in for genuine 
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exculpatory memories. So, it would seem that while metacognitive error is not solely 
responsible for bringing about memorial injustice, it is at least a key component in it. 
4.3.3 An account of memorial injustice 
The aim of this subsection is to make clear exactly what I take memorial injustice to 
be. So far, I have said that memorial injustice is the result of a failure of 
metacognition. But just as the presence of mindreading error alone does not a 
testimonial injustice make, neither does metacognitive error guarantee memorial 
injustice. However, where self-directed credibility assessments are deflated by 
internalised prejudices about groups of which the subject is a member, and by the 
ethically toxic behaviour of an authority figure, the likelihood that an injustice has 
arisen is higher. In other words, we might think of morally specious metacognitive 
failure as a necessary but not sufficient condition for memorial injustice. 
An important clarification here is this: neither Fricker (2007) nor I mean to 
assert that every time an agent who is a member of a group targeted by negative 
identity prejudices has her testimony rejected, she has automatically suffered a 
testimonial injustice. There are, of course, many legitimate reasons to reject 
testimony, and these reasons can be deployed against all kinds of testifiers, 
regardless of their membership in a group targeted by identity prejudices. What 
distinguishes an ordinary, non-culpable rejection of testimony from a testimonial 
injustice is whether the hearer’s prejudices have played an epistemically culpable 
role. This can be spelled out counterfactually, if crudely: if a receiver rejects the 
testimony of an agent who is a member of a group targeted by identity prejudices, 
when she would have accepted the testimony had the testifier not been a member of 
that group, the receiver has perpetrated an epistemic injustice. This counterfactual 
formulation, however, will fail to capture every instance, for there are also instances 
in which one suffers a credibility deficit but it does not put her testimony below the 
threshold for acceptance. Her credibility may be damaged but her testimony not 
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thereby rejected. Thus, the counterfactual formulation should be taken as a sufficient 
but not necessary condition for testimonial injustice. 
There are multiple reasons that a speaker might be assigned diminished 
credibility, but not all of them constitute an injustice. For instance, if a credibility 
deficit is traceable to non-culpable17 misunderstanding or error, consequent 
rejections of testimony are less likely to constitute an injustice (Wright forthcoming). 
Determining which instances of assignments of credibility deficits rise to the level of 
injustice depends crucially on whether the assignment is just such a 
misunderstanding or error, or whether it is a result of an unjust identity prejudice. 
But without perfect access to the mental states of the person who assigns a credibility 
deficit, determining whether it is an injustice or merely an error is difficult. An 
inability to determine this, however, does not change the fact of the matter. 
For the present section, let us set aside the question of mere (i.e. non-culpable) 
error and explore cases of error arising from unjust identity prejudice. If we are to 
say that some cases are merely erroneous and some are unjust, then the question of 
which cases are which matters for determining which are genuine cases of memorial 
injustice. In making this distinction, the first thing to note is that all injustices involve 
error, whether moral or epistemic. However, in judging the blameworthiness of the 
agents involved in the injustice, it is important to determine whether there is such a 
thing as a non-culpable error. The answer to this question essentially comes down to 
whether people are responsible for their biases (Holroyd 2012; Holroyd, Scaife, and 
Stafford 2017). If people are indeed responsible for their biases, then their actions in 
the injustice will inherit the culpability. If, however, people are not always 
 
17 The non-culpability requirement here is important, for it keeps perpetrators of such wrongs as 
interpretative injustice or conceptual competence injustice on the epistemic (and moral) hook. Wilful 
or otherwise morally specious misunderstanding remains squarely in the domain of epistemic 
injustice, especially if such misunderstanding is due to identity power or identity prejudice. 
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responsible for their biases, then errors arising from biases might not always be 
culpable.  
What this means for the metacognition argument is this: one idea central to 
the notion of responsibility is that we are not responsible for things outside of our 
control. Thus, you might think that people haven’t committed an injustice if they’ve 
made some kind of mistake with their metacognition, because metacognition is 
usually beyond our conscious control.18 
Nevertheless, even if the suspects are not responsible for their own biases, 
and so not morally culpable in the false confession, the suspect’s biases are not the 
only morally specious element of memorial injustice. We must also attend to the fact 
that hostile, guilt-presumptive interrogators are providing the necessary background 
conditions for memorial injustice to obtain. So, in short, memorial injustice arises 
when morally specious background conditions provide fertile ground for memory 
distrust to take root, and when that memory distrust is so profound that it causes the 
outright rejection of one’s own memories and, contingently, the internalisation of 
their morally noxious alternatives. 
4.4. Harms and implications of memorial injustice 
Above, I developed an account of what memorial injustice is: namely, an instance in 
which, owing to a self-directed prejudice, one errs in assigning credibility to oneself 
such that he overestimates or underestimates the epistemic worth of his own 
memory. The more insidious forms of memorial injustice will involve credibility 
deficit, since it is likely that one’s epistemic (and psychological) confidence will 
suffer as a result, and may further corrode his willingness or ability to contribute to 
future epistemic projects. This is not to say, however, that credibility excesses do not 
 
18 This point aligns with Hyde’s criticism of Fricker’s “testimonial sensibility”: Where Fricker 
recommends developing a “testimonial sensibility” to counteract identity prejudice and minimise 
occurrences of testimonial injustice, Hyde suggests that proposing such a testimonial sensibility is 
overly optimistic with respect to agents’ ability to control their metacognition (Hyde 2016; see also 
Sherman 2016). 
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also pose an epistemic threat. The Dunning-Kruger Effect (Dunning 2011), for 
example, arises when individuals are unaware of their own ignorance and attribute a 
credibility excess to themselves, such that they overestimate their own competence 
and thereby deflate their assessments of the credibility of those around them.19 This 
section is devoted to exploring these kinds of implications of memorial injustice, but 
before I begin to discuss them, there is an obvious objection about the metaphysics of 
remembering: that it is not clear whether the present self and past selves are really so 
different. First, I address this objection. Second, I explore the practical and epistemic 
harms that might result from memorial injustice. Finally, I consider how memorial 
injustice might shed light on existing phenomena. 
4.4.1 Concerns about past self and present self 
At this point, the objection may be raised that, while testimonial injustice is (at least 
on Fricker’s view) a two-agent phenomenon involving both testifier and recipient, 
remembering takes place internal to one subject. If this is true, then we arrive at a 
puzzle for epistemic injustice. If there is only one subject, then it is much harder to 
see how an agent could perpetrate an injustice against himself, but if there are two 
agents (past self and present self), then it is hard to see where the harm comes in; 
surely the past self is impossible to harm, since he is no longer accessible. Let us 
explore this puzzle in more detail below. 
By way of first response, it seems as though epistemic injustice is not 
necessarily agential at all. Hermeneutical injustice, for example, is a purely 
structural—rather than agential—notion (Fricker 2007, 159), where no one individual 
perpetrates the injustice, although individuals and collectives alike are harmed. 
Instead, hermeneutical injustice is produced by features of society that enable 
participation in the epistemic life of groups for some members of society more than 
others. So, it is not necessary for epistemic injustice that there be an agent: 
 
19 See also Wright (forthcoming) on epistemic harm and the Dunning-Kruger Effect. 
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hermeneutical injustice is non-agential and yet is a kind of epistemic injustice. 
Therefore, even if there is no agent of memorial injustice, that shouldn’t prevent us 
from understanding memorial injustice as a species of epistemic injustice. However, 
this response is likely unsatisfactory, especially given that my motivation for 
pursuing this project proceeds from the analogy between memory and testimony. 
Testimonial injustice is agential (though structurally influenced), so we should 
expect that memorial injustice, qua analogue to testimonial injustice, is agential as 
well.  
Expecting memorial injustice to be agential invites a further objection. Let us 
here return to the earlier question of whether remembering involves two selves or 
merely one. Earlier, I bracketed the question of personal identity and the 
metaphysics of the self over time, opting to use the terms “past self” and “present 
self” as shorthand for the self at the time of encoding and the self at the time of 
recall, without positing a particular ontological view of selfhood. The problem, then, 
is that in testimonial injustice, there are two agents: one who perpetrates the injustice 
and another who is victim to it. But if the ontological view of selfhood is that one 
remains the same self over time, then it is less clear how memorial injustice could be 
like testimonial injustice in this way.  Though I myself remain agnostic on the 
ontology of selfhood, dodging this question might disappoint some readers’ 
philosophical expectations. Here I suggest two different responses to the past 
self/present self worry, in the hope that the reader can adopt whichever view she 
prefers. 
Response: Two Selves 
Let us begin with the more straightforward—though, to my mind, less plausible—
possibility, and suppose that the terms “past self” and “present self” are not mere 
shorthand for the self at the time of encoding and the self at the time of recall, 
respectively, but instead reflect real ontological commitments. Such a view aligns 
cleanly with Fricker’s view of testimonial injustice as involving two agents, since it 
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implies similarly that two distinct agents are involved in a memorial exchange. The 
concern here, however, is that the past self is exactly that: past. There is no obvious 
way in which the past self suffers a harm, since her existence is either completely in 
the past or is otherwise inaccessible, and in either case, unlikely to be morally salient.  
 There are two things to be said in response: first, even inaccessible selves 
might bear moral standing. Consider, for instance, the moral standing of deceased 
persons. Though it is impossible to harm them in the conventional sense, most of us 
would still rankle at the thought of graverobbing, for instance, or vandalising a 
headstone, or failing to execute a will faithfully. Similarly, while the past self in an 
instance of remembering is no longer accessible, we should not take that to imply 
that he bears no moral standing whatsoever. He might still be a potential victim of 
harms, despite the fact that he might be unaware of them, and indeed, not 
consciously affected by them.  
The other response is that the past self’s stake in the situation is not a moral 
one. For Fricker, the primary harm is necessarily epistemic, and while moral or 
practical harms often follow downstream, they are contingent. Even if one thinks it is 
impossible to harm a dead person morally, it is important to bear in mind that 
considerations of moral harms do not necessarily translate to epistemic harms. In 
other words, it may well be impossible to harm a dead person morally and at the 
same time possible to harm a dead person epistemically. For instance, the diary of 
Anne Frank provides plenty of testimony as to the conditions of life in hiding in 
Nazi Germany. Even if we conceded, for the sake of argument, that she could no 
longer be harmed morally, this alone should not lead us to conclude that she could 
no longer be harmed epistemically. To reject the testimony recorded in Anne Frank’s 
diary because of a credibility deficit resulting from prejudices about her age, gender, 
or religion does not seem to be different in any principled way from rejecting exactly 
the same testimony from a similar testifier living under the same conditions today. 
The only potentially relevant difference may be the inability to seek further 
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information from her, but as I remarked in Chapter 1, Section 1.7, this does not affect 
the diary’s status as an instance of testimony. 
Moreover, it is important to note that even if the epistemic harm to a past 
person is minor, there are still other potentially harmful downstream consequences 
of epistemic injustice, such as depriving others of important information. The most 
obvious ‘other’ in this case is the present self, who, like the people at the 
employment office in Carmita Wood’s case, fail to learn what sexual harassment is 
or what Wood’s experiences have been; they remain ignorant and fail to gain the 
relevant knowledge. The difference between the present self and the office 
employees who don’t know what sexual harassment is, however, do not bear the 
same moral harms: the office employees come out morally unscathed, while the 
present self suffers a blow to self-confidence or self-respect as a result of not being 
able to access knowledge that is hers by right. In this way, the present self 
internalises and deploys prejudices such that she renders her past self the victim and 
present self the perpetrator of memorial injustice, while consequently depriving the 
present self both of the epistemic resources needed to understand herself and of her 
deserved corroboration of moral worth. 
So, if we take the view that the past and present selves are real, we see that it 
is still possible to perpetrate an epistemic injustice because it is still possible to harm 
the past self epistemically. All one needs to do is not afford appropriate credibility to 
the past self; if that credibility deficit results from an identity prejudice, then the 
rejection of one’s memories can amount to memorial injustice. Thus, there can still be 
an injustice even if it’s only epistemic, i.e. even in the absence of a practical harm.  
Moreover, there does seem to be a kind of practical harm. Whatever view one 
adopts about selfhood, it seems that even if there are two metaphysically distinct 
selves, the phenomenology of identity aligns with the intuition that there is only one 
self over time. At a minimum, past and present self seem to be deeply connected. 
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Thus, epistemically harming my past self might have psychological consequences for 
my present self, even if the two are ontologically distinct. 
Response: One Self 
Suppose, however, that you claim that the past self and present self are just one 
person. If this is the case, then the link to testimonial injustice is less clear, but the 
story is more plausible. All that would be required for a memorial injustice would be 
the rejection of memories owing to an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. At first 
glance, this sounds both familiar and peculiar. It is familiar because, as we have 
seen, this formulation appears time and time again throughout the epistemic 
injustice literature. What makes this usage peculiar is that, if there is only one self, 
then an agent must deploy an identity prejudice against a group of which she is a 
member. For memorial injustice still to obtain, even if there is only one self, it must 
be the case that a person can do so. 
  The Matilda Effect (Rossiter 1993)—where the accomplishments of women 
are attributed to their male colleagues, such as Rosalind Franklin’s contributions to 
the discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA, most commonly attributed only 
to James Watson and Francis Crick—serves as one example. Knobloch, Glynn, and 
Huge (2013) found that the preferential ranking of male-sounding and female-
sounding scientist names did not vary along respondent sex; that is, female 
participants in the study exhibited the same preference for male-sounding scientist 
names as did their male counterparts.  
 The evidence goes beyond this study: gay men can internalise homophobia 
(Malyon 1982; Meyer 2003; Meyer and Dean 1998), women can internalise sexism 
(Bartky 1998; Bearman, Korobov, and Thorne 2009), people of colour can internalise 
racism (Speight 2007), and so on. Intellectual self-trust—which I take to be roughly 
equivalent to epistemic self-trust—is political (Jones 2012), and can be bolstered or 
threatened by social phenomena such as implicit bias and stereotype threat. So, it is 
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entirely plausible that a person could hold and deploy a prejudice against themself, 
thus giving rise to identity-prejudicial credibility deficits. Indeed, as Wright 
(forthcoming) notes, people can harm themselves epistemically through self-
overestimation or self-underestimation, and when these harms arise from identity 
prejudices, they rise to the level of injustice in Fricker’s sense.  
There is one final point I wish to make about memorial injustice qua species of 
epistemic injustice. I claimed in Section 4.2 that testimonial injustice provided the 
best framework for understanding cases such as the false confessor. So, the reader 
may wonder how distinct memory and testimony really are. The upshot, in other 
words, is that if one thinks that memory is essentially a form of testimony, but 
nonparadigmatic in that it is internal to a single agent, then one will likely conclude 
that memorial injustice is likewise a nonparadigmatic form of testimonial injustice 
but not an altogether distinct form of epistemic injustice.  Whether memorial 
injustice is best understood as a nonparadigmatic subspecies of testimonial injustice 
or as its own, separate species of epistemic injustice is an important question. 
Ultimately, I remain noncommittal on the issue, but suggest that one’s ontological 
view on whether remembering is best understood as involving one or two selves 
will be one significant consideration for deciding between the two possibilities. In 
any case, even if memorial injustice is best understood as a nonparadigmatic form of 
testimonial injustice, the work I have done in this chapter should be a significant 
step toward elucidating its unique features. 
4.4.2 Harms of memorial injustice 
Like all species of epistemic injustice, memorial injustice’s central harm is an 
epistemic one. I take it that this has been well-established by now; the doxastic shift I 
mentioned above and the undermining of one’s status as a knower are paradigmatic 
examples of the central epistemic harm of memorial injustice. In the false confession 
case in particular, Kassin et al. (2010) have pointed out—somewhat cynically but 
with evidence—that the purpose of police interrogations is not to find the truth but 
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instead to secure a confession and conviction. Yet, disguised as an epistemic project, 
interrogations precipitate in suspects such a severe distrust that it undermines their 
status as knowers.20 In more general terms, when power imbalances and social 
circumstances conspire to produce profound self-distrust, subjects suffer the central 
harm of memorial injustice.   
 In addition to the epistemic harm done to the individual, there are harms that 
target the individual as well as the broader epistemic community. Memorial 
injustice, qua species of epistemic injustice, “causes deficits in self-trust” (Jones 2012, 
246), but so too do deficits in self-trust bring about epistemic injustice. Jones 
identifies this cycle: “unjust social relations cause epistemic injustice, which 
undermines self-trust among the underprivileged; unjust social relations create 
excessive self-trust among the privileged, which perpetuates epistemic injustice, 
which further undermines the self-trust of the disadvantaged in a vicious feedback 
loop” (Jones 2012, 247). So, epistemic injustice is self-perpetuating. Likewise, 
memorial injustice serves to undermine the self-trust of underprivileged knowers 
and to maintain repeated epistemic injustices. 
Sue Campbell offers a vivid example, which I reproduce in full here for its 
richness: 
 “Consider the following sort of relationship between a woman and 
her partner. Fights frequently escalate into some form of abusive 
behavior, and these fights frequently start as discussions about what 
happened on a past occasion. You, as the abused partner, are 
challenged to give an account of yourself in the past, and this account 
is then challenged with hostility. What are the probable effects of 
repetitions of this kind of situation? You are not being allowed to give 
your own account of the past when it is important that you should 
 
20 I suspect that if suspects knew that the aim of the game was to secure a confession, whether or not 
the confession was true, they would be less susceptible to memory distrust and memorial injustice, 
for their status as epistemic agents would not be under threat in the same way. This question is an 
empirical one, however, and I do not pursue it here. 
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succeed at doing so. You may be put into doubt about the reliability 
of your evidence for your beliefs about yourself in the past and your 
beliefs about yourself in the present; and there may be consequences 
for how you regard your memory evidence for other important 
beliefs about yourself. You may be put into doubt as to whether your 
desires were reasonable or self-deceived, whether your actions were 
warranted, and whether what is of significance to you, as evidenced 
by what you remember, really is of significance. In sum, you may be 
put into doubt about the reliability of your memory as a source of 
warrant for your beliefs, desires, actions, and values in serious 
repeated situations. In becoming unsure of your descriptions of the 
past, you will be unsure as to who bears responsibility for past acts. 
Your abilities to assign responsibility, take responsibility, and be seen 
as responsible may all be threatened by the progressive distrust of 
your own recollections. Borland’s response to Beatrice21 displays an 
understanding of how someone can be undermined through a 
challenge to their memory, and it displays an attempt to avoid this 
undermining. Although it is not always possible to avoid 
undermining others, we can be on the lookout for strategies that 
deliberately weaken someone’s ability to make sense of her or his past 
and his or her ability to negotiate responsibility for past acts. I believe 
that a view of personhood that is sensitive to the ways in which core 
cognitive abilities can be undermined can and must be used to locate 
the ways in which downward psychological constituting is 
implicated in abusive situations.” (1997, 63-64) 
Here, Campbell vividly illustrates the harms to the victim of memorial injustice, 
showing how memorial injustice loops back on itself and compounds its own effects 
over and over. The harms of memorial injustice to the individual are pernicious and 
repugnant, undermining an agent’s self-trust in a way that other species of epistemic 
injustice do not seem to approach. 
As bad as memorial injustice is for the individual, it also damages the 
collective pool of knowledge: as Hyde remarks in the testimonial injustice case, “the 
inappropriate [credibility] judgments caused by [metacognitive] failures may 
 
21 This is an example given earlier in the article, but as the details are not important here, I omit a 
summary. 
   
175 
 
prevent hearers’ efforts at getting at the truth and further thwart speakers’ rightful 
participation in the epistemic community” (2016, 864). When speakers cannot 
contribute satisfactorily to the body of knowledge, the entire community suffers 
through losing access to valuable knowledge. Similarly in the memorial injustice 
case, subjects who distrust their own memories so thoroughly that they reject them 
altogether pre-emptively silence themselves; the corresponding testimony never has 
the chance to make it into the collective pool of knowledge, for the content is 
disregarded before the testimony is uttered. 
The harms of memorial injustice do not begin and end with the epistemic 
harms. Again, let us return to the false confession case, where the consequences are 
pronounced. One obvious practical harm is that a false confessor is likely to be tried 
and convicted of a crime he did not commit. All of the ordinary harms of wrongful 
conviction attend: incarceration, difficulty finding employment after incarceration, 
separation from loved ones, and so on. Even in memorial injustice cases aside from 
false confession, there might be practical harms, though without a concrete example 
it is difficult to spell them out in a meaningful way. In any case, as Fricker argues, 
the practical harms are contingent, and even if a given instance of memorial injustice 
bears no practical harm, it is no less an instance of memorial injustice than one that 
does. 
The point is that, like other species of epistemic injustice, memorial injustice 
brings with it a variety of harms, both epistemic and practical, that affect the victim 
and the epistemic community at large. 
Before concluding this chapter, I want to address a final objection to which I 
alluded above. So far, I have claimed that memorial injustice is internal to the 
remembering subject. But some readers may have noticed that my prime example, 
the false confessor, is not alone in the interrogation room. They may have noticed 
that his memorial injustice takes place in a testimonial setting, in which he offers 
testimony about his whereabouts and that testimony is rejected on ethically noxious 
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grounds. After repeated questioning, he gradually comes to reject his own memories 
and fill in the remaining void using information from the interrogators. But it is hard 
to imagine a circumstance in which a subject would spontaneously reject his own 
memories. You might therefore think that the false confessor is in the same boat as 
the laypersons who accept Bill Nye’s testimony about the value of philosophy: that 
the false confessor has unjustly attributed a credibility excess to the interrogators 
and consequently accepts their testimony about his whereabouts on the night of the 
crime. If this is right, then the false confession is merely a case of testimonial injustice 
owing to identity-prejudicial credibility excess rather than deficit. 
 The response to this objection is twofold. First, while the interrogation is 
apparently an atypical situation, it is probably better understood as a concentrated 
version of ordinary life. Black men, for example, are routinely regarded and treated 
as dishonest and prone to crime or violence, the micro- and macroaggressions they 
experience in this vein will add up and erode their own epistemic self-trust over 
time. Women who constantly experience jokes about women’s supposed ineptitude 
in mathematics, for example, may eventually genuinely come to believe that they are 
bad at math, even in the face of decisive evidence to the contrary. Challenges to 
one’s reliability in a given domain can undermine one’s confidence in that domain, 
endangering their epistemic self-trust in exactly the same way as the false confessor. 
We might, then, think of the interrogation room as a pressure cooker that throws 
into sharp relief what happens when one is routinely challenged as a knower. 
Gudjonsson and Lister (1984) found that individuals were more susceptible to 
influence from interrogators when they perceived greater disparity between 
themselves and the interrogators with respect to “competence, power, and control” 
(99), and that subjects’ suggestibility and their perceived distance to the 
experimenters were highly significantly correlated. These findings lend further 
support to the notion that members of groups that are routinely challenged in their 
epistemic proficiency will be more likely to fall prey to memorial injustice, for it is 
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these individuals who are most likely to perceive a greater power disparity between 
themselves and interrogators. Indeed, as Gudjonsson et al. (2014) note, “most cases 
of false confession involve memory distrust being induced by police during 
prolonged and persuasive interviews, emphasising the importance of social 
influence” (338) to false confession.  The importance of social influence cannot be 
overstated, and is what makes false confessions a striking example of epistemic 
injustice. 
 The second response to this objection is that even if we were to concede, for 
the sake of argument, that the false confession is just an ordinary testimonial 
injustice, we would be left unable to account for the corresponding doxastic shift in 
the agent. We cannot explain how the testimony of the interrogators can override the 
very memories of the suspect without, at a minimum, appealing to an internalised 
credibility deficit, which testimonial injustice alone cannot make sense of. Either 
way, we will need to import some additional conceptual resources to explain what is 
happening, and what I have presented in this chapter seeks to make plain the 
mechanisms to which we must appeal to explain memorial injustice. 
 So, while it is true that the suspect is not the only person in the room, and that 
the memorial injustice occurs under social circumstances, the important thing is that 
an internal doxastic shift takes place in a way that appears to be unique to memorial 
injustice. In other words, to call memorial injustice “purely internal” has been a 
convenient but perhaps misleading shorthand. The more precise way of putting it is 
to say that while the relevant epistemic phenomenon is internal, it takes place under 
certain external social conditions, and is thus not simply a matter of an agent 
perpetrating an injustice against himself. Instead, like all injustices, it is the result of 
a confluence of events, circumstances, agents, and most importantly, disparities in 
power. 




In Epistemic Injustice, Fricker (2007, 44) writes that “we are long familiar with the 
idea, played out by the history of philosophy, that our rationality is what lends 
humanity its distinctive value. No wonder, then, that being insulted, undermined, or 
otherwise wronged in one’s capacity as a giver of knowledge is something that can 
cut deep.” I agree, but think that she does not go far enough. Fricker’s focus on 
agents as givers of knowledge is, to my mind, well-justified, but as we have seen, 
epistemic injustice can cut still deeper than that. Memorial injustice does not merely 
undermine one’s status as a giver of knowledge: it undermines one’s status as a 
possessor of knowledge in the first place. Memorial injustice jeopardises one’s 
potential to share knowledge because it jeopardises one’s potential to have 
knowledge. It is therefore every bit as insidious as its cousin species, and brings the 
added threat of destabilising the internal epistemic lives of those it affects. 
I conclude this chapter with a brief remark that I will revisit in the conclusion 
of this thesis. I have shown in this chapter that the way we evaluate our own 
memories and make judgments as to whether to accept or reject them is heavily 
influenced by social factors. Literature in social epistemology and moral psychology 
has already begun pointing this way: Bartky’s (1990) chapter “Shame and Gender”, 
Jones’ (2012) “The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust,” and Dillon’s (1997) “Self-
Respect,” to name a few, discuss how our conceptions of ourselves as full epistemic 
agents are politically and socially coloured. To the extent that our memories play 
vital roles in these self-conceptions, as well as how they are informed by them, social 
epistemologists should be thinking of memory in similar ways. Perhaps memory, 
like testimony, is better understood not as an individual enterprise, endeavour, 
capacity, or faculty, but as a social one. 22 
 
22 I am grateful to audiences at the University of Otago philosophy postgraduate seminar and the 2019 
New Zealand Association of Philosophers’ conference and the New Zealand Association of 
Philosophers’ 2019 Annual Conference for comments and discussion that improved this chapter. 




I began this thesis with the relatively uncontroversial claim that memory and 
testimony alike are vital to our successful functioning as epistemic agents. 
Throughout the thesis, I have explored the various ways that memory and testimony 
serve as sources of knowledge, where remembering, roughly understood, is a matter 
of learning from oneself, and receiving testimony is a matter of learning from others.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that memory and testimony are analogous, and that 
whatever epistemologists conclude about one, they must also conclude analogously 
about the other. Though I am not the first to advance this argument, the canonical 
version of it (Dummett 1994) takes memory to be a fundamentally transmissive 
capacity, transmitting beliefs from the past self to the present self. Until recently, 
epistemologists have taken this view of memory to be basically correct, despite the 
fact that the transmissive view is incompatible with empirical findings about 
memory (Michaelian 2011c). Instead, mounting research shows that memory is not a 
matter of transmission, but of reconstruction. I capitalised on memory’s constructive 
features to defend the view that there is nevertheless an analogy between memory 
and testimony, and identified the corresponding constructive features of testimony.  
The rest of the dissertation was devoted to identifying and exploring the 
implications of this analogy. In other words, I took as my starting point that memory 
and testimony are analogous, and determined what followed from there. I also 
worked to identify the ways in which they interact directly with each other; that is, I 
explored how testimony about an event influences a subject’s memory of it. I also 
explored how understanding memory as a non-paradigmatic kind of testimony 
allows us to expand the notion of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007). 
In Chapter 2, I considered an implication of viewing testimony and memory 
as analogous. I proceeded from the observation that it is widely accepted that there 
is such a thing as memory-how, yet no testimonial counterpart exists; on the face of 
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it, this poses a problem for the memory-testimony analogy I defended in Chapter 1. 
For that reason, I set aside the topic of memory for a time and delved into the nature 
of testimony-how, i.e. exactly how it is that we might conceptualise instructions as a 
kind of non-paradigmatic testimony. I set up the problem as an inconsistent triad: (i) 
Instructions are non-propositional, (ii) instructions are a kind of testimony, and (iii) 
testimony is propositional. Ultimately, I argued that rejecting (i) or (ii) would not 
suffice as a solution to the problem, but that rejecting (iii) would. Testimony, I 
concluded, is not necessarily propositional. Although I did not explore this idea in 
depth, I suggested that there might be a way to posit an analogy between testimony-
how and memory-how in much the same way that I had argued there was an 
analogy between testimony-that and memory-that in Chapter 1. Crudely put, my 
suggestion was that we can consider procedural memory to be a sort of testimony-
how from the past self. This seems to me to be a promising avenue for future 
research. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that if collective memory was like individual memory 
in the relevant ways, and if memory errors are a feature of individual memory, then 
it follows that memory errors are a feature of collective memory. The existence of 
collective memories is confirmed by the existence of the Mandela Effect (u/Jhoobie 
2017) , which I argued was an example of collective confabulation. I argued that if 
one adopts a reliability account (Michaelian 2016a; 2016b) of memory, then the 
collective memories that constitute the Mandela Effect (“ME-memories”) are 
confabulatory because they are produced by malfunctioning memory systems. On 
the other hand, if one adopts a causal account (Bernecker 2010; 2017; Robins 2016b; 
2017) of memory, then ME-memories are confabulatory because they lack the 
appropriate causal connection to the past event. Whichever account one adopts, ME-
memories are collective because interaction among members promotes the 
emergence of qualitative details through in-group testimony, such that the group 
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remembers more than does anyone individual. In short, ME-memories are collective 
confabulation. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I argued that there was such a thing as memorial 
injustice. First, I rehearsed the central argument of epistemic injustice, and 
particularly testimonial injustice, put forth by Miranda Fricker (2007). I argued that if 
the memory-testimony analogy holds, and if there is such a thing as testimonial 
injustice, then there is also be such a thing as memorial injustice, which might be 
well exemplified by internalised false confessions (Kassin and Wrightsman 1985). I 
considered how hostile and guilt-presumptive interrogations provide background 
conditions conducive to inducing memory distrust in innocent suspects, and 
compared these high-pressure situations to lower-pressure but equally ethically bad 
situations outside the interrogation room. I drew on literature about the role of 
mindreading in determining the trustworthiness of testifiers and compared it to the 
role of metacognition in memory, and concluded, following Hyde (2016), I argued 
that if testimonial injustice involves a failure of mindreading, then memorial 
injustice involves a failure of metacognition. Finally, I concluded with a sketch of an 
account of memorial injustice to join the growing family of species of epistemic 
injustice. 
At this point, I think it is worth discussing how my arguments might provide 
the groundwork for future research. In Chapter 1, I was careful to emphasise that 
while I thought there was an epistemological and epistemic analogy between 
memory and testimony, I was agnostic with respect to what the epistemologies of 
the two really were. (For example, I took no stand in the reductionism/anti-
reductionism debate.) Instead, I claimed simply that whatever epistemologists said 
about one, they would have to say (mutatis mutandis) about the other. Obviously, 
then, the natural progression is to investigate the epistemologies themselves. What 
should epistemologists say about memory and testimony? There has been plenty of 
discussion about this, of course, but as far as I can tell, almost none of it has taken 
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place under the presupposition that memory and testimony are analogous. One 
impact thinking about the two analogously might have is that if there is a compelling 
reason to reject a view (say, reductionism) in testimony, then that alone might give 
us reason to reject the analogous view in memory. We need not necessarily come up 
with independent reasons to reject reductionism in memory. If the analogy holds, it 
provides a different set of parameters for us to pursue the epistemologies of memory 
and testimony. 
The focus in Chapter 2 was on the non-propositionality of testimony, which I 
pursued with the hope that showing that testimony could be non-propositional 
would create space to talk about an analogy between testimony-how and memory-
how. The obvious next step is to marry these claims with psychological research 
about the nature of procedural memory to see whether the broad memory-testimony 
analogy holds as tightly as I think it will. Indeed, the claims I have made have been 
in accordance with the generally accepted taxonomy of memory, but should that 
taxonomy ever come under serious criticism, it would certainly be worth exploring 
what that means for the analogy I have proposed here. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the Mandela Effect amounted to a type of 
collective confabulation. While I think the Mandela Effect provides a neatly 
contained, slightly humourous example, the phenomena and mechanisms that give 
rise to it can also give rise to much more significant collective confabulations. In the 
political sphere, collective confabulation can contribute to the growing divide 
between social groups. As has been noted by countless others, political debates are 
no longer about what the best responses to the facts are; they are about the facts 
themselves. They are disagreements about what is true and what really happened, 
not merely about economic policy or electoral reform or tax brackets. When we take 
seriously how testimony from others is incorporated into memory on a group scale, 
particularly in echo chambers, we can begin to see how collective confabulation 
compounds and feeds into the epistemic schism. I think it would be worth 
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investigating collective confabulation and its relation to politics and political 
discourse. 
Throughout Chapter 4, I relied on the example of internalised false confession 
to make plain some of the features of memorial injustice. However, memorial 
injustice has broader reach and might provide conceptual resources that go some 
way toward explaining several other epistemically specious phenomena. For 
instance, gaslighting is a kind of psychological abuse in which an abuser seeks to 
manipulate a victim into agreeing with him by gradually eroding her epistemic self-
trust (Abramson 2014; Calef and Winshel 1981; Spear 2020). Central to successful 
gaslighting is the abuser’s reliance on “manipulation, fabrication, and deception” 
(Spear 2020, 230) to force the deterioration of the victim’s self-trust. Gaslighting 
typically depends on the victim’s perception of the gaslighter as an epistemic peer or 
authority. The points of contact with internalised false confession should be clear: an 
imbalance of epistemic and social power erodes the victim’s self-trust such that she 
eventually experiences a doxastic shift consonant with the abuser’s way of seeing the 
world (or at least the abuser’s desired way for the victim to see the world). Memorial 
injustice can provide a way toward understanding the distinctly epistemically unjust 
dimensions of gaslighting. 
Memorial injustice, I suspect, can also do something to explain phenomena 
such as impostor syndrome (Clance and Imes 1978) or the Dunning-Kruger Effect 
(Dunning 2011), where the two are understood as deflated and inflated self-directed 
credibility judgments, respectively. If persistent challenges to one’s competence in a 
domain gradually erode the subject’s epistemic self-trust, as is the case in impostor 
syndrome, or unearned epistemic overconfidence artificially inflates one’s 
judgments of oneself, as is the case in the Dunning-Kruger Effect, such that the 
relevant doxastic shifts take place, then it appears as though something much like 
internalised false confessions is going on. I think that with further research, 
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memorial injustice (or at least the mechanisms that underpin it) can provide a 
fruitful way to think about these issues. 
I will offer one final remark on the twin roles that memory and testimony 
play in our epistemic lives. Social epistemology takes as its starting point the claim 
that knowledge is best understood not in the heavily individualistic way that 
abstracts knowers from their social locations, but as a feature of human existence 
that is heavily shaped by social interactions, norms, and institutions. The obvious 
target for social epistemologists is testimony, which is steeped in social mores and 
heavily influenced by power relations, assessments of authority and expertise, and 
prejudice. Testimony can be adversarial or collaborative, constructive or 
destructive—inevitably, social interactions and institutions inform the norms of 
testimony, how it is produced, and how it is taken up. For this reason, testimony has 
long been the bread and butter of social epistemologists. 
But if what I have said in this thesis is correct—and naturally, I am inclined to 
think it is—and if memory is not so different from testimony after all, and if the two 
interact with each other in ways that alter the beliefs each produces (the Mandela 
Effect being a case in point), then it is high time that social epistemologists turned 
their attention to the way that memory is knit into the same social fabric as 
testimony. Memory has long occupied a position on the pedestal of basic sources of 
knowledge, right alongside perception and reason. If we attend to the myriad ways 
in which social phenomena influence memory—whether that be through testimony 
integrated into memories, through the culturally specific ways of remembering, or 
through our credence in our own memories depending on our social location, just to 
name a few—we begin to see that memory, even garden-variety biological 
individual memory, is anything but the purely internal and individual process it has 
long been taken to be. I hope that this thesis can serve as a starting point for further 
steps toward understanding what this really means for us, not only as 
epistemologists, but as knowers.
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